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INTRODUCTION 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, 
the western defense lines of the Soviet Union/Russia were with-
drawn 700-1000 kilometers eastward. The border of Russia in the 
west between the Gulf of Finland and the Black Sea runs now 
roughly along the same lines as in the late sixteenth century. The 
Baltic area was then under the rule of Poland and Sweden. Russia 
took possession of the entire Baltic coastline down to Riga in 1721, 
in the reign of Peter the Great, and absorbed Baltic Lithuania in 
1795 (under Catherine the Great). 
In those days the Baltic area was important to Russia, a con-
tinental power building its fleet, seeking naval supremacy, and in 
need of a defensive zone around its new capital, St Petersburg. 
In more recent times, too, it is commonly said that the Baltic 
area has been a high priority in Russian/Soviet geopolitical think-
ing in Europe. But is this really so? Have the basic geopolitical 
factors remained unchanged since the era of Peter the Great? These 
are some of the questions this paper seeks to address. 
In the 1990s the relationships between the states in and 
around the Baltic region1 will have growing implications for Eu-
ropean security. Geopolitical changes in the area of the Baltic states 
have an impact on adjacent regions as well, including Denmark, 
Colonel Ari Puheloinen drafted this paper in 1996-97 while a Fellow at the 
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. Subsequently he served as 
the Secretary of the Finnish Defence Council. At present Colonel Puheloinen is 
the Commander of the Armoured Brigade. 
5 
Germany, Finland, Poland, Russia and Sweden. The implications 
of NATO's decisions on enlargement should be carefully consid-
ered. Recently it has become clear that the Baltic states will not be 
among the Alliance's first new members, contrary to their own 
wishes. There is fear among these states that they will be left in a 
grey zone, exposed to Russian pressure. If ignored, Baltic security 
concerns may have an unfavorable effect on the stability of East 
Central Europe, as well as in the Nordic regions. Hence it is neces-
sary that NATO's decisions about enlargement take into consider-
ation principles concerning the security of the Baltic countries. 
Russian sensitivities are mentioned among the reasons for 
NATO's reluctance to include the Baltic states in the first phase of 
the Alliance's enlargement. When the Baltic countries became in-
dependent, Russia/Soviet Union lost ports and air defense loca-
tions in the region. As NATO members, the Baltic states would 
influence the access to St Petersburg, and the Russian Kaliningrad 
exclave would be more deeply separated from Russia proper. Some 
Russian officials have warned that Russia would take countermeas-
ures if the Baltic countries were to join NATO, and in the mid-
1990's some made statements going so far as to hint at a Russian 
invasion.2 Subsequent developments in Russia and NATO-Russia 
relations have proved these warnings unrealistic in the contempo-
rary situation, but such statements reflect the importance of the 
region. 
Russia's geopolitical interests should not be ignored when 
the West makes crucial decisions, not only about NATO enlarge-
ment but also about the longer term. What are these interests? This 
study seeks to identify them and to provide a clear understanding 
of their possible impact on the Baltic security environment. The 
main questions addressed in this paper are: What does the area of 
the Baltic countries mean geopolitically to Russia at present? Are 
traditional perceptions of military security preponderant? What is 
the significance of economics? What means might Russia use in 
pursuing its geopolitical interests in the region? 
Several studies and articles written in the 1990s touch on 
Russia's interests in the Baltic region. In many of them, unfortu-
nately, very little attention is paid to the contemporary Russian 
geopolitical situation as a whole and the emphasis is often laid on 
military-strategic issues. Many commentators have seen the present 
situation solely in the light of Russian and Baltic history and have 
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assessed future developments as if they were merely a linear con-
tinuation of the past. In this paper I try to delineate the Russian 
geopolitical situation, assess the consequences of recent geopoliti-
cal changes as well as Russia's strategic alternatives, and deal with 
the Baltic situation in this framework. 
In this paper, Geopolitics means politics, considered in a geo-
graphical framework. Geopolitics is also the study of political phe-
nomena in their spatial relationship and in their relationship with 
the land as well as of those cultural factors which constitute the 
subject matter of human geography.3 In the practice of politics, ge-
opolitics is an angle of vision that takes into account the relation-
ship between geography and politics in diverse areas, such as for-
eign policy, trade policy, economy, military/ defense /security pol-
icy, etc. Geopolitical interests are political interests in which the rela-
tionship between geography and political issues is a decisive fac-
tor. Geopolitical interests can be identified in diverse areas of pol-
itics: for example, in foreign policy, trade policy, economic policy, 
military/defense/security policy, etc. This paper analyzes not only 
the basic geopolitical interests, but also factors that significantly 
affect geopolitical interests and/or can be used as means of pursu-
ing geopolitical interests. I would like to point out that I view geo-
political interests as subordinate to national interests. The latter is 
an overarching concept, of which geopolitical interests are an im-
portant part. I do not perceive geopolitics as the whole of foreign 
policy orientation, but instead as one aspect of it. 
In the first sections of the paper I deal with Russian and Sovi-
et geopolitics in general, analyze Russia's current situation and offer 
some observations on the historical context of the Baltic region in 
Russian geopolitics. I discuss Russia's contemporary and future 
geopolitical interests in the area of the Baltic states from the mili-
tary perspective and from the perspective of economics, foreign 
policy and politico-military questions. I also suggest a brief geos-
trategic analysis of the Baltic states' area and deal with the ques-
tion of the Russian diaspora in the Baltic countries. Sections dealing 
with Russian/Soviet geopolitics are fairly extensive, because a clear 
understanding of this dimension of Russian/Soviet history is a 
prerequisite for understanding the contemporary situation and the 
future. 
At the beginning of my research I asked myself whether the 
classical geopolitical theories' are adequate to interpret contem- 
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porary international developments. My observations support the 
ideas of some contemporary scholars on the need to add new in-
gredients to the classical geopolitical theories. So when discussing 
contemporary Russian geopolitics, I suggest some new ingredients 
for classical geopolitical analysis, leading to what I would call the 
new geopolitics."' Finally, I do not argue that Russia's foreign and 
security policy must follow the lines sketched in this paper. But I 
do argue that the matters I discuss are essential elements of Russia's 
international behavior and have to be taken into account when es-
timating its national interests. 
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1 GEOPOLITICS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF 
THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND 
THE SOVIET UNION 
From a geopolitical perspective, three periods can be distinguished 
in the evolution of the Russian/Soviet state. Before 1917 there was 
a 500-year period of continental expansion. It is estimated, for ex-
ample, that between the mid-sixteenth century and the late seven-
teenth century Russia conquered territory the size of the modern 
Netherlands every year for 150 years running.6 
The Soviet era clearly marks a second period of evolution, 
though the basic geopolitical trends did not significantly differ from 
those of the Russian Empire. The geopolitical code of the Soviet 
Union was a mixture of communist ideology and Russian expan-
sionism. The dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the end of 
the second and the beginning of the third evolutionary period, 
which has seen the most dramatic geopolitical changes in Russian/ 
Soviet history. But what were the main reasons for the historical 
expansion? Do these reasons persist into the present? What is Rus-
sia geopolitically today, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union? 
What is its place in the changed geopolitical situation? Seeking to 
answer these questions, one can identify several foreign policy 
positions within today's Russia. Among them some Western com-
mentators see a possibility of an emerging neo-imperial policy.' Is 
that possibility real? I address these questions in the following two 
sections. 
The Geopolitics of Russia before 1917 
In the seventh and eight centuries the Slavonic tribes inhabited 
territories now known as Belarus and Ukraine. Their neighbors to 
the north were the Baltic peoples, while the lands to the northeast 
were chiefly inhabited by Finnic tribes. In the eastern and south-
ern steppe lands lived nomadic peoples, mostly Bulgars, Khazars 
and Magyars. The main power center of that time was the Byzan-
tine Empire, with its capital in Constantinople. 
The Vikings controlled the Baltic Sea and developed a trade 
route from the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea. In the mid-ninth 
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century, probably the Vikings established Kievan Rus, a loose fed-
eration comprising the east Slav tribes. Kiev conquered the entire 
Volga river network and ruled from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Its 
western neighbors from the Gulf of Finland down to the Black Sea 
were Ests, Letts, Lithuanians, Prussians, Polish, Hungarians and 
Bulgarians. In the eleventh century Kievan Rus was the largest fed-
eration in Europe. In the mid-eleventh century, Kiev's ruler Yaro-
slavl divided the realm between his five sons, and in less than a 
hundred years the power of Kiev began to weaken. Taking advan-
tage of Russian divisiveness, the Tatars conquered Rus by the mid-
thirteenth century and dominated it for 250 years. 
The principality of Novgorod escaped invasion because its 
prince, Alexander Nevski, submitted voluntarily to Tatar rule. The 
policy of Alexander Nevski created preconditions for his son, Daniel 
to found the Muscovite dynasty, which reigned from 1274 to 1598. 
The rise and expansion of Muscovy was the nucleus and rallying 
point of the new Russian state and its expansion until the twenti-
eth century. During the sixteenth century, Russian expansion was 
directed primarily to the east. The way to the west was blocked by 
Lithuania and Sweden, denying access to the Baltic Sea. Kazan on 
the Volga, a Tatar stronghold was captured in 1552, which opened 
the way south to Astrakhan and the Central Urals and further to 
Siberia. Within a century after the fall of Kazan, Russians had bro-
ken through to the Pacific Ocean, 5000 kilometers to the east. In the 
seventeenth century, the focus of expansion was in the east and 
south. 
In the eighteenth century, Peter I (the Great) reversed Russia's 
eastern orientation, toward Europe. In Peter's era (1682-1725), Rus-
sia broke out into the Baltic Sea, annexed Estonia, Livonia, and 
areas of southeastern Finland, and later managed to get a foothold 
on the Black Sea for more than a decade. In the far East, Kamchat-
ka and the Kurile Islands were taken. Catherine II (the Great) con-
tinued the Russian expansion toward Europe. During her reign 
(1762-96), Lithuania, non-Slav Courland and Belorussia, as well as 
parts of Poland were annexed. For the first time in its history, Rus-
sia now shared common borders with Prussia and Austria, Russia's 
western border following the Niemen, Western Bug and Dniester 
rivers. Catherine also succeeded where Peter the Great had failed: 
in making Russia a Black Sea power (through access to the north-
ern shores in 1774 and the annexation of Crimea in 1783). 
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During the nineteenth century, the main direction of Russian 
expansion was southward, bringing the Caucasus and Central Asia 
under Russian domination. In Europe the Napoleonic wars brought 
Finland, most of ethnic Poland and Bessarabia into the fold by 1815. 
Russia's western expansion was, however, coming to an end. The 
humiliating defeat in the Crimean war of 1853-56, on Russia's own 
territory, was the final milestone in Russia's expansion in Europe. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, during its 500-year period of 
expansion, Russia had come up against the borders of the conti-
nent in the north and east; in the south it confronted rim of high 
mountains and the sphere of influence of the British Indian Em-
pire and shared the Black Sea with the Ottomans. Yet at the turn of 
the century Russia turned to the Far East, challenging Japan for 
influence on the Korean peninsula. The war against Japan (1904-
05) ended with Russia's defeat and loss of prestige in the world 
arena. 
At the beginning of World War I, Russia's goals included East 
Prussia, the Polish provinces of Germany and Austria, Galicia, Bu-
kovina, Bohemia, Slovakia, part of Hungary and the Turkish Straits. 
However, at the end of the war, the Brest-Litovsk peace-treaty of 
1918, negotiated by the Bolsheviks under pressure from all sides, 
stripped Russia of its western territories, including Ukraine, Esto-
nia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Polish core areas. Finland had sev-
ered its connections with Russia at the end of 1917. A dissolution 
seemed to be unavoidable in 1918-19, when Georgia and Armenia 
broke away and many others, including Tatars, various Cossack 
groups and Central Asian regions, tried to assert independence. 
But Russia soon regained its influence with the latter group. 
What were the reasons for Russia's expansionism and what 
were the methods applied? Undoubtedly, among the primary rea-
sons was the fact that the old Russia (and Muscovy as its nucleus) 
did not have natural or otherwise fixed boundaries. But that would 
explain only the expansion in the first centuries and is not a plau-
sible reason for expansion in regions where Russia met resistance. 
The Tatar rule partially explains the initial extension of influence. 
Against that background, the consolidation of Russian power was 
conducted using the same methods as in some European nation-
states. The rise of Muscovy and the growth of its domain over all 
of Russia were political developments. The Muscovite rulers used 
their Tatar overlords for improving their positions against all ri- 
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vals. As Muscovy strengthened, the liberation of other areas from 
Tatar domination gradually turned into conquest.' 
The thinly populated Eurasian plain simply encouraged ex-
pansion. The last Siberian khan was defeated in 1598, and little 
resistance was met on the way to the Pacific.9 For centuries, there 
was no competition in the drive eastward. Between Eastern Eu-
rope and the Pacific there was a vast no-man's-land, and to estab-
lish control over it was only a question of time.1° This vast and 
dispersed frontier, together with cultural differences within the 
empire made Russian frontiers relatively permeable. Throughout 
most of Russian history, the frontiers have been shifting and ill-
defined. There were many kinds of frontiers: the fur frontier in 
Siberia, the blockhouse and picket-line frontier of the southern 
steppe, the fishing and hunting frontier of the lower Volga, the gold 
frontier of the Altai, and the formal-treaty frontiers of Sweden and 
Poland in the west.11 
Strategic motives were secondary at the beginning, but they 
became more and more significant as time passed. During the first 
centuries of expansion there was occasionally a tendency to add 
strategic territory. The treeless steppes had to be guarded against 
nomads, and vague frontiers were an excuse to push the line of 
defense farther away. Later, space became a more significant factor 
in security. As later times were to prove, space saved Russia from 
the Poles in the seventeenth century, the Swedes in the eighteenth 
century, the French in the nineteenth century, and the Germans in 
the twentieth century. According to Wesson, religion also provid-
ed a weapon or excuse for the Russian expansion. "Heathen" Tatars 
and then "infidel" Turks were to be expelled: the enemy was al-
ways non-Orthodox, and there were often fellow Orthodox on the 
other side of the border to protect".12 The idea of bringing all Or-
thodox and Slays together into one state served as an ideological 
legitimation of expansion. 
Economic purposes, primarily the quest for furs, and the inse-
curity of the European district against Tatars were the main rea-
sons for Russian expansion into Siberia. The insecurity of the 
Ukrainian frontier against Crimean Tatars was the initial rationale 
for expanding into the Black Sea region, which implied fighting 
the Turks. Commercial and strategic challenges demanded expan-
sion in the Baltic region against Sweden and England. In Poland, 
the need for protection against attacks from the west was the 
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Russia's main geopolitical interest, and by possessing Warsaw, 
Russia for its part could threaten Berlin, Vienna and the northern 
regions." 
John P. LeDonne has developed a geopolitical model that ex-
plains the methods and goals of Russian foreign policy between 
1700 and 1917. Modifying the theories of Halford Mackinder, Al-
fred Mahan, Geoffrey Parker and Owen Lattimore, he suggests a 
geopolitical interpretation based on relations between the Heart-
land and the core areas. The Heartland consisted of a plain (cut 
only by the Ural Mountains) extending from the Baltic Sea in the 
west to the Enisei river in the east and from the Barents Sea in the 
north to the mountains of the Caucasus as well as the Plateau of 
Persia in the south. Four maritime basins were the main elements 
of the Heartland. One was the Arctic drainage watered by the Ob, 
the Enisei, the Lena and their tributaries, while the second was the 
continental drainage area consisting of the basin of the Caspian 
and Aral seas. The Black Sea was the third, including the Don, the 
Dnieper, the Danube and the Turkish Straits, and the Baltic Sea 
was the fourth drained by the Oder, the Wisla, and the Neva as 
well as the streams of Finland and Sweden.14  
Factors defining core areas were social and political organiza-
tion as well as the drive of an area for hegemony. LeDonne's core 
areas were Ile de France, Castile, Brandenburg, Austria, Muscovy, 
Turkish Straits, Sweden, Poland and Persia within the Heartland, 
as well as Britain, China and Japan in the Coastlands.15 The goal of 
Russian foreign policy was to reach the Heartland's periphery and 
in the long run, to project power from the Heartland's periphery 
into the Coastland. LeDonne crystallizes the process of Russian 
expansion as follows: The story of Russian expansion takes place 
against the background of slow but inexorable change in the bal-
ance of power within the Heartland. It is the story of a struggle 
between a rising Russia and declining core areas for the control of 
frontiers separating them; of a persistent attempt to destabilize, 
partition, and even annex those declining core areas in order 
eventually to occupy the entire Heartland. And it is the story of the 
determination of the Germanic and maritime powers to prevent 
that expansion from reaching the Heartland's periphery.//16 
LeDonne's analysis suggests that the internal dynamics of the Rus-
sian core was the main source of expansionism: i.e. Russia's desire 
to claim the powers of the surrounding Teutonic Order, Byzantine 
13 
Empire and Chingissid dynasty; the formation of a strong ruling 
class and the consolidation of serfdom; a political-religious ideolo-
gy; a search for contacts with the European Coastland in order to 
gain tools for Russia's modernization, and the drive for strategic 
superiority in the west and south.17 
Geography determined the routes and partially the objectives 
of Russia's expansion. Plains and rivers were channels for exten-
sion, and mountain ridges were obstacles strengthening contain-
ment by opposing forces. Efforts to gain access to warm-water ports 
became more and more a pressing need to meet strategic trade in-
terests. "Russians tried to close the narrow seas along the 
Heartland's periphery - the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Sea of 
Ohotsk - and create a ring fence to support a fortress-fleet strate-
gy18 capable of protecting their shores not only against a naval at-
tack but also against a political presence by maritime powers that 
would inevitably carry subversive ideas".19 In terms of geography, 
reaching the Heartland's periphery could be a source of both 
strength and weakness. Since the periphery allows access to the 
Heartland at several points, Russian/Soviet geography can be a 
strength or a weakness, depending on politico-military conditions.2° 
Expansion created resistance among the Coastland powers. 
Prussia (Germany), Britain and France were the main opposing 
forces on the western frontiers. Britain and the Ottoman Empire 
imposed containment in the south, while China (ever since the late 
seventeenth century) and Japan were the main eastern containing 
powers. During the first quarter of the eighteenth century, Russia 
was able to establish its superiority on the western frontiers, and 
only the combined efforts of two core areas (Prussia with British 
back-up) were sufficient to contain its expansion by the 1760s. But 
Russia still advanced, and later through the Napoleonic wars it 
managed to reach its main geopolitical goal in the western fron-
tiers: to establish Russian influence in the Heartland's periphery 
from Scandinavia (where the Kjolen mountains were the next ob-
stacle) to the Dinaric Alps in the Balkans.21  
On the southern and eastern frontiers, expansion allowed 
Russia at the close of the eighteenth century to project power into 
the Coastlands (in the Mediterranean, Caucasus, Pacific regions) 
for the first time in its history. In the 1860s Russia entered the zone 
between the inner and outer periphery on its southeastern fron-
tiers as well as in the Far East, and reached the Heartland's periph- 
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ery there in 1907.22 The resistance of the Coastland powers turned 
stronger, particularly in the 1850s, when a sea-power coalition was 
for the first time engaged in war against Russia,23 as well as in the 
1870s, when the combined German and Austrian efforts, together 
with those of Britain and Japan along the Heartland's periphery, 
constituted a global containment policy. Despite repercussions in 
the first years of the twentieth century, Russia still managed to 
improve positions on its southern and eastern frontiers, through 
the partitions of Manchuria and Persia with Japan and Britain in 
1907.24 In World War I, Russia was to consolidate its position on 
the Heartland's periphery. The collapse of the Russian core area in 
the Bolshevik Revolution eventually brought these plans to an end, 
which meant the victory of the containment policy of the oppos-
ing powers. 
For two hundred years before World War I, Russia had fo-
cused its expansion on the Heartland's periphery, trying to reach a 
domain that LeDonne calls the ideal line of an optimum conquest. 
How large should this domain be? Does the Russian failure in World 
War I give any ground for asking, where the line of an optimum of 
conquest should run? Undoubtedly Russia's plans marked were 
overly ambitious. The decline and fall of empires generally depends 
on a discrepancy between their geopolitical goals and their politi-
cal resources. LeDonne points out the initial geopolitical rationale: 
"A line of an optimum of conquest had to run within the Heart-
land along a political isobar equalizing the pressure of Russian 
energies with the resistance of core areas guarding the landward 
approaches to the periphery, supported by the Coastland powers 
guarding those on the seaward. Such an isobar had been created in 
the eastern Baltic after 1815 between Russian pressures and An-
glo-Swedish resistance and, by the beginning of this century, be-
tween German pressures and Russian resistance."" 
The Geopolitics of the Soviet Union 
In the international relations of the Soviet Union, an interaction 
between ideology and classical geopolitics was predominant. The 
intensity and models of interaction have varied, depending on in-
ternational situations and the capabilities of the Soviet Union. Al-
though in the 1920s geopolitics was declared to be a bourgeois pseu-
do-science, the foreign policy of the Soviet leaders was in practice 
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based on clear geopolitical calculations, albeit disguised often in 
declarations about class interests and ideology.26 The Soviet Union 
applied a wide array of classical geopolitical postulates, from the 
concept of control over space to the idea of a state as a geographi-
cal organism striving for a maximum increase of its power. 
Konstantin Pleshakov has identified three models of interac-
tion between geopolitics and ideology in general. The first model 
is called reciprocal generating (vzaimogenerirovanie). In this model 
the geopolitical factors and ideological motives continuously 
strengthen each other, and neither of them can exist without the 
other. Reciprocal reduction (vzaimogashenie) is a second model, in 
which the ideological and geopolitical standpoints are inseparable 
but eliminate each other's expansionary components. This model 
results in a tendency to maintain the status quo. A third model is 
the dominance of geopolitics over ideology (dominirovanie geopoli-
tiki nad ideologiei). It may appear when there is no direct influence 
by ideology in international relations?' 
Since the sixteenth century, the territorial expansion of Russia 
was doctrinally confirmed through an alliance between the Rus-
sian state and the Orthodox church. But the state doctrine began to 
approach ideology only during the second half of the nineteenth 
century. At the turn of the century, four tendencies were compet-
ing for the upper hand: Slavophilism, liberalism, nationalism, and 
a revolutionary ideology with a strong component of Marxism.28 
During the Bolshevik Revolution, there were high expecta-
tions in Russia of a rapid worldwide revolution of the proletariat. 
Until around 1920, Lenin tried to place ideology above geopoli-
tics,29 believing that geopolitics would not be needed in a world-
wide classless and borderless society. The Brest-Litovsk peace was 
to serve only as a breathing spell before the upcoming new wave 
of revolution. But when expectations of a rapid worldwide revolu-
tion proved unfounded, Soviet Russia soon began to resume clas-
sical geopolitics, concluding the Rapallo Treaty with Germany in 
1922. The goal of eventual worldwide revolution generated Soviet 
endeavors to enhance state control over space, and the need for 
control generated ideology. From the early 1920s until the late 1980s, 
reciprocal generating was the relation between ideology and geo-
politics in the Soviet Union. The geopolitical success of the Soviet 
Union was to promote the ideological progress of the worldwide 
revolution, and the expansion of communist ideology into new 
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areas would strengthen the position of the Soviet Union.3° 
In their first years in power, the Bolsheviks recovered one af-
ter another of the areas that had separated from the former tsarist 
empire in 1918-1919, including Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and 
Mongolia. Only Finland, the Baltic states and Poland managed to 
maintain their independence. The geopolitical phase that followed 
the early 1920s in the Soviet Union could be called a phase of con-
solidation. In the late 1920s the Soviet Union turned inward and 
until the late 1930s did not significantly expand its direct control 
over space. But Moscow tried to extend indirect geopolitical con-
trol abroad. After the failure of revolution in Western countries, 
Communist parties in them were directed not to make revolution 
but to weaken the state. Seeking and creating ideological partners 
abroad, Moscow interfered in the internal politics of other coun-
tries. Stalin was not interested in the victory of Communism in 
other countries unless he could control it. In both China and Spain, 
the Soviet Union tried to make a geopolitical breakthrough. In Spain 
it failed due to international geopolitical rivalry, but in China the 
Soviet Union managed to establish geopolitical control points in 
the northern "liberated" regions.31  
The rise of Germany caused a change in the geopolitical out-
look of the Soviet Union in 1934. The expansion of Russia and the 
mission of international communism had been bound together 
through Komintern already in the 1920s. In the 1930s, the Russifica-
tion of minority areas, set back in the 1920s, was resumed. Stalin 
reverted to nationalism, bringing back much of the old Russia. In 
the mid-1930s the USSR entered international power politics more 
actively than ever before, seeking security and advantages in the 
traditional balance-of-power mode, by combination with one side 
or the other.32 The pact with Germany in August 1939 rendered a 
Soviet geopolitical breakthrough possible in Eastern Europe, and 
the USSR could regain most of the territories the Russian Empire 
had lost at World War I on its western frontiers - the Baltic states, 
part of Poland, Bessarabia and some territories in Finland.33 
Ideology played a secondary role in the geopolitical break-
through in Eastern Europe. In the reciprocal relation between the 
Soviet ideology and geopolitics, the latter dominated. So the ex-
tension of control over space was not based on ideological expan-
sion. The assumption of ideological control over the Baltic states, 
Belorussia and Western Ukraine was begun only after the annexa- 
17 
tion of these territories.34 The Soviet Union behaved like any state 
with its own interests. Non-ideological motives were reflected also 
in official declarations. Molotov defended the Soviet-German pact 
on grounds of national interest, without any linkage to the prole-
tariat. The annexation of parts of Poland was explained on tradi-
tional ethnic grounds and the Baltic states were forced to admit 
Soviet forces for strategic reasons and because they had earlier been 
a part of the Empire.35 
The Second World War weakened the role of ideology in the 
Soviet geo-ideological paradigm. In its territorial expansion, the 
USSR achieved after World War II approximately what Russia had 
been striving for in World War I. Throughout the Second World 
War, the Soviet Union had taken maximum advantage of its alli-
ances, first with Germany and later with the United States and the 
United Kingdom against Germany. As in 1939-1941, Soviet mili-
tary conquests in Eastern Europe were reinforced by an ideologi-
cal transformation of the subordinate societies. Once again, it ap-
pears that Stalin's geopolitics was based not on faith in the inter-
national proletariat, but on expanding the domain controlled by 
the Soviet Union.36 
In the aftermath of World War II, the relation between ideolo-
gy and geopolitics took the form of reciprocal generating in a bipo-
lar world politics setting.37 The geopolitical relation between the 
Soviet Union and the United States was a stalemate in which the 
Soviet Union, as a continental power, was not able to undermine 
the American dominance of the seas and the United States, as a 
maritime power, could not reduce the total geopolitical field38 of 
the Soviet Union. The continental power was invulnerable to the 
maritime power and vice-versa. A conflict would have been possi-
ble only in the border fields of these powers.39 
In the early 1950s, two major developments affected the Sovi-
et geopolitics. First, both the Soviet Union and the United States 
had become capable of waging nuclear war; and second, with 
Stalin's death in 1953, totalitarianism evolved into authoritarian-
ism in the Soviet regime.° Nuclear warfare capabilities radically 
changed the possibilities of controlling space by military means 
and undermined the security of the territorial state. The evolution 
of nuclear missiles shattered the impenetrability of geographical 
boundaries and made the entire Soviet Union vulnerable to attacks. 
"Natural boundaries", buffer zones and geographical space as a 
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strategic asset lost much of their politico-military value, even 
though later developments proved that territorial control through 
nuclear weapons would not be concretely realized.'" 
Under Khrushchev the foreign relations of the Soviet Union 
were reshaped. Among Khrushchev's first premises was the con-
ception of "Peaceful Coexistence," according to which the world 
should be converted to socialism without war, through evolution 
or parliamentary processes. Another premise was the inadmissi-
bility of nuclear war. The Soviet Union took many conciliatory steps, 
including the settlement with Austria and Yugoslavia, and the re-
nunciation of the Porkkala base in Finland. But expansive steps 
were taken, too. Wesson argues that the strategy applied by the 
Soviet Union was the old Russian one of expanding in Asia (or the 
less developed nations in general) to draw strength to fight the 
West. Concurrently with "Peaceful Coexistence," the Soviet Union 
began in 1955, coinciding with the withdrawal of the Western pow-
ers from their former colonial empires, to offer economic and po-
litical cooperation to the less advanced nations of Asia and Africa. 
It was hoped in the USSR that those countries would first become 
neutral in the East-West conflict and then shift into the group of 
socialist countries led by the Soviet Union. That strategy had little 
success, since the potential new partners were wary of Soviet di-
rection. The hoped-for fusion of Eastern Europe did not occur ei-
ther. Economic growth was disappointing, and there were centrif-
ugal moves that led to a hardening of the Soviet line.42 
Ensuring the Soviet Union's military security and consoli-
dating Soviet power in Eastern Europe seem to have been the pri-
mary geopolitical objectives during the Khrushchev era. The sign-
ing of a German peace treaty consolidating the division of Germa-
ny was a first priority, together with preventing Germany from 
acquiring nuclear weapons. According to Adam Ulam's analysis, 
the Cuban missile crisis was a Soviet attempt to extort concessions 
from the West, including acquiescence in the aforementioned So-
viet aims.43 Konstantin Pleshakov's analysis suggests that the role 
of ideology in the Soviet geo-ideological paradigm was declining 
throughout all the Khrushchev era. In 1953-1958 the decline of ide-
ology was a tendency; in 1958-1962 it was an experimental policy; 
and after 1962 it was a permanent foreign policy line through the 
late 1980s. The role of geopolitics was constantly growing44 (though 
Pleshakov can be criticized for oversimplifying the trend, since 
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Brezhnev emphasized ideology in foreign policy after the Czecho-
slovakian crisis of 1968). 
Under Brezhnev the policy of the Soviet Union became more 
conservative. Where Khrushchev had counted on economic ties to 
effect the fusion of Eastern Europe, Brezhnev focused on military 
unity through the Warsaw Treaty Organization. In Europe the so-
called Brezhnev Doctrine was adopted, meaning limited sovereign-
ty within the socialist commonwealth. Toward the Third World in 
the Brezhnev era, military assistance was offered rather than, as 
formerly, economic ties. Khrushchev had drastically reduced Sovi-
et military power, but under Brezhnev the armed forces were stead-
ily built up. The Soviet Union continued to create geopolitical con-
trol points in Eurasia, extending its influence to Vietnam and Laos, 
which were located within the Chinese total geopolitical field. The 
USSR supported North Vietnam's effort to expand its total geopo-
litical field as a counterbalance to China. In Africa efforts were made 
to extend the Soviet sphere of influence, especially in Angola and 
Mozambique (in 1975), in Ethiopia (in 1978), and in several other 
countries, including South Yemen and Benin, which generally fol-
lowed the Soviet lead though they may not have been fully Marx-
ist-Leninist in their governing structures.45  
Geopolitical relations between the USSR and the USA were 
dominated by military issues. The 1970s was a decade of détente, 
which was launched at the Moscow summit in 1972 when the Unit-
ed States accepted the Soviet Union as an equal superpower. How-
ever, the intentions and expectations of the superpowers diverged, 
and détente vanished in the end of 1979 at the latest, when the Sovi-
et Union invaded Afghanistan.46 The invasion led to counteractions 
taken by the United States, China and many Western countries. 
The Soviet Union came under strong geopolitical pressure, e.g. from 
the United States regarding the deployment of intermediaterange 
nuclear weapons in Europe, but also in the field of arms control as 
well as through enlarged US security cooperation with Japan and 
China. Developments in Poland in 1979-1981 foreshadowed inter-
nal weakening of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and its disinte-
gration ten years later. 
Later in the 1980s the triangle of the United States, China and 
the Soviet Union also began to shift when China initiated a gradu-
al settlement of relations with the Soviet Union, without a the par-
ticipation of the United States. After 1978 the geopolitical triangle 
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had been directed toward the Soviet Union, and China wished to 
balance it. The Soviet Union, for its part, wanted to undermine 
American-Chinese geopolitical co-operation, perceiving it as a 
source of pressure against the Soviet Union. China's terms were 
clear: the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan and 
the Soviet-Chinese border, as well as the withdrawal of Vietnam-
ese troops from Cambodia. From the Soviet perspective, to admit 
those terms while under pressure in the West was considered im-
possible, but it was deemed doable together with similar changes 
in the global geopolitical system47 This connection bound the Eu-
ropean, Asian and Central Asian dimensions of Soviet geopolitics 
together. 
Up to and through the 1980s, Russia as the core of the Soviet 
Union had created four geopolitical circles around itself. The fourth 
(outermost) circle involved comparatively new acquisitions, mainly 
developing countries that had been brought into the Soviet orbit, 
socialist countries geographically far away, namely China, Cuba, 
and Yugoslavia, and the easternmost countries of the West co-op-
erating with the Soviet Union, including Finland. This circle was 
heterogenous, unstable, and did not make up a connected zone. 
The third circle comprised mainly the socialist countries of East-
ern, Central and Southeastern Europe, and Asia. This was a stable 
and geopolitically important zone. The second circle consisted of 
the Soviet Republics, the territories of which earlier belonged to 
the tsarist empire. The first (innermost) zone encompassed auton-
omous entities of different levels, from republics to areas (okrug) 
within Russia proper. This circle involved several solid blocks of 
areas with concentrations of strategic natural resources.48 However, 
in the 1980s it became clear that the Soviet Union was experienc-
ing growing difficulties in maintaining its military, political, tech-
nological, and economic security in countering a tendency toward 
disintegration within its sphere of influence. 
The third circle disintegrated from 1989 on. The dissolution of 
its main bonds, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance, along with the unification of Ger-
many, changes in economic relations and the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops, eventually broke this circle. The fourth (outermost) circle 
also disintegrated very soon after some of its elements had taken 
their distance from the USSR and others lost Soviet support. The 
second circle was dissolved in 1991, but its uncontrolled disinte- 
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gration had begun already in 1989, when the Soviet Republics start-
ed gaining sovereignty/independence. The first (innermost) cir-
cle, the autonomies, have improved their status in the administra-
tive hierarchy and some have claimed independence. Their con-
frontation with the Russian center resembles the earlier confronta-
tion between the Soviet Republics and the Soviet Union. The first 
circle contains more than half the territory of the Russian Federa-
tion but only 18 percent of the population, of which 60 percent are 
not ethnic aboriginal.49 The way these claims for independence are 
settled, may set the direction of future developments within the 
first circle. 
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2 THE GEOPOLITICS OF RUSSIA AFTER 
THE DISINTEGRATION OF 
THE SOVIET UNION 
In the twentieth century, ideology was twice placed above geopol-
itics in Russia (Soviet Russia). The first time was in 1917-1920. The 
second was in 1991-1993, when the integration of Russia into the 
West was the main goal of Russian foreign policy." However, by 
the end of 1993 it was widely perceived in Russia that more had 
been conceded to the West than had been gained in return and also 
that the attempt to radically marketize the Russian economy was 
linked to this foreign policy.51 It was then concluded that the state 
of affairs left Russia no apparent choice but to reconstitute its great 
power status as well as its statehood" 52 
In addition to the officially abandoned pro-West position, at 
least three other foreign policy positions can be identified in Rus-
sia. A group that could be called moderate conservatives, repre-
senting mainly institutional forces like the military high command, 
industrial managers and the main sectors of federal bureaucracy, 
thinks that Russia should avoid undue dependence on the West 
and develop its sphere of influence, especially in the "near abroad". 
A group of moderate liberals puts emphasis on pragmatism and is 
seeking a foreign policy based on a realistic assessment of Russia's 
national interests. A third orientation, pursued by the radical left 
and right, advocates a rebuilding of the superpower status of the 
country, by military means if necessary.53 In the debate on foreign 
policy positions, geopolitical considerations are widespread in 
Russia.54 Some even consider that the previous ideological con-
flicts have been replaced by a struggle for spheres of geopolitical 
influence." 
One reason for the rise of geopolitics in Russia would seem to 
be the availability of space for new ideas after the communist ide-
ological monopoly. The need to consolidate the new state, define 
its spheres of interest, and adjust Russian foreign policy to the 
changed situation are certainly other important causes." A com-
mon theme among Russian geopoliticians is the call for a reform of 
classical geopolitics, while maintaining its core. This theoretical 
reform is justified with changes in the physical environment and 
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by new emphases in the behavior of states, as well as by the in-
creased significance in world politics of factors that do not have a 
direct connection with the physical environment. 
Contemporary Theoretical Aspects of Geopolitics in Russia 
Konstantin Sorokin's analysis identifies three historical phases in 
geopolitics. The first phase was the evolution of classical geopoli-
tics up to World War II. The post-war era was a second phase, dur-
ing which no significant evolution in Western geopolitics took place 
because of the relatively stable world order and positive develop-
ments in East-West relations. Nevertheless, some new ingredients 
were suggested. In 1977 Colin Gray proposed understanding geo-
politics as the relation of international political power to the geo-
graphical setting," exploring the relation of the physical environ-
ment, as perceived, molded, and utilized by men, to international 
politics57. This reflected a less deterministic and more realistic ap-
proach but did not lead to a further reform of geopolitics. Sorokin 
goes so far as to see the failure of the West in foreseeing the col-
lapse of the USSR as a crisis of Western geopolitics in the late 1980s. 
In the third phase, Russian geopoliticians call for geopolitics tai-
lored to Russian needs and serving Russian security interests. The 
ideas of reform presented by Pleshakov, Razuvaev and Sorokin 
seem to coincide widely with ideas put forward by some western 
scholars/58 though they all may not be previously unheard of. Many 
new proposals are in fact old, but their forms and emphases have 
varied in different eras.59 
Sorokin calls for an identification of new factors in geopoliti-
cal analysis and in the evaluation of states' and groupings' geopo-
litical authority, as well as geopolitical factors that are losing or 
changing their previous significance. A new fundamental geopol-
itics could analyze developments not only at the global but also at 
regional, sub-regional and inter-state levels, embracing the total 
play of interests of a state and covering combinations of divergent, 
parallel and intersecting processes.6° 
Emphasizing new factors in a geopolitical analysis does not 
mean neglecting geography or the core of classical geopolitics. The 
purpose is to supplement geographical factors with the other geo-
political ingredients of today's world and to re-evaluate the rela-
tive importance of these factors. One of the preponderant geopo- 
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litical factors today is economics. Its significance is growing both 
at inter- and intra-state levels. Any analysis of the contemporary 
international situation must include economic factors. The relations 
between the economy and the environment are changing. If for-
merly the physical environment profoundly affected the economy, 
today the economy also profoundly affects the environment. Now-
adays the links between the economy, state sovereignty and exter-
nal economic influences are stronger than formerly, and globaliza-
tion enhances the geographical scale of interaction. The growing 
dynamism of worldwide economic processes carries the risk of 
geopolitical instability. Discussing the growing importance of eco-
nomics, Pleshakov suggests replacing the classical postulate of con-
flict between the continental Center and the maritime Periphery 
with a revisionist idea of the economic and political interdepend-
ence of these elements." 
The information revolution is a significant new geopolitical 
factor. Historically it can be compared with the invention of print-
ing, steam power and electrification. A country's information ca-
pabilities may promote or hinder its integration into global mar-
kets and institutions.62 Information capabilities can also confer stra-
tegic advantages. The geopolitical significance of information in 
Russia's case follows from the country's vast territory and the need 
for international communications as a prerequisite of the country's 
economic growth. But so far Russia remains far behind the devel-
oped countries in these respects. 
Sorokin has identified other new geopolitical factors: the lev-
el of evolution in natural sciences, especially in regard to new tech-
nologies affecting economy and military developments; a policy 
making stratum capable of identifying optimal strategies of na-
tional development and rational geopolitical behavior; the general 
level of culture and civilization; the usability and capabilities of 
the armed forces; the influence of world religions; and the effec-
tiveness and internal stability of the political regime, respect for 
the law, and the legitimacy and competence of the leadership.63 
 
A number of changes have taken place in the military aspects 
of geopolitics. The development of military technologies in the 
areas of destruction and detection, command and control, manoeu-
vrability, transport of troops, weapons of mass destruction, con-
ventional forces, and long-range weapon systems, have under-
mined the traditional geopolitical postulate of spatial invulnera- 
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bility. Regions once considered invulnerable have become vulner-
able. These changes have reduced the geopolitical significance of 
geographical factors like space and distance, forests, mountains, 
rivers, seas and oceans as determinants of economic activity, pro-
tection against attacks, and routes of expansion. For example, the 
Arctic region can be used for hostile penetration into Russia as a 
result of evolution in aerospace, missile, and air technologies. Rail-
roads and sea connections have lost a part of their traditional geo-
political importance due to the evolution of air and road transpor-
tation capabilities and the use of pipelines in strategic oil and gas 
delivery, etc.64 
Some argue that the geopolitical significance of military force 
may increase in the future as a result of growing political, ethno- 
religious, ecological and other tensions between global and regional 
powers and their allies. Numerous peace-support operations as 
well as continuous threats of military force (Iraq, Northern Korea, 
former Yugoslavia) suggest this possibility. Thus the size and par-
ticularly the quality of armed forces could once again become a 
prior concern of states. An increasing use of multinational military 
forces as geopolitical arbitrators in regional and intra-state con-
flicts should also be noted." 
Population factors are constantly affecting growth rates, food 
supply, migrations, expansion, and the environment. In Russia, for 
example, population growth is declining, especially in the vital 
regions east of the Urals. On the other hand, the importance of 
small countries which possess considerable scientific, fiscal, or tech-
nological advantages, is growing." 
The forms of control over geographical space have changed 
over the decades. Physical forms of control are more sophisticated 
and new means of non-physical control have been introduced. 
Missile, communications, and surveillance technologies have im-
proved: for example, all the globe is now controllable from space. 
Pleshakov has identified the following dimensions of geopolitical 
control: political, economic, military, civilizational, ideological, com-
munications-related, demographic, information-related and phys- 
ical control. Traditional geopolitical concepts of control remain 
valid, however. For example, nuclear missiles have remained po-
litical weapons and never became a means of direct physical con-
trol over geographical space.67 
Geopolitical expansion is adopting new forms as well. Tradi- 
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tionally expansion meant territorial gains or the establishment of 
politico-military spheres of influence. Recently, however, many con-
flicts have emerged from territorial disputes but have remained at 
low levels of intensity because the oppressing parties have not been 
willing to solve them by military means, given the unpredictabili-
ty of the defender's and the world community's reactions, eco-
nomic as well as military. In the future the likelihood of high-in-
tensity territorial expansion may grow because of competition for 
natural resources and geopolitical expansion may include infor-
mation-related, civilizational, religious, ethno-religious, political 
(including pressure, sanctions, isolation, etc.) and economic dimen-
sions." 
Russian geopoliticians question the concept of confrontation 
between the Heartland and the rest of the world, because it reflects 
bipolarity and a static setting while the contemporary world is 
polycentric, multistructured and changing. Sorokin suggests that 
there will be no exact zones of confrontation between geopolitical 
poles, though most areas will have their centers of gravity. Geopo-
litical poles may converge and collaborate, though there will still 
be grounds for conflict. He also notes that a multistructured geo-
political setting implies more risks of misjudgments than the earli-
er, more static situation. It is worth noting that Russian geopoliti-
cians' polycentric picture of world shares common features with 
LeDonne's geopolitical model of the Heartland and core areas." 
The purpose of this section is not to provide a comprehensive 
analysis but rather an overview of contemporary geopolitical dis-
cussion in Russia. It seems that Russian scholars tend to blur the 
distinction between geopolitical views and general views of for-
eign policy. So to some degree the relation of geopolitical theories 
to Russia's foreign policy remains ambiguous. In my opinion, geo-
politics can hardly be a substitute for a foreign policy line, but it 
can produce ingredients for the application of diverse foreign-pol-
icy positions.7° Accordingly, an analysis of Russia's geopolitical sit-
uation cannot be tightly bound to any particular foreign policy 
course. The reform of geopolitics suggested by Russian scholars 
seems to maintain the core of classical geopolitics. Some judgments 
are clearly exaggerated, e.g. the abandonment of geographical de-
terminism. In my opinion, geographical determinism, to a degree, 
remains valid even today. Geography may not determine what kind 
of policy should be pursued, but it provides some basic constraints 
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and possibilities. For example, geography determines the vitality 
of the eastern, western and southern political directions for Russia 
while the northern regions are less emphasized because of their 
geographical location at the Arctic Ocean. 
The Contemporary Geopolitical Situation of Russia 
Russia's contemporary geopolitical situation is unstable. The coun-
try is still recovering from the consequences of the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. Developments in the democratization of society 
and in political structures are positive, but Russia's international 
position is ambiguous and the basic lines of foreign policy are un-
certain, which makes it difficult to predict Russia's international 
behavior and its geopolitical code. In 1997, the national security 
concept was approved and the foundation of the military doctrine 
and a military reform were defined. In what follows, despite the 
difficulties in determining the status of basic variables, I will try to 
delineate Russia's contemporary geopolitical situation, assess its 
geopolitical interests and speculate about future developments. 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia's share of 
the former superpower was three quarters of the territory, half the 
population, 60 percent of national wealth and gross national prod-
uct (including two-thirds of industry and 45 percent of agricultur-
al production), 70 percent of exports, and 85 percent of the armed 
forces. The share of Ukraine was 2.7 percent of the territory and 
15-22 percent of GNP, while that of Kazakhstan was 12 percent of 
the territory and 3-7 percent of GNP. Russia is the largest country 
in the world in territory and the sixth largest in population.71 In 
some respects, contemporary Russia is physically a reduced copy 
of the Soviet Union. It is not self-evident that Russia could be called 
a global power. For the Russians, nevertheless, great-power status 
(velikaia derzhava) has always been very important. 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia lost three of 
the four geopolitical circles it had created around the Russian core 
area over the centuries. Its total geopolitical field72 no longer ex-
tended beyond the borders of the Russian Federation. It does not 
have total political or military control over the former Soviet Re-
publics, nor does it control the Russian diaspora. On the contrary, 
some former Soviet Republics have been able to exercise partial 
economic control over Russian space on the basis of economic in- 
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terdependencies inherited from the Soviet economic system. 
Along its perimeter from the northeastern frontiers of Esto-
nia to Donbass, to Crimea and the northern areas of Kazakhstan, 
Russia is surrounded by geopolitical cross fields73 which contain 
high conflict potential. Russia has been able to maintain partial 
economic, demographic, civilizational and communications con-
trol in the former Soviet Republics. Russia is the main supplier of 
oil and gas in the territory of the former Soviet Union, and there 
are twenty-five million ethnic Russians living in the former Soviet 
Republics.74 
A number of questions have arisen about Russia's borders. In 
the north Russia has controversies with Norway over delimitation 
of the Arctic waters and the rich natural resources of the sea bot-
tom. In the Baltic Sea region Russia has not signed border agree-
ments with Latvia and Estonia. Turmoil simmers on the frontiers 
in North and South Caucasus, and in the Far East the question of 
the Kurile Islands shadows Russo-Japanese relations. Although the 
border with Kazakhstan is stable, the volatile situation in Central 
Asia imposes security threats and makes Russian trade communi-
cations there subject to disturbances. Borders have a new role within 
the territory of the former Soviet Union. If earlier they were main-
ly administrative, they are now frontiers between new states. But 
the locations of ethnic populations and the use of land do not al-
ways coincide with the new borders. Hence, from a Russian per-
spective, transparency of borders within the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States (CIS) would be of utmost importance. It would 
diminish problems, prevent conflicts, promote cohesion and allow 
a wider Russian influence in the former Soviet republics. The fact 
that Russia has assumed the responsibility for guarding the outer 
borders of all CIS states (except Azerbaidjan) reflects the signifi-
cance of these interests. The disputable border issues absorb polit-
ical energy and render economic activities difficult, but in some 
cases the situation may provide Russia with opportunities to pur-
sue security interests by balancing between neighboring states. 
Russia's activities in conjunction with the crises in Abhaziia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh are a clear example of this. South Caucasus and 
Central Asian border areas contain the most serious risks from 
Russia's national security perspective. 
Communication channels have profoundly changed. Russia's 
access to oceans is more limited than that of the Soviet Union. There 
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are three main seaports in the northern waters: Murmansk, Arch-
angel and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii, and one or two large ports 
in each of the other directions: Vladivostok and Nahodka in the 
Far East, Novorossiisk on the Black Sea, St Petersburg and the Ka-
liningrad exclave on the Baltic Sea. Since most of the previous So-
viet Black Sea and Baltic Sea ports were lost, contemporary port 
capacity is insufficient for Russia's international contacts. Novo-
rossiisk, Murmansk and Kaliningrad are the only ports ice-free all 
year that are available for European connections!' In the future, 
due to its limited access to the Baltic Sea and Black Sea, Russia's 
policies toward these regions will obviously be active. This imbal-
ance of needs and possibilities may result in constant tensions be-
tween Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic states. 
In terms of land communications, Russia is even more isolat-
ed than by sea. The so-called "Carpathian bulge," where the bor-
ders and communications of several countries come together, is 
now beyond Russia, although a junction at Briansk might replace 
it!' A poor infrastructure renders domestic communications diffi-
cult. Due to the bad state of roads, for example, the average speed 
of trucks in Russia is only one-third of that in developed countries, 
and 75 percent of road construction allowances are used for repair-
ing roads.77 The greatest change, nevertheless, is that the majority 
of Russia's land communications with Western Europe now tran-
sit several countries, which makes them more expensive than for-
merly and subject to disturbances. The risk of an energy crisis or a 
breakdown of communications in Belarus together with the vul-
nerability of trade connections via the Baltic Sea would nearly iso-
late Russia from its western contacts. Russia has direct transporta-
tion communications by land with European countries beyond the 
CIS only in two areas: with Poland through the Kaliningrad en-
clave and with Finland and Norway through northwestern Rus-
sia!' The importance of Northern Europe as an international com-
munication channel for Russia has grown and may grow further if 
Russia begins to exploit the huge energy resources of the Arctic 
Ocean. Russia's communications beyond the CIS are highly de-
pendent on geography. In the future, the commercial significance 
of sea communications will likely grow at the expense of land com-
munications. In the long run, however, this may change, if west-
ernizing economies of East Central European countries makes 
Russia's access to Western markets physically easier. 
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In telecommunications, computerization and information sys-
tems Russia remains far behind the developed countries. Russia 
inherited from the Soviet Union eleven hundred international tel-
ephone lines with one switching center, while a hundred thousand 
lines for international communications would be required by the 
year 2000. It is estimated that an investment of sixty billion US 
dollars in the Russian telecommunications system would be nec-
essary to raise it to the international level. In its level of telecom-
munications, Russia is rated forty-first in the world, falling at least 
15-20 years behind the Western countries. In computerization Rus-
sia falls behind not only the developed countries but also the new-
ly industrialized countries, being rated thirty-fourth in the world 
in the number of computers per person. The lack of a national com-
puter network is a grave defect, even though there are developed 
information networks in some areas.79 Since the major backward-
ness of telecommunications and nationwide computer systems is 
in infrastructure, it is unlikely that significant improvements will 
occur in the near future. 
Russia's geopolitical power is diminishing in a number of ar-
eas. Industrial and agricultural production is falling, infrastruc-
ture deteriorates, taxes are not collected, salaries are not paid, and 
the population is becoming destitute. By the end of 1995, the gross 
domestic product had fallen 34 percent from the level of 1991. In 
1996 industrial input was 40 percent of the country's economic 
activity, while it was 75 percent in the 1980s." In industry more 
than 40 percent and in transport 60 percent of enterprises are un-
profitable. In 1996 only 16 percent of companies and organizations 
were without serious tax trespasses and 34 percent did not pay 
taxes at all. From 1991 to 1995 grain production dropped 45 per-
cent. Russia is fortieth in the world in per capita food consump-
tion.81 About 23 percent of the population live below the poverty 
line (the officially designated subsistence line is equivalent to 75 
USD per month). When interpreting statistics, it should be noted 
that in the Soviet era statistical figures painted a more positive pic-
ture than the reality, while in post-Soviet times a great deal of eco-
nomic activity takes place beyond statistics. Hence, mere statisti-
cal figures give an excessively gloomy picture of the magnitude of 
the change. The economic crisis may perhaps be considered as a 
short-term difficulty, but there are other factors that may be more 
destructive in the long run, namely demographic developments. A 
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population deficit is threatening Russia. The number and quality 
of population is decreasing. The mean age is distressingly low, the 
population is deteriorating physically, psychically and mentally, 
and the ethno-national structure is changing. The average life span 
of men is 58 years (in some regions less than 50 years), while the 
longevity for women is 72 years, giving an average of 65 years. 
The number of births per thousand dropped to nine in 1996, from 
seventeen in 1985 and thirteen and a half in 1990. The number of 
deaths has risen from eleven to fifteen per thousand, which is close 
to some African countries. This development would result in a 
decrease of Russia's population from 147 million now to 123 mil-
lion over the next thirty-three years.83 This may cause serious diffi-
culties in utilizing the country's natural resources. It may cause 
weaknesses in information, communications and the armed for-
ces. Russia's human resources may prove insufficient to reinvig-
orate industry and agriculture, and the quality of intellectual work 
may deteriorate. Those developments may encourage foreign ac-
tors to encroach on Russian geographical space and resources, while 
ethnic Russians concerned about degeneration might radicalize. 
Konstantin Sorokin suggests that emphasis should be placed on 
developing the remaining internal factors of geopolitical power: 
natural resources, military power including nuclear weapons, and 
strong areas of industry like the production of military equipment.84 
When stressing the importance of natural resources, Russian geo-
politicians seem to forget that in the modern world, a combination 
of education and natural resources, processed products, innova-
tion and cooperation in the long run make for a strong geopolitical 
position and wealth rather than natural resources as such. 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a relative-
ly weak geopolitical actor. The organization exists largely on pa-
per and its ability to act is very limited. The treaty on collective 
defense signed by six CIS countries has not been implemented. 
Nor has it been possible to create any kind of real defense within 
the commonwealth.85 Trends among the CIS-states are centrifugal, 
and increased overall cohesion - necessary for the establishment of 
common strategies - is not foreseeable. Bilateral economic ties are 
important, although an attempt to create an economic union with-
in the CIS failed.86 Seven years ago Russia's imports from the former 
Soviet Republics covered 23 percent of Russia's machine-building 
needs, more than a third of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy 
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needs, and about 25 percent of the demands of chemical and light 
industries.82 As the main supplier of oil and gas, Russia plays a 
significant politico-economic role among the CIS countries. Geo-
politically, Belarus and Kazakhstan are Russia's most substantial 
CIS partners at present. Through the former, Russia can maintain 
some geopolitical influence in the Baltic region and maintain com-
munications with Europe. Together with Kazakhstan, Russia could 
pursue security interests in the unstable Central Asian region. The 
axis Minsk - Moscow - Alma-Ata is important also for political sta-
bility in the territory of the former Soviet Union." Russia, Belarus, 
and Kazakhstan are collaborating successfully and the links be-
tween them are likely to strengthen in the future. Kyrgystan is en-
tering the triangle in some areas89 Armenia is a focus of Russia's 
influence in Caucasia. One could ask whether Russia's aim is to 
build around itself a security system based on bilateral arrange-
ments fulfilling the same kind of role as the Warsaw Pact for the 
Soviet Union. 
The state of Russia's armed forces has gravely deteriorated. 
Combat readiness has dropped continuously since 1990. Numer-
ous weapons systems have decayed. According to expert evalua-
tions, only one-third of the ground forces' divisions are combat 
ready. About 50 percent of all Russian warships are inoperable, 
and the remainder is manned at about 65 percent to 70 percent 
leve1.9° Approximately 50 percent of military aircraft are opera-
tional. Because of the shortage of kerosene, pilots fly 30 to 50 hours 
a year, though they should fly 180 to 240 hours to keep up neces-
sary qualifications. The capability of Russia's nuclear forces is es-
timated to be about 40 percent of that of the United States. Ac-
cording to Defense Minister Igor Sergeev, only 80-90 percent of 
the necessary armament and military equipment is available. Ap-
proximately 30 percent of those are of advanced models, while 
the percentage of advanced models should be at least 60.91 Al-
most half of the former Soviet defense installations necessary for 
warfare are now located beyond Russia's borders. The future of 
Russia's military industry is uncertain. In 1986 the Soviet Union 
accounted for 43 percent of global arms sales. In 1996 Russia's 
share was 17 percent. Despite a recent rise in arms exports,92 the 
lack of domestic acquisitions and the limited capabilities of in-
dustry to develop high technologies without government support, 
along with shrinking defense budgets and tougher global compe- 
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tition, may jeopardize the survival of design bureaus and produc-
tion lines as well as the long-term capacity to provide Russian 
armed forces with modern equipment. 
When assessing the international significance of these trends, 
it should be noted that most great powers have sharply reduced 
their military commitments in the 1990s. But the Russian case is 
different. It is a question of an unpremeditated, uncontrolled dete-
rioration of the defense system and a profound drop in quality, 
which may soon become irreparable. It is reasonable to ask wheth-
er the armed forces could defend Russia against external threats. 
But there is no significant external military threat against Russia at 
the moment. According to Defense Minister Igor Sergeev, at least 
by the year 2005 the probability of a large scale aggression against 
Russia is low. Instead, the probablility of local wars touching 
Russia's interests is high.93 
The most recent concerns in Russia pertain to the survival of 
the armed forces, control of nuclear forces and the internal role of 
the army. Is there a guarantee that the nuclear arsenal will be un-
der authorized control? Is the command structure of the armed 
forces reliable or will it break down? Could the armed forces cease 
to function as an unified organization? These are the most acute 
unanswered questions. Dramatically deteriorating material con-
ditions among the troops have given rise to a risk of illegal actions 
by local commanders in order to sustain the soldiers' livelihood. 
Although the Russians may have exaggerated this gloomy picture 
of their armed forces in order to improve their position in negotia-
tions, it is clear that the Russian armed forces are in crisis. Howev-
er, it is not likely that the army would provoke a coup or a civil 
war. The army is not unified enough to do that, and the military 
leadership would hardly run the risk of giving orders that might 
not be obeyed. That risk was proved real as early as the August 
coup in 1991. 
The above described developments together with the chang-
es of the security environment have led to a profound revaluation 
of Russia's defense system. According to Defense Minister Igor Ser-
geev, the main tasks of the armed forces in the future will be as 
follows: to provide a guaranteed nuclear containment (iadernoe 
sderzhivanie), to prevent any attempts to pressure Russia with power, 
to secure information security and conduct information counter-
measures (informatsionnoe protivoborstvo), to cooperate with other 
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power structures to fight against terrorism, to fulfil Russia's inter-
national obligations.94 
An urgent, profound military reform is necessary, including 
drastic reduction in the armed forces. The dilemma is that Russia 
cannot afford to maintain its current armed forces but does not 
have the money to carry out a speedy reform. Theoretically, the 
optimal procedure is that a plan for a military reform is worked 
out in connection with the development of a national security con-
cept and a new military doctrine. In 1997, the Security Council 
approved the new National Security Concept. However, the plan 
for the reform of the armed forces seems to outpay the doctrinal 
work and the doctrinal work will lag behind the other two areas, 
in which case economics may dictate the core of the reformation of 
the armed forces. By now, the deterioration of the armed forces has 
lasted almost for a decade. Assuming that building up the pro-
foundly deteriorated military capabilities would take at least as 
long it did for them to decline, Russia cannot restore its military 
power before the year 2010. This is the best-case scenario.95 Ac-
cording to Defense Minister Sergeev, one of the main tasks of the 
military reform is to create a new model for cooperation between 
economy, politics, society and the military organization of the state. 
A central part of the military reform is to reform the armed forces, 
to build up highly equipped, battle ready, compact and mobile 
armed forces that have sufficient potential for containment (poten-
tsial sderzhivaniia) as well as professional, psychological and moral 
efficiency at a modern level. During the first phase, by the year 
2000, serious qualitative changes will take place, including organ-
izing formations and units of constant readiness in strategic direc-
tions. Army and Navy groupings in the north-west of the country, 
in Kaliningrad area and Leningrad Military District will be reduced 
by 40 percent. Here, formations above division and brigade level 
will not be deployed. During the reform, the Navy will be reduced, 
including a reduction of vessels by 20 percent. During the first phase 
of the reform the total strength of the armed forces will be reduced 
to one million two hundred thousand servicemen. During the sec-
ond phase, in 2001-2005, a three-service structure of the armed forc-
es will be established.96 
 
It is difficult to assess the real impact of the above-mentioned 
reductions, because the force levels, from which the percentages 
are counted, are not clearly defined. According to some estimates, 
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even 1.2 million men will be far more than Russia can afford in the 
future, especially, if it strives to create a well-equipped army and 
keep to the 3.5 percent level of defence spending ruled by presi-
dent Yeltsin.97 So the eventual strength of the armed forces could 
well be below the level of 1 million men. It is planned that from the 
beginning of 1999 there will be ten formations of constant readi-
ness in the Army, including three all-arms formations, three air-
borne formations and four all-arms brigades. Formations of con-
stant readiness are in full strength and capable of taking part in 
operations.98 It is worth noting that those are peace-time forces. 
Russia is under strong external and internal geopolitical pres-
sures. To the west of Russia there is the Western European geopo-
litical core area, which includes a strengthening NATO, Germany, 
and European Union, penetrating into the Heartland's periphery 
by extending political, economic and military power closer to the 
Russian core area. Such a development is perceived in Russia as an 
indirect threat, implying that Russia could fall behind the leading 
powers and become subject to manipulation and intimidation. The 
West could dominate Russia economically and militarily, exclude 
it from Europe, deny its access to Eastern Europe, and limit Russia's 
freedom of action.99 At present the threat is political and economic 
rather than military. 
The relation between Russia and the Western European core 
area has changed. If in the early 1990s Russia's objective was to be 
a partner of the West in building European security, there has been 
subsequently a growing uncertainty whether Russia's voice will 
be heard. In Russia this has created feelings of exclusion, isolation 
and disintegration. Russia has always wanted to be a European 
state, albeit in its own way and without dependence on Europe. 
The conclusion of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooper-
ation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation sig-
nificantly improves the situation by creating a mechanism for con-
sultation and negotiations. The value and usability of this mecha-
nism will presumably be seen in the next 2-4 years. 
Russia's most acute security threats are in the south, where 
geopolitical cross-pressures are focused on the Caucasian and Cen-
tral Asian zones from the Russian and the Turkish-Iranian geopo-
litical core areas. The situation in Afghanistan concerns Russia and 
may be one reason for Russia's approach to Iran. The decision of 
Azerbaijan and Georgia in the early 1997 to form a strategic part- 
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nership may reduce Moscow's power in the Caucasus. This may 
signal a strengthening of Islamic influence in the Heartland's south-
ern periphery. It also indicates a willingness among CIS states to 
collaborate on a bilateral basis, which may increase centrifugal 
trends in the Commonwealth. Despite the traditional policy of bal-
ancing power and the deployment of Russian military forces in 
Georgia and Armenia, it is unclear how Russia can maintain its 
hold on the region. Presumably the decline of Russia's hold is only 
temporary. It can be restored through Christian Armenia and Geor-
gia, for the experience of history shows that they need Russia's 
support to survive in the troubled Caucasian environment. 
Russia's far-eastern zone contains less acute security problems 
but is challenging in the long run. Three powers collaborate on 
Russian eastern frontiers, namely China, Japan and the United 
States. American interests in the area are growing. China is strength-
ening economically and militarily and will likely become a global 
power in the future. And Japan is not particularly eager to collab-
orate with Russia. Russia's long-term challenge is, how to main-
tain influence in the region. 
An analysis of the Russian geopolitical situation leads to three 
conclusions. First, the unstable geopolitical situation as well as eco-
nomic and military weakness are the main factors reducing Russia's 
geopolitical weight. Russia today is largely compelled to react rather 
than initiate, and its freedom of action and choice is dramatically 
diminishing. Second, it follows that internal strengthening should 
be the first among Russia's geopolitical objectives. In its current 
weakened circumstances, Russia's only major instrument is politi-
cal power inherited from the Soviet Union, but even that will de-
cline if there is no stronger economic, military and other back-up 
from the Russian core area. Third, it seems that Russia's only way 
of getting out of the crisis and protecting national interests in the 
long run is to create external conditions that provide a breathing 
spell for domestic reform. But how long will that take? Ten years 
ago a similar aim was set for the Soviet Union under Gorbatchov. 
The current situation is profoundly different. Undoubtedly, the 
necessary time span for restoring Russia's status as a great power 
must now be counted in decades. 
Despite the gloomy picture given above, Russia has disposa-
ble geopolitical strengths: a vast geographical territory, rich natu-
ral resources, and an advantageous location connecting Asia and 
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Europe. Russia holds 25 percent of the world's energy resources 
and is self-sufficient in raw materials. For the time being Russia 
has strategic nuclear parity with the United States and will main-
tain its strategic forces.10° These are important corner stones, but a 
restoration of geopolitical power is possible only if the Russian po-
litical system can find solutions and carry them out. 
Russia's Geopolitical Strategy Alternatives 
Russia's basic geopolitical views can be clarified by comparing the 
contemporary situation with the situation after the Second World 
War, when two views of world order were clashing: the "univer-
salise view and the "sphere-of-influence" view. The universalist 
view assumed that national security could be guaranteed by an 
international organization, while the sphere-of-influence view as-
sumed that it would be guaranteed by the balance of power. Amer-
ican thinking was considered to be universalist, while Soviet think-
ing represented the sphere-of-influence view.101 Today it seems that 
the Western positions favoring NATO's enlargement derive from 
the universalist view, while Russia's opposition reflects sphere-of-
influence thinking. According to Evgenii Bazhanov's analysis (in 
1996), an urge to restore its sphere of influence is one of the main 
goals shaping Russia's foreign policy. It should also be noted that 
since the early 1990s, Moscow has considered countries of the "near 
abroad" a zone of Russia's vital interests.1°2 So far these positions 
remain unchanged. Additionally, numerous Russian statements 
conclude that the West is seeking to create a structure of interna-
tional relations which will ensure western dominance in European 
security. In the foreseeable future, the goal of influence in the "near 
abroad" will presumably be an essential part of Russia's code of 
geopolitical behavior. 
In theory Russia has three strategic geopolitical alternatives: 
expansionary, yielding and position (status quo) strategies. Russia 
does not have sufficient economic or military power for an expan-
sive strategy. This makes it implausible that an aggressive policy 
would be adopted by nationalist forces if they gain power in Rus-
sia. Attempted territorial expansion would drive Russia into an 
isolated stalemate which would likely have only one way out: a 
withdrawal resulting eventually in zero advantages. The lessons 
learned in Afghanistan are fresh in Russia's memory. In Afghani- 
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stan the Soviet Union for the first time discovered that military 
power cannot always be translated into political power as it was in 
the 1950s and 1960s in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.103 Forms of 
expansion other than territorial seem just as inapplicable. The states 
of the "near abroad" as well as the neighbors of the former Soviet 
Union are centrifugally oriented in relation to Russia and are so 
anti-Russian that cultural, civilizational, religious and ethno-reli-
gious expansion in those regions is, simply put, a mission impossi-
ble. Belarus and Kazakhstan may be the sole exceptions. 
The second basic alternative, a yielding strategy also seems 
inappropriate for several reasons. First, the current geopolitical sit-
uation is seen as an outcome of a yielding strategy applied in the 
late 1980s and the early 1990s. The foreign policy of those years is 
widely criticized for giving up too much, too quickly, and without 
relevant compensation, including concessions in nuclear and con-
ventional weapons and the Soviet military presence in Europe. Ac-
cording to critics, another kind of policy based on a step-by-step 
approach would have brought Russia into a more favorable geo-
political situation. Second, the entire Russian political field seems 
to be committed to preserving the territorial integrity of the Rus-
sian Federation. Foreign policy actions of the current administra-
tion contain direct or indirect references to the necessity of restor-
ing Russia's big power status,104 which seems to be the position of 
the opposition as well. A yielding strategy simply does not fit this 
political setting. Third, territorial concessions would risk the break-
up of the Russian Federation. At the moment this risk does not 
seem high, because outright separatist ideas are not widespread, 
but some republics, especially those with rich natural resources, 
may strive for at least partial sovereignty, despite the fact that it 
could be limited by economic and/or territorial dependence on 
Russia proper.105 Moscow must take this risk into account, although 
it has an array of means available to put pressure on separatist 
areas, e.g. by limiting energy supplies, closing air space or land 
communications, etc. The fourth reason for not adopting a yield-
ing strategy is that nothing at present is forcing Russia to do so. At 
the moment Russia can be compelled to make concessions on eco-
nomic, political and politico-military issues like NATO enlarge-
ment and Chechnia, but that does not mark an adoption of a sub-
missive strategy. On the contrary, such concessions make Russia 
more resistant to further retreats. 
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Among Russia's three geopolitical strategy alternatives, the 
position (status quo) strategy is the only option left. How should it 
be applied? Undoubtedly, an essential part of the position strategy 
would be to keep the countries of the "near abroad" within Russia's 
sphere of interest and to restrict the damage caused by NATO en-
largement. At the same time, Russia should be active in its rela-
tions with other geopolitical core areas, i.e. the countries of the 
"far abroad," to prevent itself from becoming isolated. Geopoliti-
cal weakness is the main limitation on Russia's choices. Hence, 
Konstantin Sorokin suggests that Russia should play a balancing 
role between, and in relation to, other geopolitical power centers 
(Europe, United States, China, etc.). Being an arm of a balance, 
Russia could increase its geopolitical gravity. That would serve the 
interests of a temporarily weak Russia and maintain a multipolar 
geopolitical world order, precluding the superiority of any other 
power center. In order to preserve equilibrium, Russia could, for 
example, adjust its economic and politico-military positions in fa-
vor of one or another subject, use energy (oil, gas) deliveries for 
influence and make the most of contradictions between world pow-
ers, combining with one or another party depending on the situa-
tion.'°6 In short, toward the other geopolitical power centers the 
position strategy would be a strategy of delaying actions by apply-
ing the traditional methods of balancing power, which Russia has 
used throughout history. However, Russia's success will be limit-
ed by the fact that power is necessary even for playing a balancer. 
Hence, being pressured in the West, Russia could become more 
active in the southern and eastern directions. Russia's approach to 
Iran can be viewed in this light. Moving closer to China is a logical 
element of Russia's balancing policy, knowing that the United States 
will presumably need good relations with Russia in the future in 
order to counter the growing power of China. An alliance between 
Russia and China is, however, highly unlikely, because China would 
presumably accept only one role in such an alliance, namely the 
role of the leader. It also seems that China's policy is oriented to-
ward a broad international cooperation rather than creating alli-
ances. 
Geopolitical realities put restrictions on Russia's policies to-
ward the "near abroad." Ideas of reunifying the former Soviet Re-
publics or rebuilding the Russian Empire are unrealistic. To build 
the Russian/Soviet imperium required hundreds of years; now, 
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even though rebuilding might be desired, Russia does not possess 
the means even to begin. The use of force is clearly excluded in the 
foreseeable future, and the countries of the "near abroad!' do not 
want to join Russia voluntarily, except for Belarus. The orienta-
tions of the neighbors go to the opposite direction. Russia has ir-
revocably lost the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, and there 
is no possibility that Russia could make itself attractive to its clos-
est neighbors in terms of reunification. Quite the opposite, the ex-
perience of the Soviet era makes the neighbors avoid close politi-
cal ties with Russia. Nor are there economic incentives for reunifi-
cation, because Russia's economy is falling behind most of the 
former Soviet Republics. According to the Russian Institute of Eco-
nomic Analysis, the countries of the "near abroad" can be divided 
into four groups as regards the success of economic reform. The 
first group includes all three Baltic states. Moldova, Kyrgystan, 
Armenia and Georgia can be assigned to the second group. Kaza-
khstan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan make up the third group, and 
Belarus, Ukraine, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan belong to the fourth. 
In the middle of 1992, Russia was the leader among the reforming 
countries, but it soon fell behind the Baltic states, then it lagged 
behind the second group and now Russia is falling closer to the 
countries of the fourth group, which have the slowest pace of eco-
nomic reform or have in practice abandoned it."' Moreover, Rus-
sia is losing economic ground in the CIS countries to the West.108 
Nevertheless, collaboration with Russia is vital to several coun-
tries of the "near abroad," especially in economics and some areas 
of security (e.g. border guarding). But the newly independent states 
seem to avoid forming alliances that could give Russia dominance 
over their affairs. For example, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan 
have taken a decisive stand against all plans on creating a defense 
alliance within the CIS.109  
Since attempts to integrate the CIS have met firm resistance 
and in some cases led to unambiguously negative reactions, Rus-
sia is compelled to build relations with the "near abroad" bilater-
ally instead of through multilateral, unified strategies.1" Hence, 
the leading goal of Russia's geopolitical relations with the "near 
abroad" will likely be to influence these countries individually, 
focusing on areas and functions that are important to Russia. Un-
doubtedly, the existence of Russian interests and the availability of 
geopolitical instruments in each case are preconditions for con- 
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ducting these policies. However, for pursuing geopolitical goals in 
the "near abroad," neither Russia's physical presence nor total ge-
opolitical control over those countries are necessary. 
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3 GEOPOLITICAL TRENDS IN 
THE BALTIC REGION 
The Geopolitical Position of the Baltic Sea - the Historical Context 
Throughout modern history since the thirteenth century, the Baltic 
Sea has been an area of conflict between East and West. The con-
flicts have stemmed from opposing economic and military inter-
ests not only among the littoral states but also among external pow-
ers. Geopolitically, Baltic history during the last five hundred years 
is dominated by a rivalry between two major geopolitical trends. 
First, the Baltic powers have attempted to close the Danish Straits 
and make the Baltic sea into a mare clausum, a closed sea, to in-
crease their influence in the area. Second, Western European naval 
powers have attempted to keep the Danish Straits open in order to 
make the Baltic into a mare liberum, a free sea, to increase influence. 
The aim has been to ensure one's own freedom of movement in 
and out of the Baltic Sea and deny the opponent's."' 
From the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries, Sweden, Denmark 
and the Hanseatic League dominated traffic within the Baltic Sea 
as well as into and out of it. The Hanseatic towns sought to make 
the Baltic Sea into a mare clausum. In the latter part of the fifteenth 
century, Russia challenged the Hanseatic League, Russia's inter-
ests coinciding with those of Holland to make the Baltic Sea a mare 
liberum, a free trade area. Holland influenced the situation in the 
Baltic Sea through the seventeenth century. With the decline of 
Holland's power and the rise of British seapower, Britain and Rus-
sia became the main competitors for the control of access to the 
Baltic Sea. A mare liberum was Britain's interest. Russia, however, 
established hegemony in the Baltic in the eighteenth century and 
through the first half of the nineteenth. In the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury British interests lessened as a result of industrialization and a 
shift of attention to Africa and Asia. Now Germany emerged as 
the leading power in the area up to the end of World War I and 
sought to make the Baltic a mare clausum. In the interwar period, 
Germany and the Soviet Union, being both mare clausum powers, 
were competing in the region, and as the revived British interests 
waned in the mid-1930s,112 Germany and Russia dominated the 
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Baltic Sea until the end of World War II. Through the post-World 
War II era up to the 1990s, the Soviet Union largely dominated the 
Baltic Sea. Yet the post-war period brought a new geopolitical ac-
tor into the Baltic arena, namely the United States, which through 
NATO had strategic interests in the region. It challenged the Soviet 
mare clausum regime and took over the role of Germany as a con-
taining power on the Soviet/Russian influence. The Baltic region 
became a part of the Northern European power balance, being the 
far east of the NATO-Warsaw Pact frontier. With the development 
of military air power and missile technologies the Baltic Sea be-
came linked to the strategic entity consisting of the Kola Peninsula 
and northern Norway.113 
Post-Cold War developments in the Baltic region have brought 
constant change. It seems that the political environment will re-
main in a state of flux, and a renewed status quo is not foreseen. 
After the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, 
the political situation has evolved from fragmentation to coopera-
tion and integration. The role of the European Union is strength-
ening in the Baltic region, promoting integration and reforms in 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Regional cooperation is 
gaining strength. The Council of the Baltic Sea States, founded in 
1992, encompasses all the regional countries. The Nordic countries 
contribute to the Baltic states' political, economic and security pol-
icy reforms. With the break up of the Cold-War politico-military 
confrontation, economic interests are gaining importance in the 
Baltic Sea region. On the southern and eastern shores there are new 
developing market economies, the foreign economic relations of 
which are growing. The Baltic Sea itself is becoming more impor-
tant as a transportation route. It is foreseen that the volume of sea 
transportation will grow significantly during the next ten to fif-
teen years.114 In terms of security, NATO enlargement is the major 
challenge to political and military stability in the region. 
The following conclusions emerge from this historical survey. 
First, the major geopolitical transitions in the Baltic basin have been 
closely linked to rise and/or fall of great powers. Second, until the 
twentieth century the geopolitical interests of the littoral and ex-
ternal powers in the Baltic were mainly economic. In the twentieth 
century until the end of the Cold War, military considerations domi-
nated the Baltic geopolitical setting.115 In the 1990s, economic ac-
tivities are gaining more importance, supported by consensus 
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among the nations on an economic mare liberum status of the Bal-
tic. Third, maritime power has played an important role through-
out history, but the control of the Baltic Sea has been mainly based 
on the control of its shores. And finally, the mare clausum - mare 
liberum paradigm has been transformed over the centuries. The sig-
nificance of the Danish straits as the focal point of a closed/free 
sea has declined, while the economies of the littoral states have 
become more important as regards freedom of trade. In military 
terms the Danish straits maintain their geostrategic importance, 
although in the contemporary situation, none of the states tend to 
challenge the current status of the straits as a military mare liberum 
in NATO's regime. 
The Historical Context of the Baltic States' Common Geopolitical 
Position 
The history of the Baltic Sea actually covers a lot of the history of 
the Baltic peoples. In the eleventh century, the chronicler Bishop 
Adam of Bremen first used the name Mare Balteum in 1075. Hero-
dotus, as early as the fifth century BC, referred to the Balts as "Ney-
rii." These were later considered as the ancestors of the Baltic Prus-
sians, Lithuanians and Latvians, who since 2000 BC occupied the 
northern shores of the Baltic Sea north of the Vistula, in the basins 
of the Nemunas and the lower Daugava rivers. The Baltic peoples 
are utterly different from the Russians. They arrived originally from 
elsewhere: the Finnic Estonians probably from Ural-Altaic region 
and the Latvian-Lithuanians apparently from south-western Eu-
rope. The Baltic languages are not a part of the Slavic group, and 
the Balts belong to Western European civilization and culture. The 
area covered by the three states presents a coastal plain that rises 
from the Baltic shores toward a region of rolling wooded hills.116  It 
is worth noting that the historic ethnographic border between the 
Baltic peoples and Russia has run roughly along the same lines for 
more than thousand years, at least since the era of Kievan Rus in 
the ninth century. And even earlier, in 200 BC-AD 750, the first 
Slav expansion to the northwest came to a halt in the same areas, 
as did the Tatar invasions in the thirteenth century.117 Undoubted-
ly, the reason lies in geography: the broad belt of marshes, swampy 
rivers, lakes, and peat-moss forests, extending from Lake Peipus 
down to the upper Pripet Marshes,118 has been a significant phys- 
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ical impediment. 
The Teutonic Knights, backed by the Danes held sway over Latvia 
and Estonia beginning in the late twelfth century. The Swedish 
period of the Baltic states began at the end of the sixteenth century 
and lasted for a century and a half, until Russia conquered the 
lands.119  Throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies the Baltic provinces were a battleground for Poland, Swe-
den and Russia. In World War I the Baltic area was a battleground 
between Russia and Germany, as it was in World War II after the 
twenty-two years of the Baltic states' independence in 1918-1940. 
Already before the modern age, the geopolitical significance 
of the Baltic area was commercial, stemming from its location on 
the important waterway that connected European centres through 
a river network with Greece and Byzantium. Commercial reasons 
made the Baltic region initially important for Russia. Ivan IV (the 
Terrible, tsar in 1533-1584) fought for many years in vain to open 
an outlet to the Baltic Sea to establish a trade route. At that time the 
Baltic area was a maritime zone, while Russia was a landlocked 
hinterland, possessing only one seaport in Europe, namely Arch-
ange112° (founded in 1584) on the White Sea, difficult to navigate 
and too far in the north. Peter I (the Great) eventually succeeded in 
opening a window to the West through the Gulf of Finland and by 
absorbing the Baltic coast down to Riga in 1721. In previous centu-
ries the conquest of the Baltic provinces had been a key to domi-
nating the Baltic Sea. 121 Under Russia's sway the Baltic area as-
sumed the role of a gateway between Russia and Europe (Germa-
ny in particular), which was one of Peter Is aims, both in trade 
and in culture. Fiscal considerations were predominant in Peter Is 
foreign policy.122 Consequently, in Russia's expansion into the Bal-
tic area, "commercial strategy" was predominant, followed by mil-
itary strategy. Until the twentieth century, economic considerations 
were also foremost among the Western powers' interests in the 
Baltic area, because the area provided a gateway to the Russian 
market, a bridge between Europe and Russia. The Baltic area had a 
role in supporting seafaring, providing maintenance for sail-pow-
ered wooden ships, but the role vanished with the replacement of 
sail power by steam power in the late nineteenth century.123 
When assessing the geopolitical significance of the Baltic re-
gion to Russia after Peter Is reign, Russia's other outlets to seas 
and oceans should be considered. Russia was able to establish Black 
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Sea ports only in the 1770s. Yet the sea remained closed to Russia 
because the Ottomans controlled both shores of the straits, and 
sending warships out required their agreement.124 In 1829 Russia 
extended its control of the Black Sea coast to Poti in the east:125 but 
as a result of the Crimean War (1853-1856), its right to keep its fleet 
on the Black Sea was taken away.126 Russia's Far Eastern seaports 
became strategically important only after 1891, when the Trans-
Siberian railway was opened. In Europe, the Murmansk port was 
founded only in 1916. Thus the Baltic Sea was Russia's only stable 
outlet to warm seas for almost two hundred years. St Petersburg 
was defended by a fortress-fleet strategy in the Gulf of Finland,'27 
and the conquest of Finland in 1809 guaranteed St Petersburg's 
security from the northwest. In the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies the Baltic states' area was perhaps more important to Russia 
than at any time. 
It is often erroneously said that the fundamental Baltic prob-
lem is the struggle for dominance between Russia and Germany. 
In fact, that became true only in this century, for the Baltic provinc-
es were never faced with a definite Russo-German alternative un-
til 1914. After World War I, each Baltic state signed peace treaties 
with Germany and Soviet Russia in 1920, and gradually a modus 
vivendi with the USSR was worked out.128 The Baltic states became 
an important channel of commerce.129 But the true geopolitical po-
sition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was that of a buffer zone, 
although they were not created as buffer states in the Versailles 
Treaty. During the interwar decades the rivalry between Germany 
and the Soviet Union was temporarily dormant. The Soviet Union 
was still anxious to obtain ice-free ports in the Baltic.13° The more 
conspicuous the German threat, the greater was the Soviet Union's 
military interest in the Baltic region. The Baltic states' constructive 
foreign policy was aimed at improving their security and balanc-
ing relations between Russia and Germany,131 but it did not suc-
ceed. Buffer zone countries are safe as long as the geopolitical cent-
ers around them are mutually balanced. In the 1930s, in their neu-
trality policy the Baltic states followed the Swedish pattern, but as 
Alfred Bilmanis puts it sarcastically, the trouble was that the Bal-
tic states were geographically on the wrong Baltic shore."132 After 
World War II, military and economic interests predominated in 
Russia's relations with the Baltic republics. 
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Assessments of the Future Geopolitical Trends in the Baltic Region 
In the foregoing sections I have invoked the geopolitical model 
that John P. LeDonne developed to describe and explain the meth-
ods and goals of Russian foreign policy during the Russian Em-
pire. This model can be applied in an interpretation of the geopo-
litical reasons for the dissolution of the Soviet Union. But can the 
model be applied to the contemporary situation? Not directly, be-
cause it is based on the assumption that Russia has the power of 
initiative, which is not the case now at least regarding Europe. But 
the model may be of some use nevertheless in speculating about 
future developments. In its framework NATO enlargement means 
a penetration of the Western European geopolitical core area close 
to the Russian geopolitical core area, backed with strong support 
from the American core area. Just as Russia's (and later the Soviet 
Union's) expansion to the west was contained through the centu-
ries and as Russia's actual political statements indicate, it can be 
expected that the current Western expansion will meet resistance 
from the Russian core area. A key question is, where could or should 
the optimum line of enlargement133 run in relation to Russia? It is 
not within the scope of this paper to answer precisely, but history 
shows that the closer the line gets to Russia, and the more the West-
ern core area projects power into the the Russian core area, the 
stronger will be Russian resistance and containment and the high-
er the tension along the surface of contact.134 How will Russia's 
policy and strategy interact with these geopolitical developments 
and how will they affect the situation in the Baltic region? How 
could cooperation between Russia and the West affect the devel-
opments? Could confrontation be mitigated by economic coopera-
tion? 
It is possible to advance six scenarios delineating the long-
term developments in the European geopolitical picture from the 
perspective of East-West relations. I would like to point out that 
the scenarios are not meant to be prognoses. Neither do they re-
flect my assessments on probabilities of future developments. They 
are first of all meant to serve as a framework for assessing the width 
of the spectrum in international developments. 
The first scenario could be called "NATO's restrained enlarge-
ment". In this scenario, the relations between Russia and the West 
will be dominated by NATO enlargement in the near future. How- 
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ever, in the long run NATO enlargement as a crucial factor for the 
relations will become a secondary issue. Countries bordering Rus-
sia135 will not become NATO members. Russia will keep its current 
position strategy and cooperate with NATO. The East Central Eu-
ropean countries will fall into two groups: NATO members and 
non-allied countries. Non-allied countries will closely cooperate 
with NATO. Russia attempts to influence the countries near abroad 
in order to make them act in a way that serves Russia's security 
interests. There will be no major tension between Russia and the 
West. Tensions may appear if strength relations change over the 
decades to come. The security of the countries bordering Russia 
will depend to a great extent on the way they arrange their rela-
tions with the European Union, NATO and Russia. The EU en-
largement takes place in areas bordering Russia, and cooperation 
between the EU and Russia will partially stabilize the security po-
litical situation. In the Baltic Sea region, economic and political as-
pects will constitute the major aspects of the security political situ-
ation, while military issues will lie in the backround. The Baltic 
Sea will remain a mare liberum controlled by NATO. 
The second scenario could be called "NATO enlarges and 
changes significantly". In this scenario, the relations between Rus-
sia and the West will be dominated by NATO enlargement, but 
later its influence on the relations will diminish. NATO will en-
large widely and profoundly change as an organization. Its role as 
a politico-military defensive alliance will be gradually replaced by 
a new role of a collective security organisation. Article 5 tasks will 
in practice be moved to the backround as a result of new tasks, the 
growing number of members and the lack of military threats. Coun-
tries bordering Russia will become NATO members. Peacekeep-
ing and crisis management will become major functions. At the 
same time, NATO members' geographical area of activity enlarg-
es, extending beyond the Atlantic region to other parts of the world. 
Russia cooperates with NATO in this transformation, attempting 
to dilute the Alliance's military role. Collective security will be the 
outcome of this scenario, but military security guarantees to the 
member states may grow weaker as the nature of the Alliance 
changes. Regional groupings may emerge within the Alliance, lead-
ing perhaps to weaker cohesion. In the Baltic Sea region, some 
tension will prevail while Russia strives to increase its influence in 
NATO's activities and neutralize the Alliance. Over the long run, 
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with a possible dilution of NATO as a politico-military defensive 
alliance, the security of some European countries may become sub-
ject to disturbances and pressures. 
The third scenario can be called The European Union will come 
ahead". In this scenario, the relations between Russia and the West 
will be dominated by the EU's enlargement and its impact. The 
importance of international economic cooperation in Russia's in-
ternational relations will grow, while military considerations will 
be moved to the backround. From Russia's perspective, along with 
the enlargement of the EU, the advantages of economic coopera-
tion with the EU will exceed the disadvantages Russia experiences 
as to NATO enlargement. NATO enlargement as a generator of 
tension will remain in the backround. The bipolar setting between 
Russia and the West will be gradually replaced by a multipolar 
European setting. In the Baltic Sea region, economic considerations 
will take over, while military aspects in the security political set-
ting will remain in the backround. 
The fourth scenario is called "Russia 's cohesion will weaken". In 
this scenario, the evolution of the security political situation in 
Europe will be crucially influenced by Russia's internal develop-
ments. As a result of Russia's internal economic and political chang-
es the power of the central administration in relation to the regions 
will weaken. The regions will become more independent, which 
can occur even without violence or power politics. Formally Rus-
sia will continue to exist as a state, but the regions will not be un-
der the control of the center. Russia's international weight will di-
minish. The geopolitical Russia-West setting will gradually be re-
placed by a multipolar order. The European Union will enlarge to 
the east, which will also improve the economic situation of Russia's 
western regions. Countries bordering Russia may become NATO 
members. 
Finally, I would like to advance two bipolarity-confrontation 
scenarios, though I do not consider them very probable. The fifth 
scenario could be called The rise of Russia". In this scenario, rela-
tions between Russia and the West are dominated by NATO en-
largement. Countries bordering Russia will become NATO mem-
bers. Russia will maintain its current policy and the position strat-
egy and will manage to maintain its political weight in the world 
arena. There will be constantly tension between Russia and the 
West. Over the coming decades, Russia manages to restore its eco- 
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nomic, political and military power. As Russia strengthens, it will 
put an increasing political and military pressure on the East Cen-
tral European countries and the West. The political and economic 
price for military presence in the countries bordering Russia will 
become too high for the cohesion of the West. That will result in 
political fragmentation within the western sphere, weakening of 
NATO's cohesion after an extensive enlargement and accordingly 
weakening NATO's military commitments in the countries bor-
dering Russia. The outcome is that democracy and free market econ-
omies are promoted in the countries bordering Russia, but eventu-
ally NATO membership will not significantly improve their secu-
rity. According to this scenario, the economic element in the Baltic 
Sea region will grow but political and military tensions will par-
tially undermine favourable economic developments. There will 
be constantly at least latent tension between Russia and NATO. 
The Baltic Sea remains at the beginning militarily a mare liberum 
controlled by NATO, but later the regime will be challenged at least 
in the eastern parts of the sea by the rising power of Russia. 
The sixth scenario is called "Tension at the beginning, followed 
by profound changes in Russia". According to this scenario, NATO 
enlargement and the economic penetration of the West into Russia 
will dominate international developments. Countries bordering 
Russia will become NATO members. Russia keeps to its current 
policy and the position strategy, resisting and attempting to con-
tain the Western enlargement. The Western influence in the Rus-
sian geopolitical core area is political, economic and military, and 
it soon becomes evident that Russia is neither cooperative nor pow-
erful enough to resist. Russia is forced to change policy and resort 
to a yielding strategy, accepting the western expansion. The over-
all situation is tense at the beginning, but mainly politically, since 
Russia is not able to respond militarily. The position of the Russian 
core area will weaken, resulting perhaps in separatism and centrif-
ugal trends within it. This may ultimately mean neutralization of 
the Russian geopolitical core area and increasing Western influ-
ence within it. (In such a development China would also have its 
word to say.) The Western influence will eventually speed up eco-
nomic progress in Russia, but that would happen mainly under 
Western control. The international atmosphere will be strained at 
the beginning, but with the change of Russia's policy, détente will 
prevail. In the Baltic Sea region, economic activities are first influ- 
51 
enced by the politically and militarily tense situation, but soon eco-
nomic considerations will come to the fore. The Baltic Sea will re-
main a mare liberum controlled by NATO. 
These scenarios are simplified, because their purpose is to iden-
tify major alternatives. There may well be other combinations as 
well. First, it may be asked whether Russia could accept NATO's 
enlargement to the bordering countries and yet fully cooperate with 
NATO. Yes, it could, but I do not see that as a separate scenario 
because sooner or later such a situation would lead to develop-
ments along the lines of the fifth ("The rise of Russia") or sixth ("Ten-
sion at the beginning, followed by profound changes in Russia") scenar-
io, i.e. either to the weakening of the Western influence or to Russia's 
weakening. However, cooperation in that case could be possible 
along the developments of the third scenario ("The European Union 
will come ahead"), if economic aspects take over military considera-
tions. In Russia, NATO is perceived as a representative of Ameri-
can power, and Russia will not voluntarily accommodate to NATO's 
presence on its frontiers. The contrast is mainly military and polit-
ical. The European Union is different in Russian thinking. It is a 
European and an economic community, albeit developing common 
foreign and security policy. 
A second question is: could Russia join NATO or could the 
Russian geopolitical core area merge with the Western European 
core area? History gives a number of examples of geopolitical core 
areas that have been neutralized. The neutralization of the Russian 
core area is possible because of its political, economic and military 
weakness, but it is not probable. The area of Russia is vast, rich in 
natural resources, and has an advantageous geographical position 
covering both Europe and Asia. A merger of the Russian geopolit-
ical core area with the Western one might happen in the way de-
picted in the third ("The European Union will come ahead"), fourth 
("Russia's cohesion will weaken") or sixth ("Tension at the beginning, 
followed by profound changes in Russia") scenario. A merger with the 
West by maintaining the current Russian control over the Heart-
land is unlikely because of the wide economic gap between the 
East and the West, which is likely to remain also in the foreseeable 
future. Besides, the United States would hardly agree to such a 
marriage, because it would create too strong a core area in Eurasia, 
where it is a long-term American interest to prevent any Eurasian 
power center from gaining a dominant position. Russia's mem- 
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bership in NATO is most unlikely. The Russian Federation would 
join NATO only if provided with a position equal to that of the 
United States, which the United States will not accept because it 
would undermine the transatlantic link. In any case, Russia's mem-
bership might bring too many conflicts from inside Russia into 
NATO. The picture would change, of course, if NATO becomes a 
collective security organization at the expense of the Article 5 obli-
gations, assuming, for example, the role of the military crisis man-
agement tool of the OSCE. 
From the perspective of the Baltic states there are a lot of com-
mon features in the scenarios. First, in all the scenarios the Baltic 
Sea remains a mare liberum controlled by the West, and Russia is 
militarily pushed to the eastern rim of the region, limited in mili-
tary freedom of action. Second, Russia's attempts to make the Bal-
tic into a mare clausum are not envisaged in any scenario. Third, in 
all scenarios the imbalance of power in the Baltic Sea environment 
and attempts to restore equilibrium are primary geopolitical influ-
ences affecting the Baltic countries. Fourth, the military contact 
surface of the Western and Russian core areas lies at the Baltic states. 
Fifth, in all scenarios, at least latent geopolitical pressure from Rus-
sia is imposed on the Baltic countries. When Poland becomes a 
NATO member, Russia's interests will be focused on the East-Bal-
tic littoral as the only open flank corridor between it and the West. 
If Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania join NATO, the pressure will be 
stronger. It could be mitigated in the second ("NATO enlarges and 
changes significantly"), third ("The European Union will come ahead") 
and fourth ("Russia's cohesion will weaken") scenario. 
In all scenarios the position of the Baltic states is affected by a 
number of intertwined decisions made by international actors. 
NATO's dilemma is that if the enlargement does not reach Russia's 
borders, it will partition the East Central European countries, and 
if the enlargement reaches Russia's borders, there is a risk of parti-
tioning Europe. The attitude of Finland and Sweden to NATO 
membership is important from the perspective of Russia's attitude 
to the Baltic states. When Finland and Sweden remain non-allied, 
there are less reasons for Russia to attempt to pressure on the Bal-
tic states. In the current situation, from NATO's perspective the 
Baltic countries, Finland, and Sweden can be viewed as one strate-
gic entity. Russia would presumably welcome non-allied countries 
around the Baltic states. This conclusion is supported by an analo- 
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gy from history: after 1815, when the Swedish geopolitical core 
area was neutralized and Swedish foreign policy became pro-Rus-
sian, the position of Finland was easier in relation to Russia. By the 
same token, after World War II Finland's position in relation to the 
Soviet Union was mitigated by the fact that there was neutral Swe-
den to the west of Finland. 
54 
4 RUSSIA'S MILITARY INTERESTS 
IN THE EAST-BALTIC LITTORAL 
In the 1990s three major factors have affected the contemporary 
security situation in the Baltic area: (1) the collapse of the Warsaw 
Pact; (2) the dissolution of the Soviet Union; (3) the implementa-
tion of arms control treaties affecting conventional forces in Eu-
rope. In addition to the withdrawal of the troops from Central Eu-
rope, the Soviet Union/Russia lost its access to the sea via the Bal-
tic republics. It also lost shipyards, garrisons, dry docks and stor-
ages on the southern and eastern littoral of the Baltic Sea. In the 
1980s, the Soviet Union had in the Baltic republics two motorized-
rifle divisions, one airborne, one coastal defense and two training 
divisions, as well as eleven air force, air defense and naval avia-
tion regiments, totaling some 120.000 troops. There were Soviet 
naval bases in each Baltic republic, namely Paldisk, Tallinn, Riga, 
Liepaja and Klaipeda. The region was also an important air de-
fense area, comprising an extensive early warning system, several 
airfields and a command, control, communications and intelligence 
(C3I) system. After the withdrawal of all this, Russia's geostrate-
gic situation resembles the situation of the Soviet Union before 
World War II, the single major difference being that Russia now 
possesses the Kaliningrad exclave. The Treaty on Conventional 
Forces in Europe (CFE) meant the destruction of nearly half the 
heavy weaponry of the former Soviet Armed Forces as well as lim-
itations on the size of Russia's forces in certain areas.136 The con-
tent of the future adaptation of the treaty is a question mark for the 
time being, but presumably Russia will seek to increase its free-
dom of action in the flank areas, which will touch upon the Baltic 
Sea region as well. But what are Russia's military-strategic and 
geostrategic interests in the changed situation? What are the geos-
trategic key areas in the Baltic region? I address these questions 
next. 
Common and Land-Strategic Aspects 
The main strategic emphasis of Russia's military interests in the 
Baltic states' area has changed over the centuries. In the era of Pe-
ter I, the emphasis was on sea strategy, because the region was 
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acquired for the establishment of sea communications. After Peter 
I's reign, the sea-strategic significance of the East-Baltic littoral 
apparently remained a major military motive for Russia's domi-
nance over the region from the late eighteenth to the mid-nine-
teenth century. In those years, as a result of Russia's expansion to 
central Poland (in 1795), the likelihood of a threat by land through 
the Baltic provinces was relatively low. With Germany's rise as the 
dominant power on the Baltic Sea in the mid- nineteenth century, 
the importance of the Baltic area grew from both land-strategic and 
sea-strategic perspectives. Russia's response included building a 
sea-fortress in 1912-1917 to defend St Petersburg in the Gulf of Fin-
land, while Russian ground forces in the East-Baltic littoral were 
grouped for an attack to East Prussia. The coastal and naval de-
fense requirements of St Petersburg tied Estonia and southern Fin-
land together into one entity in Russian strategic views. Russia's 
seaward defense plan in the Gulf of Finland in 1914 comprised 
several lines of defense covering the Estonian, Finnish and Rus-
sian coasts and extending from the Hiiumaa (Estonia) - Hanko (Fin-
land) line in the west to the Kronshtadt line in the east. The Soviet 
Union's military interests in the Gulf of Finland prior to World 
War II were focused on the same coastal and sea areas, the differ-
ence being that in the 1930s the Soviet Union no longer controlled 
the Estonian and Finnish coasts.137 
Both World War I and World War II, however, showed that 
the foremost military significance of the Baltic republics to Russia 
was land-strategic. The Germans occupied Lithuania and south-
ern Latvia by land in 1915, but they were stopped south of the 
Daugava river for two years,'" after which Estonia was occupied 
in 1917. In May 1915, Liepaja, Russia's most formidable naval base, 
was easily taken by the Germans.139 In World War II Germany con-
quered Lithuania and Latvia up to Riga in eight days, conducting 
a typical ground forces' operation. The time gained by the Soviet 
troops in the Baltic area, although small in the beginning, was a 
major contribution to saving the city of Leningrad. So in both wars 
the Baltic states were, in effect, a defense outpost of St Petersburg. 
In the post-World War II era, two major developments affect-
ed the geostrategic interests of the Soviet Union in the Baltic re-
publics. First, the traditional role of the East Baltic littoral as a land 
and sea-strategic defensive zone of the Leningrad/St Petersburg 
region diminished when the Soviet Union extended its influence 
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into Central Europe. At the same time the East-Baltic littoral as-
sumed a new role, a springboard for projecting Soviet military 
power into the Straits of Denmark area as part of wartime com-
bined arms operations .14° Second, the evolution of air force and 
missile technologies gave rise to a new dimension, the importance 
of the Baltic region as a deployment area for air surveillance and 
early warning assets. In the post-Cold War era, after the loss of 
these areas, Russia's position is more difficult than ever before, 
because threat perceptions now include an air component in addi-
tion to the traditional land and sea components. 
Four key geostrategic areas directly affect the military securi-
ty of the East Baltic region. These are: (1) Poland; (2) the passage of 
the Gulf of Finland together with the Aland Islands and Southern 
Finland; (3) the St Petersburg area; (4) the Straits of Denmark. The 
geostrategic significance of these areas is directly reflected in Rus-
so-Baltic relations. The importance of the first and third key areas 
for Russia has remained almost unchanged throughout history, 
while the significance of the Straits of Denmark and the passage of 
the Gulf of Finland has varied depending on the extent of Russia's 
or the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. The history of the region 
shows that the more unstable are relations between Russia and the 
powers which control the territory of Poland, the passage of the 
Gulf of Finland, and the Straits of Denmark, the greater is Russia's 
security interest in the areas of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The 
significance of the Polish key area is mainly land-strategic. The 
passage of the Gulf of Finland and the Straits of Denmark are pre-
dominantly of sea-strategic importance, while the security of the 
St Petersburg area is linked mainly to air- and land-strategic as-
pects. In the following, I address the areas in more detail. 
The geostrategic position of the Baltic states' area in terms of 
land warfare is determined by its location by the side of a major 
historical east-west/west-east channel of expansion. This is the 
northern European plain, which has been the main strategic attack 
line from west to east and east to west throughout history. The 
plain is also called the north European lowland or German-Polish 
lowland. It is wedge-shaped, widening to the east and extending 
from the Netherlands through northern Germany and Poland to 
Russia. The total east-west extent of the plain is over 800 miles, 
with a width at least 250 miles. Over the entire plain, the relief 
does not rise over 900 feet except in some areas of Pomerania and 
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East Prussia (Kaliningrad).141 Poland is located within the north-
ern European plain, being geostrategically crucial to Russia. At the 
Yalta conference in 1945 Stalin characterized the significance of 
Poland by saying that Poland has always been a question of life 
and death for Russia. Throughout history Poland has been the cor-
ridor for attacks on Russia. A top postwar priority of any Russian 
regime must be to close that corridor.142 The importance of the 
region was demonstrated as early as the late eighteenth century, 
when Russia expanded into central Poland as far as the Warsaw 
area, which allowed it to threaten Berlin, Vienna and the northern 
regions. Later, when Germany controlled Warsaw, this situation 
was reversed. When operating along the northern European low-
land, an attacker (or defender) must neutralize the threat against 
its northern flank, i.e. the threat from the Baltic states' area. At a 
minimum, the southern Baltic area up to the Daugava River should 
be taken under control. This connection links Poland and the Bal-
tic countries into the same geostrategic entity and is an obvious 
reason why Lithuania has so often been a corridor for attacks.143 
From the Russian perspective, the East-Baltic littoral is not only an 
attacker's flank but also may open a separate attack line toward St 
Petersburg. 
Each Baltic country has a slightly different geostrategic signif-
icance for Russia. Estonia has traditionally been linked to the pas-
sage of the Gulf of Finland and to the defense of the St Petersburg 
area. Latvia's position is central, wherefrom power can be directed 
both to north and south. This may be a reason for the Soviet Union's 
strong military presence and build-up of infrastructure in Latvia 
during the Cold War, and consequently for Latvia's extensive Rus-
sification. The southernmost Baltic areas are linked rather to the 
Central European strategic entity. This was reflected, for example, 
in the Soviet strategic command system in 1975, in which Estonia 
and Latvia belonged to the northwestern theater of strategic mili-
tary actions (TSMA), which included the northwestern USSR and 
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland as its main operation area. 
Lithuania and Kaliningrad belonged to the western TSMA that in-
cluded the Straits of Denmark. So the Soviet ground forces in Ka-
liningrad and Lithuania were planned for operations in Central 
Europe.144  
In neither intentions nor capability is there any major military 
threat against Russia from Europe at present, nor is any threat like- 
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ly to emerge in the foreseeable future. However, in Russia's armed 
forces, as in any army, continuous threat analysis and wartime 
operations planning are a part of normal military activities as pre-
cautionary measures. Threat analyses are also indispensable for 
building up Russia's defence system, which was broken up in the 
Baltic region more thoroughly than anywhere else in the former 
Soviet domain. Presumably the main military danger, however 
unlikely, is the emerging NATO countries' ability to conduct a sur-
prise aircraft-missile strike against the whole of Russia. Hypothet-
ically NATO's aircraft would reach the lines of Smolensk-Briansk-
Kursk and Petrozavodsk-Iaroslavl-Belgorod.145 From the discussion 
above, it appears that one of the Russian military threat scenarios 
touching the Baltic states would be a strategic offensive through 
Poland to Russia, with a closely connected threat from the Baltic 
land area toward the St Petersburg-Pskov-Novgorod area.146  
Russia's main strategic interest in such a situation is to "close the 
Polish door" and repel the threat from the Baltic littoral against St 
Petersburg and its southern regions. Russian forces would operate 
in at least two major areas: (1) Kaliningrad - Belarus, and (2) the 
frontier area between Russia and the Baltic states. In the first area, 
Kaliningrad and West Belarus are gateposts of Russia's operations, 
especially important in case Russia's strategic operation concept is 
offensive defense.147 Kaliningrad is geostrategically very important 
for Russia. The exclave is a significant bridgehead of surveillance, 
intelligence and threat projection in peacetime as well as in a 
strained international situation and during a threat of war. In war 
the strategic value of the Kaliningrad region will drop dramatical-
ly if it remains isolated. The wartime role and strategic tasks of the 
region will be reflected in peacetime troop levels and types. To a 
degree the current high levels are a result of the hasty withdrawal 
of Soviet/Russian troops148 from the East Central European and 
Baltic republics. It remains to be seen whether the levels will be 
changed in future, depending on the results of military reform and 
particularly the doctrinal and structural changes within Russia's 
armed forces.149  
Military cooperation between Russia and Belarus is on the 
increase. The Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Russia signed in 
1997 is militarily important for Russia, providing a formal basis 
for the further development of military cooperation between the 
two countries, although the treaty may be symbolic in other re- 
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spects. Stating that one of the aims of the Union is to ensure securi-
ty and maintain a high level of defense capacity as well as to 
strengthen fraternal relations in the military sphere among oth-
ers,"° the Union Treaty clearly implies the possibility of extending 
Russia's defense systems into the territory of Belarus.151Subsequent-
ly, wide military cooperation between Russia and Belarus has been 
established. According to Russia's defence minister Igor' Sergeev 
(October 1998), practical steps in common protection of air and 
cosmic space of the two states have become possible. A joint air 
defence system has been established and is functioning, including 
joint air defence alert. The Russo-Belarussian treaty on military 
cooperation as well as the agreement on common provision of re-
gional security have been ratified by Russian parliament. In Octo-
ber 1998, a meeting of the common college of the Russian and Be-
lorussian defence ministries took place in Moscow. The parties dis-
cussed questions related to defining goals and tasks of common 
defence as well as the composition of the groupings of troops and 
their command. Agreements were signed on the common use of 
military infrastructure of Belarus and Russia and on the exchange 
of information. According to defence minister Sergeev, the politi-
cal decisions on the creation of common defence between the two 
states are being realized.152 These developments may create pres-
sure all along Lithuania's eastern border and Latvia's southeast-
ern border. The use of Belarussian territory helps Russia close the 
Polish door" and extend surveillance and defense to the west, par-
tially compensating for the earlier losses of Russia's positions in 
the Baltic littoral. 
After the closure of Russia's early warning radar station in 
Skrunda, Latvia, the utilization of Belarussian territory has helped 
Russia compensate the weakening of its air and cosmic surveil-
lance capacity in the west. As a result of the closure, the space 
between the British Islands and Greenland within a radius of two 
thousand five hundred kilometres from the Skrunda station will 
apparently remain "dark" in Russia's surveillance system. For 
the replacement of the Skrunda station, a new radar station is 
said to be under construction in Baranovichi, Belarus.153  In the 
second operation area, on the eastern frontiers of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania, Russia builds up its defense around the nucleus 
of the troops stationed in the southern parts of the Leningrad 
Military District, consisting in the early 1997 of one airborne divi- 
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sion (location: Pskov), one motorized rifle brigade (Vladimirskiy 
Lager), two designated permanent storage sites (Novgorod and 
St Petersburg south), further to the north from St Petersburg : one 
training center (Osinovaya Roshcha), one designated permanent 
storage site (Cherenaya Roshcha) and one motorized rifle brigade 
(Kamenka). Russia's conventional forces in Leningrad Military 
District have been significantly reduced. However, the remain-
ing conventional forces are better equipped than most of Russian 
forces in other districts. That together with the presence of naval 
infantry and airborne forces indicate that warfighting capabili-
ties have been given higher priority than in most of the other re-
gions of Russia.154  
In case of war there will inevitably be pressure to extend 
Russia's defenses to the territory of the Baltic states. Russia's inter-
est in the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces 
in Europe (CFE) in 1996 seemed to be aimed at improving its mil-
itary capability in respect of the Baltic states. Russia's objectives in 
the future adaptation of the CFE Treaty might include even higher 
ceilings for Russian troops in the Pskov district. Presumably prep-
arations for the worst-case scenario - NATO membership for the 
Baltic states - have been initiated in Russia, at least in terms of con-
tingency planning. 
Sea-Strategic Aspects 
Sea-strategically the Baltic Sea is an open flank leading into Russia's 
vital areas. When assessing the significance of Baltic Sea space to 
Russia, three things should be taken into account. First, since the 
era of sail-powered wooden ships, no major naval battles have taken 
place on the Baltic. Second, Russia's control over the Baltic Sea has 
been based mainly on control of its coastlands. The performance 
of the Soviet navy on the Baltic in World War II was worse than in 
World War I and can be disregarded. Much more relevant strategi-
cally were Stalin's political efforts to expand influence in the Baltic 
region after the war.155 Third, since Russia's presence in the litto-
rals has been a high priority along with an emphasis on land war-
fare, it seems that the Russians view strategic straits more as barri-
ers, where operation areas can be closed off, rather than as Russia's 
vital communications links.156 In the first instance this refers to the 
Straits of Denmark during the Cold War, but it may also concern 
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the passage of the Gulf of Finland at the present. Historically, the 
sea-strategic focus in the Gulf of Finland has been on closing the 
passage rather than on maritime operations in the Gulf itself. Rus-
sia has traditionally sought to close the passage to prevent hostile 
penetrations into the St Petersburg area. Finland and Germany, in 
turn, closed the passage in World War II in order to bottle up the 
Soviet navy in the Gulf of Finland. 
In World War II the Soviet Union expanded in the Baltic Sea 
farther than ever before. It gained about 500 nautical miles of coast-
line under Soviet control and another 350 nautical miles under the 
control of Warsaw Pact countries.157 In the West there were two 
main views of the Warsaw Pact maritime concept in the Baltic dur-
ing the Cold War. The first assumed that the Soviets would seize 
the Straits of Denmark and open them, which would allow the Baltic 
Fleet to join the Northern Fleet. This option, however, was criti-
cized for being too comprehensive a task for the Baltic Sea naval 
forces, because it would have included neutralizing NATO in the 
Baltic approaches area, in southern Norway and in the United King-
dom, fighting for air superiority over the central front, occupying 
Denmark and facing NATO forces deployed in the North Sea as 
well as encountering the NATO Strike Fleet Atlantic. The second 
and more realistic view was based on a barrier concept, according 
to which the main Soviet objective was not to break out but to close 
the Baltic Sea at the Straits of Denmark and to open the straits at a 
later phase of the war. This option would have been less costly and 
more in line with the ocean-fighting capability of the Baltic Fleet. It 
would have enabled the USSR to seize control of the Baltic Sea and 
perhaps eventually open a corridor to the North Sea."' 
In the late 1960s, the ratio between Warsaw Pact and NATO 
naval forces was 5:1.159  The Baltic Fleet was being adopted to the 
Baltic environment by adjusting the equipment to the geography 
and the threat. The amphibious force and mine countermeasures 
force in the Baltic Fleet were the largest among the four Soviet fleets. 
The strong and modern amphibious capacity was considered in 
the West as suitable for assault especially against the Straits of Den- 
mark and against Sweden.16° The Soviet merchant fleet in the Bal- 
tic participated regularly in amphibious exercises and had the ca-
pability for transporting several motorized rifle divisions,161 pre- 
sumably including those stationed in the Baltic republics. The Bal-
tic republics' area and the Polish coast were to be the springboard 
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for projecting power to the western littoral of the Baltic Sea and the 
straits. 
After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Un-
ion, this naval capacity was dissolved and neutralized. The role of 
Russia's Baltic naval forces was reduced to that of a coastal fleet.162  
At present Russia has only two bridgeheads in the eastern Baltic 
littoral, Kaliningrad and St Petersburg, while Baltiisk and Kronsh-
tadt are the naval bases of the Baltic Fleet. St Petersburg and Kalin-
ingrad are also home to several shipyards.163  The naval capabilities 
of the Baltic Fleet are degraded by the fact that St Petersburg is 
obstructed by ice for some time each winter; likewise Baltiisk, de-
pending on the severity of winter. 
It is apparent that Russia's future naval interests in the Baltic 
Sea stem from the vital importance of the St Petersburg region and 
the defense requirements of the southwestern Baltic littoral (Ka-
liningrad, Belarus) as well as from the special geographical loca-
tion of Kaliningrad. Undoubtedly, the security of the St Petersburg 
area is a first priority. Here the main naval interest would be to 
prevent unfriendly penetrations into the Gulf of Finland and, as 
appropriate, to protect Russia's access from the gulf to the Baltic 
Sea proper. Focusing on a maritime area including the passage of 
the Gulf of Finland and the Aland Islands would be crucial for the 
implementation of the mission. If Estonia became NATO member, 
this operation area would be extended into the Gulf of Finland.164  
Moreover, it can be assumed that the main naval interest in the 
Kaliningrad area is to support ground forces' operations in the re-
gion as well as to protect naval operations in the northern Baltic 
Sea. Expectations on maintaining Kaliningrad's naval freedom of 
action in wartime cannot be high because of the risk that it will be 
isolated at an early stage of a crisis. To maintain sea communica-
tions with Kaliningrad as long as possible will be a key Russian 
naval interest along with interests focused on the port/base facili-
ties of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It can be expected that the 
activities of the Baltic Fleet in combined arms operations will be 
closely tied to direct support of ground forces in the theater of mil-
itary actions (TVD). This conclusion is supported by the coastal 
status of the Baltic Fleet and the fact that views of the navy's more 
independent operations ended in the Soviet Navy by the mid-
1980s.165 
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Air-Strategic Aspects 
The Soviet Air Force's latest-generation combat aircraft and most 
developed airfields were located outside the western frontiers of 
the current Russian Federation. When the Soviet Union disinte-
grated, a considerable number of those assets were left to the new-
ly independent states. Russia lost, for example, 37 percent of the 
Soviet Union's MiG-29's, 23 percent of Su-27's, 43 percent of 11-76 
transport aircraft, and the majority of its Tu-160 and Tu-95 strate-
gic bombers. Among the most modern bases, 44 were lost in East-
ern Europe and 94 in the former Soviet republics. At present Rus-
sia possesses about 90 major airfields, of which only half are of 
high quality. All in all, roughly 60 percent of the Soviet Union's 
aircraft and 50 percent of the Soviet Air Forces' air bases remained 
on Russian soil. A considerable proportion of the air defense sys-
tem was partitioned, too. Some 70 percent of the Air Defense Force's 
original assets remained within the borders of the Russian Federa-
tion.166  
Not only were the avionics systems partitioned; communica-
tions, command and control, intelligence, missile attack warning, 
air defense and logistical support systems were also disrupted. The 
loss of the Skrunda radar station in Latvia was a blow to the early 
warning system. There were no new backup systems in Russia to 
replace it when Latvia declared independence167. The depot-level 
maintenance and repair capabilities declined considerably. About 
40 percent of these facilities remained in the newly independent 
states. The Soviet Air Force's air-to-ground missiles had been in-
spected and maintained only in Estonia. The phase maintenance 
for more than 50 percent of Su-24's was done in Lithuania. The Su-
25's were serviced solely at Lithuanian and Georgian depots.168 As 
early as 1990, the Soviet Air Force had initiated a planned with-
drawal of forward-based formations and units from Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia. The pullback was begun from the Baltic states, 
Poland, and Transcaucasia in 1991 and from the German Demo-
cratic Republic in 1992. All the aircraft were withdrawn from the 
Baltic states. By 1994, 40 regiments had been pulled back from these 
forward-based locations. The withdrawal of these forces seems to 
have been partially uncontrolled, for the decline of operational ca-
pabilities was not simultaneously retrieved with corresponding 
arrangements in Russia. It became even more difficult to regain 
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these capabilities as the other former Soviet republics refused to 
accept a unified air defense of the CIS. Consequently, it will take 
time for Russia's air defense to regain an acceptable level.169 The 
main push in Russia's current defense planning is toward power 
projection. Thus transport aviation is becoming a priority instead 
of high-technology air warfare. The major decline, however, is in 
air defense. From about 2300 interceptors, less than half remain at 
present.m A Russian Air Force analysis acknowledges that the like-
lihood of a large-scale war has dropped, while low- and medium-
intensity wars are the main near-term danger. However, high-in-
tensity conflicts should be taken into account when defining the 
optimal size of Russia's air force.171 
The current deployment of air forces in Russia is a heritage 
from the Soviet era and does not correspond to the requirements 
of the future. First, about 70 percent of the Russian Air Force's air-
craft are based in the European part of Russia, with 15 percent lo-
cated in the northwest, 25 percent in the west, 30 percent in the 
southwest, and 30 percent east of the Urals. According to the Air 
Force's analysis, fewer aircraft will be needed in the northwest and 
Far East in the future, while more aircraft will be required in the 
southern regions facing the Caucasus, Turkey and Iran. Second, a 
number of aircraft are based too close to the borders. Two-thirds of 
the aircraft in the European part are located within only 200-300 
kilometres of Russia's western borders. Bombers and transport air-
craft are concentrated on too few bases. To meet the new basing 
requirements, the aforementioned Air Force analysis calls for the 
establishment of "aircraft basing regions", which would include 
bases established at the existing Frontal Aviation, Long-Range Avi-
ation and Military Transport Aviation major airfields beyond 300 
kilometres from Russia's borders. Each base would accommodate 
five or six permanently based fighter squadrons.172  
Russia's air-strategic interests in the eastern Baltic littoral stem 
from (1) the proximity of the region to the Polish-Belorussian-Rus-
sian channel of military actions and to the Kaliningrad area; (2) the 
location of the eastern Baltic littoral in relation the St Petersburg 
area; and (3) the importance of air force missions in combined arms 
operations in the region. The Russian Air Force analysis advances 
five scenarios as the core of air force planning from now until the 
early 21st century. The scenario dealing with the northwestern and 
western directions suggests that "NATO might try to employ force 
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to settle Russian internal conflicts, to deny Russia its legitimate 
interests, or even to seize parts of its territory in order to undercut 
strategic positions or for post-conflict bargaining." The scenario 
continues: "NATO would begin any such offensive with intense 
air and naval bombardment aimed at seizing the Kaliningrad re-
gion and then would press to Russia's western frontier through 
Belarus and Ukraine, employing both air attacks and deep ground-
force penetrations into the Leningrad and Moscow Military Dis-
tricts. This possibility requires a (Russian) air force capability to 
repel enemy air operations, prevent amphibious landings, and con-
duct offensive and defensive counterair operations over enemy 
territory."173 
The eastern Baltic littoral is air-strategically crucial for Russia 
not only in war but also in a strained international situation or 
during a threat of war. In peacetime the region is important from 
the perspective of surveillance and intelligence. In the event of war 
Russia's combined arms operations in the Kaliningrad-Belarus area 
would probably impinge on the air space of the Baltic states. The 
air and missile defense of St Petersburg area would also give rise 
to an interest in using their air space. Compared with sea- and land-
strategic interests, the air-strategic importance of the region for 
Russia has grown greatly during the post-World War II period, the 
main reason being the evolution of aircraft, missile and surveil-
lance technologies. The Baltic Sea and its littorals are a confined 
area. Hence the time and distance factors have become more im-
portant as the speed of weapons and weapons launchers has 
grown. The shorter the reaction time has become, the farther to the 
west Russia has sought to extend its warning and defense systems. 
This development links the air space of the East-Baltic littoral to 
the defense of the Russian core areas, a connection that will as-
sume a growing importance in Russia's geopolitical thinking. 
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5 RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN 
THE AREA OF THE BALTIC STATES 
According to Konstantin Sorokin's analysis, Russia's economic 
interests in the territories of the "near abroad" include: (1) the avail-
ability of energy sources and mineral raw materials, (2) the availa-
bility of transportation routes and communications capabilities, (3) 
access to seas and oceans, (4) agricultural resources, (5) existing 
and potential industry, (6) labor power, and (7) the possibility of 
using the territory as a storage of waste materials.174 In addition, 
economic relations between the Baltic states and Russia may be 
used as instruments in pursuing geopolitical interests. Trade routes 
and seaports have drawn Russia's economic attention to the Baltic 
region throughout history. What is the present-day economic sig-
nificance of the Baltic states to Russia? Are there economic interde-
pendencies between Russia and the Baltic countries? These are 
the main questions of this section. 
Natural Resources and Energy 
The Baltic states are poor in natural resources, minerals and raw 
materials.175 
 Estonia's most important mineral resources are oil 
shale, phosphorate and limestone.176 Forests cover about 40 per-
cent of Estonia's territory,177 but large, industrially significant for-
est areas are scarce:178 Peat reserves in the Baltic are considerable. 
In Estonia they cover twenty percent of the territory.179 The shale 
deposits lie in the northeastern part of Estonia and extend over the 
Narva River into the territory of the Russian Federation. Eighty 
percent of the quarried oil shale is used for generating electricity, 
and it represents 95 percent of electricity produced in Estonia. The 
production of electricity peaked in 1979 at 19.4 billion kilowatt-
hours but fell subsequently in the 1980s. In 1996, Eesti Energa ex-
ported 1.1. billion kilowatt-hours (twelve percent of its output) of 
electricity, selling more than half of it to Latvia and the rest to Rus-
sia. The Russian market, however, is restricted because Estonia sells 
only the electricity generated from Russian oil shale. The exploita-
ble oil shale resources have been estimated to suffice for thirty 
years.18° 
In Latvia, woodlands cover almost 40 percent of the territory. 
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Latvia has very few other natural resources. The most important 
are dolomite and limestone, but dolomite resources are only 22 
percent of those of Estonia.181 Land is considered to be Latvia's 
main natural resource, 182 because it provides foodstuffs and tim-
ber for export and encompasses the ice-free seaports of Ventspils, 
Liepaja and Riga. Lithuania does not have abundant natural re-
sources either. It has a few mineral deposits, but diggings or ore 
deposits have not been found.183 
 Exploration drilling of oil was 
begun in the early 1950s in Latvia, Lithuania and the Kaliningrad 
region.184 Oil has been found on the Baltic Sea outer continental 
shelves of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. However, oil production 
prospects are conceded to be vague, and the likelihood of the Bal-
tic countries' becoming self-sufficient in petroleum seem faint. 
Lithuania, for example, plans to exploit 0.5 million tons of oil by 
the year 2000.185 
Estonia's self-sustainability in energy is relatively high. Ap-
proximately 60 percent of energy supply is based on national re-
sources. The rest comes mainly from oil and gas imports from Rus-
sia. Latvia's energy self-sustainability is relatively low. The coun-
try imports all its natural gas and oil and half its electricity. 
Lithuania's problem is that raw materials for energy production 
are imported. The nuclear power station in Ignalina produces 80 
percent of the country's electrical energy.186 Scarce natural resourc-
es are supplemented by imports. In 1995, for example, the import 
of mineral products, products of the chemical or allied industries, 
and base metals and articles of base metal made up 26.6. percent of 
Estonia's total imports, 39.3 percent of Latvia's, and 42.2 percent 
of Lithuania's.187 From the economy of the Soviet era, the Baltic 
states inherited a considerable dependence on raw materials sup-
plied from the area of the current CIS.188 Almost all hydrocarbon 
sources of energy are imported from Russia.189  
The scarce natural resources of the Baltic countries are of low 
geopolitical interest to Russia. Oil shale in northeastern Estonia 
and oil deposits on the Baltic Sea shelf are the most significant re-
sources. Undoubtedly, Russia may be commercially interested in 
them, but in the long run, it is hardly in the interests of the Russian 
Federation as a state to actively participate in developing these re-
sources. More significant is the dependence of the Baltic countries 
on raw materials and energy imports from the east. This provides 
Russia with an instrument for pursuing its interests in the region. 
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This potential "energy weapon" against the Baltic countries should 
not, however, be exaggerated. 
Trade Relations 
Imperfect and often contradictory statistics render an analysis of 
Baltic-Russian trade relations difficult. First, in Russian statistics 
since the late 1980s, the methodology of compiling and processing 
statistics has been changed so frequently that a reasonable com-
parison of data is almost impossible. This is especially the case with 
data on the commodity composition of trade and data on trading 
partners. A second problem is that Russian statistics do not reflect 
the actual size of foreign trade turnover. A number of "grey zone" 
transactions have taken place and no one has managed to estimate 
their real volume.19° Third, in some statistics from the early 1990s, 
data on the Baltic republics and countries that were reluctant CIS 
members, is imperfect or missing. In addition to Russia, insuffi-
cient statistics constitute a problem in several other transition econ-
omies, including the Baltic states.191 Despite these difficulties, in 
what follows I try to delineate the geopolitical significance of the 
foreign trade between the Baltic states and Russia. 
In the Soviet Union the Baltic republics were among the most 
developed areas. For example, between the late 1950s and the late 
1960s Estonia's and Latvia's national income per capita rose more 
rapidly and was higher by far than that of any other Soviet repub-
lic. Traditionally, the emphasis in the Baltic countries had been on 
light industry, demanding skilled labor and few raw materials.192  
After the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union in 
1940, Moscow shifted the emphasis away from textiles, food, and 
light industry toward heavy industry. Baltic companies were inte-
grated into the Soviet economy, which made them dependent on 
other republics for inputs and markets.193 The Baltic republics ex-
ported food to the other parts of the Soviet Union, but they de-
pended on the USSR for fuel, fertilizers, seed and fodder as well as 
labor power. In manufacturing they depended on the Soviet Un-
ion for machinery, spare parts, and inputs of ferrous and nonfer-
rous metals.194  
Economic power in the Soviet Union was heavily concentrat-
ed in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). In 
1988 it produced 61 percent of the USSR's Net Material Product 
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(NMP). The RSFSR, together with the Ukrainian SSR and the Be-
lorussian SSR, produced 82 percent of the USSR's NMP, and their 
summed share in total Soviet exports in 1989-91 was approximate-
ly 93 percent.195 The RSFSR produced 90 percent of Soviet crude 
oil exports, 57 percent of refined products, 88 percent of natural 
gas, 57 percent of coal, 86 percent of methanol, 91 percent of syn-
thetic rubber, 94 percent of automobiles, 52 percent of tractors and 
46 percent of iron ore. The few commodities in which the RSFSR 
did not dominate included electricity, ammonia and potassium fer-
tilizers. Those were mainly produced by the Ukrainian and Be-
lorussian SSR.196  
The other republics were more inwardly oriented. Their shares 
in the USSR's exports were significantly lower than in intra-union 
trade, which reflected the state monopoly of trade and the central-
ly controlled division of labor.192 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
formed a middle class among the twelve economically less power-
ful Soviet republics. In 1988, for example, the summed NMP pro-
duced by the Baltic republics was 3.1 percent of the USSR's total, 
and their share of the Soviet Union's foreign exports and imports 
was 2.5 percent and 3.0 percent respectively. In terms of NMP per 
capita, however, it is noteworthy that, in the 1970s and early 1980s 
the Baltic republics and the RSFSR had far higher indicators than 
the other Soviet republics.'" 
As the political climate was liberalized in the Soviet Union, 
the Baltic republics began in 1987-88 to strive for economic inde-
pendence."' After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, during the 
first years of independence, the Baltic states achieved a rapid reo-
rientation of trade flows toward the Western market 
economies.200Subsequently, there has been a significant trend to-
ward a lower orientation to Russia and a larger orientation to the 
West in trade. 
The exports of the Baltic republics/states to the other Soviet 
republics / previous Soviet republics (including the other Baltic 
republics) and the CIS countries is presented in Table 1. 
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COUNTRY 1990 
(percent) 
1996 
(percent) 
For the CIS alone 
(percent) 
Estonia 98 40 (3rd quarter of 1996) 24 (3rd quarter of 1996) 
Latvia 97 45 36 
Lithuania 94 56 (first 3 quarters of 1996) 46 (first 3 quarters of 1996) 
Table 1. The exports of the Baltic republics/states to other Soviet 
republics / previous Soviet republics and the CIS countries (percent of 
the total exports) 201  
The share of RFSFR in 1990 was 50 to 63 percent in the Baltic re-
publics' exports and 52 to 61 percent in their imports.202 Currently, 
these figures are significantly lower. Russia's share in the total im-
ports and exports of the Baltic states is presented in Table 2. 
COUNTRY 1993 Import 
(percent) 
1996 Import 
(percent) 
1993 Export 
(percent) 
1996 Export 
(percent) 
Estonia 22.6 16.5 17.2 13.4 
Latvia 29.6 22.6 28.4 20.2 
Lithuania 28.1 23.8 53.7 29.1 
Table 2. The share of Russia in the total imports and exports of the 
Baltic states (percent of the total imports and exports of the countries) 
Notwithstanding the decrease, Russia's proportion in the Baltic 
countries' foreign trade remains very high. Russia is clearly the 
number one trading partner of Latvia and Lithuania and the sec-
ond after Finland in Estonia's foreign trade.203  
The Baltic states' major advantage in production is tied to their 
low-income, highly-skilled labor force. This is reflected in the com-
position of labor and resource-intensive exports, with textiles and 
timber in the first positions. The importance of agriculture and food 
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production should also be noted, along with the sluggishness of 
the countries' industrial sectors. Restructuring away from heavy 
industry is greater in the Baltic states than elsewhere in the previ-
ous Soviet domain.2°4 
In Russia's foreign trade, the geographical pattern has pro-
foundly changed. In 1995 the intra-NIS (New Independent States 
of the former Soviet Union) trade represented 21 percent of Russia's 
exports and 26 percent of its imports, while these shares were 74 
and 58 percent respectively in 1991205 In recent years, the propor-
tion of trade conducted with CIS (NIS) states has generally been 
around 25 percent.206 The commodity structure of Russia's foreign 
trade is heavily concentrated on a limited number of export com-
modities and has not changed as profoundly as the geographical 
pattern.207 On the export side of Russia's trade, energy products 
and raw materials continue to be the major part of total exports. In 
1993, for example, their proportion was 80 percent of total exports. 
On the import side, machines, equipment and transport still repre-
sent a major share, totaling 30 percent of imports. Agricultural prod-
ucts have traditionally been the second largest import item equal-
ing 27 percent of total imports in 1992, but their proportion dropped 
to 20 percent in 1993. The share of the Baltic countries in Russia's 
total trade is very modest. In 1992 their share in Russia's imports 
was 0.9 percent, and in 1993 0.4 percent. Their share in Russia's 
total foreign trade turnover was 1.3 percent in 1992 and 0.8 in 1993.208 
In 1992 and 1993, half of Russia's trade was with the top 7 trade 
partners; 80 percent with the top 20 and almost 95 percent was 
concentrated in 40 countries. Lithuania was the only Baltic coun-
try on the list of Russia's 40 major trade partners, holding the thir-
ty-seventh place with a 0.8 percent share in 1992 and 0.4 percent in 
1993. In 1994/95, none of the Baltic countries were on the list of 
Russia's top 20 trade partners.209 The share of the Baltic states in 
the total exports and imports of Russia in 1995 is presented in 
Table 3. 
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COUNTRY Share in Russia's total imports 
(percent) 
Share in Russia's total exports 
(percent) 
Estonia 0.59 0.5 
Latvia 0.84 0.98 
Lithuania 0.83 1.35 
Table 3. The share of the Baltic states in the total exports and imports of 
Russia in 1995210 
An analysis of trade relations between the Baltic countries and 
Russia reveals an imbalance of interchange. The share of the Baltic 
countries in Russia's foreign trade is very small, whereas the share 
of Russia in the Baltic countries' foreign trade is very high. For 
example, in 1993 Russia's exports to the Baltic states were 3.5 times 
higher than Russia's imports from these countries, and in 1994 
Russia's exports were 5 times higher than imports.211 Russia is a far 
more important trade partner to the Baltic countries than the Baltic 
countries are to Russia. In terms of commodities, the share of the 
three most largest items represents roughly 50 percent of each Bal-
tic country's exports to Russia and/or the CIS countries. On the 
import side from Russia and/or the CIS countries, the three main 
groups of commodities account for approximately 70 to 75 percent 
of each Baltic state's imports. The Baltic countries' imports from 
Russia are dominated by mineral products, chemicals, and diverse 
raw materials,212 which are also major export items in Russia's to-
tal foreign trade. Foodstuffs, machinery and equipment, and vehi-
cles are among the major commodities of the Baltic 
countries'exports to Russia. They also represent a major share of 
Russia's imports in its total foreign trade.213 Against this back-
ground, it would seem that stable trade relations are possible be-
tween the Baltic countries and Russia. 
The following observations can be made about the reasons 
for the trade structure described above. A first reason is the availa-
bility of technical infrastructure like gas and oil pipelines and rela-
tively good and short railroad communications. Second, several 
production processes in the Baltic countries are compatible with 
these import materials, particularly in energy production and the 
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chemical industry. A third reason is the cooperative tradition in 
economy and trade deriving from the Soviet era. Russia and the 
CIS countries, in turn, are a natural market area for the Baltic states. 
Market channels have remained, the Balts know how to use them 
and their products correspond to Russian quality standards. A lack 
of market channels in the West and (often formally) tight stand-
ards make exporting to the West more difficult.214 The develop-
ment of relations between Russia and the West, particularly the 
European Union, is important for the future of the Baltic states' 
economies. Under favourable conditions the Baltic countries could 
become a gateway for Russia's trade with the West, offering trans-
port services and perhaps processing and reselling raw materials 
of Russian origin.215 Undoubtedy, positive prospects for Russian-
Baltic relations would promote these developments. 
Transportation 
Because of Russia's vast continental territory, transportation is a 
crucial element in the country's economy. Russia's transport sys-
tems, however, fall far below world standards. In the development 
of railroad transportation, Russia is forty-fifth in the world. In 
motorcar transportation it is thirty-fourth, in air transportation for-
ty-sixth, and in seaport economies fiftieth. Contrary to the com-
mon trend in the world economy to move away from railroad trans-
portation toward a higher proportion of motorcar transportation, 
railroads are the main means of transportation in Russia, carrying 
seventy-four percent of cargo (in 1994), while motorcars represent-
ed 2.4 percent, sea transportation 18.4 percent and rivers 5.3 per-
cent of cargo transport.216 
 
A dramatic decline of seaport capacity was one of the major 
geopolitical changes resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. Having lost the Odessa port systems Russia no longer pos-
sess docks for general cargo or for container ships on the Black 
Sea. After the loss of four major import-export seaports on the Bal-
tic Sea (Tallinn in Estonia, Riga and Ventspils in Latvia and Klaipe-
da in Lithuania), Russia was left without an oil port on the Baltic 
Sea. In terms of available dock length, Russia lost 75 percent of 
docks on the Baltic and Black seas.217 
The remaining capacity is insufficient. Russia possesses 43 
commercial seaports with a total capacity of 165 million tons a 
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year. Of the 14 large ports (capacity more than 6 million tons a 
year) of the Soviet Union, 7 were left to Russia.218 Russia's current 
port capacity is considered to be 37 percent lower than domestic 
needs219 and 50 percent lower than the requirements of foreign 
trade. The capacity is limited not only by quantity but also by 
quality, for 60 percent of ports have such shallow waters that they 
cannot receive large ships. The changes resulted at first in lower 
freight volumes. The total cargo transported through Russian ports 
in 1993 (163 million tons) was two-thirds of the volume trans-
ported via the Soviet ports in 1990.220 Here it should be noted that 
foreign trade dropped dramatically at the same time but has 
grown since 1993, and future port capacities should be estimated 
against the background of growing foreign trade. Sixty-five per-
cent of Russia's sea freight is transported through Russian ports.221  
The remainder is processed through the neighboring countries, 
Ukraine, Transcaucasian region, the Baltic states, and Finland. 
Russia pays between 1.6 and 2 billion US dollars per year for these 
services.222 
On the Baltic Sea, approximately 40 percent of the Soviet port 
capacity was left to Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Un-
ion, the main ports being St Petersburg, Kaliningrad, and Vyborg. 
In terms of dock length on the Baltic Sea, Russia possesses 5.9 kilo-
metres of docks instead of the 20.1 kilometres possessed by the 
Soviet Union.Tallinn and Riga were equipped in the Soviet era with 
facilities designed for crop imports to all the USSR, while Vent-
spils and Klaipeda had major oil terminals. Ventspils in Latvia is 
the largest port on the Baltic Sea, through which petroleum, petro-
leum products, chemical cargo, potassium, and metal are export-
ed. Ventspils and the other major Latvian port, Liepaja, never freeze. 
After Novorossiisk, Ventspils is the second most important port 
used by Russia for oil exports, its capacity being 46 million tons a 
year. Two pipelines come from Russia to Ventspils, one for oil and 
the other for mineral products. The pipelines are of Latvian-Rus-
sian ownership. Klaipeda in Lithuania is the second largest port 
on the Baltic coast and has ferry connections with Germany, Swe-
den, and Denmark.223 St Petersburg, in turn, is the largest Russian 
port in terms of cargo, among 11 ports handling goods.224 The ca-
pacities of the ports in the Baltic countries are higher than the coun-
tries' own needs, because they were originally planned to meet 
the transport requirements of a great power. 
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Major changes have taken place in the Russian routing of ex-
port-import transportation. The loss of seaports on the Baltic and 
Black seas forced Russia to turn flows of goods toward its own 
seaports and land communications. When Ukraine raised transit 
fees, Russia reoriented land freight flows into the only remaining 
free corridor, Belarus. After the economic rapprochement in 1994, 
Belarus became the lowest-priced and most reliable export-import 
land corridor between Russia and Europe.225 As a second conse-
quence, sea routes linking the Baltic and Black seas with markets 
to the West, were revived.226 That increased pressure on the Baltic 
ports. In addition, the Baltic Sea is drawing cargo from other parts 
of Russia, including the Urals and western Siberian regions, where 
it is unprofitable to transport to the Far-Eastern ports of Vladivos-
tok and Nahodka because of high railway tariffs.227 Beyond Rus-
sia, the European Union prefers sea and railroad to motorcar trans-
portation for environmental reasons, and the Baltic Port Organiza-
tion estimates that sea transportation on the Baltic Sea will grow 
within the next 15 years from 600 million tons per year to one bil-
lion tons.228 Future development of developing ship-to-rail con-
nections for the purpose of saving time by linking the West to the 
Far East through Russian railroads and the Baltic, will put grow-
ing requirements on ports.229 It is worth noting that shipping move-
ments in the Baltic ports have grown significantly, even in the ear-
ly 1990s, when the Soviet/Russian foreign trade decreased. In Klai-
peda the growth of shipping movements from 1990 to 1992 was 
nearly forty percent, in Riga about thirty percent, and in St Peters-
burg and Kaliningrad around twenty-five percent, while the growth 
in Ventspils was ten percent.23° The growth of processed goods 
(million tons per year) from 1993 to 1995 in transit cargo was fifty-
seven percent in Riga and thirty-three percent in Ventspils. The 
total volume grew ten percent in St Petersburg and seventy-five 
percent in Kaliningrad, while the volume of Klaipeda dropped 
twenty percent. Altogether, 52.2 tons in 1991 and 64.1 tons in 1995 
were processed in the ports of the Baltic states.231 The geoeconomic 
significance of the Baltic seaports seems likely to increase. 
Besides insufficient port capacities, Russian collaboration has 
also run into other difficulties. Russian oil exporters have been con-
tinuously dependent on the terminal located at the Latvian port of 
Ventspils, and problems have been encountered with Lithuania in 
attempts to maintain Russia's commercially profitable access to 
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Kaliningrad. For example, freight fees charged by Lithuanian rail-
roads in July 1994 on transit freight through Lithuania to Kalinin-
grad made it more expensive for the Russians to export via Kalin-
ingrad than via the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda. Russia accused 
Lithuania of discriminating against Kaliningrad in order to draw 
freight from the CIS countries to the Baltic ports. Russians refer to 
the Convention on Transit Trade of Land-Locked States, on the basis 
of which, according to its interpretation, Russia should have unre-
stricted access to Kaliningrad, and if any fees are set, they should 
only correspond to the costs.232 In 1997, Lithuania's Deputy For-
eign Minister Alginas Januska announced that Lithuania has cre-
ated favourable transport conditions for the Kaliningrad region, 
and Russia's military traffic to the enclave operates unimpeded.233 
The fees charged for shipping Russian cargo through Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania are a major source of foreign-exchange re-
ceipts for these countries. In 1995 transportation and communica-
tions accounted for 9.1 percent of Estonia's GDP, 17.6 percent of 
Latvia's, and 7.6 percent of Lithuania's.234 In 1995 transit traffic ac-
counted to 45 percent of transport in Estonia's railroads and 68 
percent of the total transport of Tallinn's port. Transit transport 
represented 74 percent of the turnover of Latvia's railroad compa-
ny in 1995. As in Latvia, transit transport in Lithuania is a national 
priority. Lithuania's advantage is its ability to serve the Belarus-
sian and Ukrainian markets. Eighty percent of transport in the port 
of Klaipeda serves the purposes of transit.235 
It is clear that Russia is looking for ways to increase seaport 
capacity on the Baltic Sea in order to compensate for the decline 
and to minimize payments to other countries for port services. To 
replace its lost port capacity on the Baltic and Black seas, new ca-
pacity of one hundred million tons a year is necessary for Russia. 
The National Ports Development Plan of 1992 suggests that new 
ports should be built in Ust'-Luga, Primorsk and Batareinaia on 
the Baltic Sea during 2000-2005. The objective of the plan is to in-
crease Russia's total port capacity and to eliminate dependence on 
foreign services. The planned capacity of Ust'-Luga is 35 million 
tons a year, serving mainly dry cargo transport. The construction 
work was begun in 1997. A capacity of 8 million tons a year is to be 
built by 1999. The following stage would increase it to 17.5 million 
tons a year. An oil and gas terminal with a capacity of 45 million 
tons a year is planned for Primorsk. The port of Batareinaia should 
77 
concentrate in oil and oil products, reaching a capacity of 7.5 mil-
lion tons a year by 1999 and later up to 15 million tons. The port of 
St Petersburg worked in 1996 at 70 percent capacity, processing 
10.5 tons of goods. The capacity should be increased up to 20 mil-
lion tons a year.236 In the light of these capacity figures, after the 
realization of its planned construction Russia might not need the 
ports in the Baltic states. 
The World Bank considers the National Port Development Plan 
too optimistic in light of Russia's economic situation. Nor can the 
projects at Ust'-Luga and Primorsk be justified by calculations con-
cerning their profitableness. It would be more profitable to increase 
the capacity by modernizing and developing the existing Baltic 
ports, but Russia seems to have political and strategic reasons for 
wanting to build new ones. Financing is wide open, and the reali-
zation of the plan will not be possible without significant foreign 
loans.237 It seems that the plan will not be implemented by 2005 
and it depends on Russia's economic development whether and 
to what extent the plan will be realized at all. 
Russia has at least three options in developing port capacities 
on the Baltic Sea, and some combination of them might be the op-
timal way to proceed. The first option is collaboration with other 
countries by using their port facilities specially assignable to serve 
Russian shipping. A partner country does not necessarily have to 
border Russia. A second choice is to reach long-term agreements 
with the Baltic states and Ukraine on sea transportation. A third 
option is to modernize existing ports and/or to build new facili-
ties. In the northern regions almost all cargo goes to Murmansk 
and Archangelsk. Other northern ports, Kandalaksha, Umba, Be-
lomorsk, Onega, Mezer and Nar'ian-Mar are small and mainly 
specialize in timber freight. Moreover, most of them do not have a 
railway connection. A new port in Ust'-Luga is an appropriate but 
not an optimal solution because of shallow waters, alluvial sand 
and ecological consequences. The same drawbacks apply enlarg-
ing the port of St Petersburg.238 Anyway, Russia's first priority seems 
to be to build its own facilities and avoid dependence on the Baltic 
countries because of the orientation of their foreign policies. De-
pending on political developments, Kaliningrad might be one area 
that could be developed, Baltiisk being utilized as a core of ex-
panded port system. Attempts to restore normal land connections 
to Kaliningrad are undoubtedly a high priority in Russia's policy 
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toward the Baltic and adjacent regions. In the future, Kaliningrad 
may have growing economic implications for the neighbouring 
countries. Besides being a strategically important gateway to Rus-
sia, it could become a key link to Lithuania and Poland. It has a 
well-established structure of roads, rail lines, ports, airports and 
other municipal services, and it could be a potential object of for-
eign investment.239 Presumably the Russian Federation is more in-
terested in developing Kaliningrad than offering a gateway to the 
neighboring Baltic countries. In this light, Kaliningrad competes 
with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. 
All told, one of Russia's major challenges in the future is to 
develop its transportation system both because of its importance 
to the national economy and because of the current inefficiency 
and backwardness in many branches of transportation.24° Rapid 
improvements cannot be expected in motorcar transportation, be-
cause its major problem is poor infrastructure. Its units are small, 
and political geography restricts its role in Russia's foreign trade. 
Railroads will likely maintain their important role because of the 
country's vast distances and the relatively large existing railroad 
infrastructure. Sea transportation will be emphasized because of 
the growing requirements, the high share of non-CIS countries in 
Russia's foreign trade (75 percent), and the scarcity of land trans-
portation lines. Considering cargo volumes, it seems that even if 
Russia's port capacities on the Baltic Sea grew in the future, it 
will need port services from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania for a 
number of years.241 
 Russia will likely proceed along three lines. 
First, it will continue to utilize the port services of the Baltic coun-
tries. This binds the interests of Russia and the Baltic countries 
together. But being uncertain about the Baltic countries' future 
policies, Russia will try to avoid any long-term dependence on 
them. Second, Russia will look for facilities in third countries. For 
example, the idea of an oil pipeline route from Russia to the Finn-
ish port of Porvoo has been advanced, though final decisions on 
this project have not yet been made.242 Third, Russia will develop 
its own facilities. But because of economic constraints, this will 
happen slowly. The capacity that would eliminate Russia's de-
pendence on the Baltic countries' ports can hardly be reached 
sooner than 10 or 15 years. This will increase the strategic impor-
tance of the Kaliningrad area and will require balancing the inter-
ests of Russia and Lithuania. Lithuania's interests are linked to 
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the large share of Russia in its foreign trade. A common Baltic 
interest is to maintain transit cargo flows as a source of income. 
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6 RUSSIA'S GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS 
RELATED TO FOREIGN POLICY 
AND POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS 
The Policies of Russia 
The contemporary political situation in the Baltic region is histori-
cally extraordinary for Russia. Until 1991 Russia had politically 
controlled the East-Baltic littoral for more than two hundred years, 
except for the twenty-two years of the Baltic states' independence 
in 1918-1940. The developments that led to the Baltic republics' 
renewed independence in 1991 were to a degree similiar to those 
that resulted in their independence in 1918, coinciding with a great 
transition within the Russian/Soviet empire. In the aftermath of 
World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution, several areas had sep-
arated from the empire, but in the early 1920s the Soviet Russia 
recovered many of them. Similarly, Russia's policy toward the Bal-
tic countries in the 1990s reflects its desire to restore political con-
trol over the three states at least partially. 
Russia's National Security Concept, Foreign Ministry's long-
term plan for Russia's relations with the Baltic countries (1997), 
Russia's political initiatives put forward in 1997 as well as threat 
perceptions provide some incredients for assessment of Russia's 
political interests in relation to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In 
May 1997 the Russian Federation's Security Council approved the 
National Security Concept.243 The main threats to national securi-
ty at the moment and in the foreseeable future are of non-military 
nature. They are mainly internal and concentrated in internal pol-
icy, economy and information as well as in social, ecological and 
intellectual spheres. The absence of direct military threat allows 
the state to allocate resources for solving internal security prob-
lems. In the category of threats related to defence, the concept ad-
vances the following: (1) attempts to compete by force against Rus-
sia; (2) local wars and armed conflicts in the vicinity of Russia's 
borders; (3) the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weap-
ons of mass destruction, especially in the countries bordering Rus-
sia; (4) international terrorism; (5) the presence or creation of pow-
erful groupings of military forces in regions near Russia; even in 
the absence of aggressive intentions toward Russia such group- 
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ings compose potential military threat; (6) NATO enlargement to 
the east and NATO's transformation into a dominating politico-
military power in Europe; (7) technological gap between a number 
of countries and their growing capacity of creating weapons and 
military equipment of new generation, which may lead to new 
development of arms race; (8) reduced capability of the armed forces 
to guarantee the security of Russia; (9) penetration of Russia by 
foreign intelligence services.244 The contemporary threats to Rus-
sia from the Baltic direction, as from Europe generally, are political 
and politico-military. They are intertwined and stem from NATO's 
enlargement. The enlargement per se does not create a military 
threat to Russia in the foreseeable future. 
In February 1997 the Russian Foreign Ministry presented a 
long-term plan for relations with the Baltic states. According to 
the plan, these relations are exceptionally important. Their impor-
tance stems from Baltic security concerns in conjunction with NATO 
enlargement, the situation of ethnic Russians in the region, and the 
geopolitical position of the Baltic countries as a link between 
Russia's and Western and Northern Europe's economies. Russia's 
constructive relations with the Baltic countries are the strategic aim 
of the plan, based on economic cooperation, respect for human 
rights and national minorities, and the "indivisibility" of the states' 
security. The plan calls for settling the fundamental problems both 
bilaterally and in the region in general. However, it links the un-
settled border issues to the improvements of ethnic Russians' po-
sition. The plan also calls for universal security in the region, mean-
ing that the security of any country should not be ensured in a way 
that causes risks to other countries. A primary idea in the plan is 
that the Baltic region's security should be based on the Baltic coun-
tries' neutrality and non-participation in military alliances. Enter-
ing into alliances is said to be outdated in a multipolar world and 
might create dividing lines.245 
Subsequently, President Boris Yeltsin called for better relations 
with the Baltic states, assuring them that the threat of an attack 
from the east belongs to the past and suggesting that Russia would 
guarantee the Baltic states' security.246 However, some dualism and 
even ambiguity is observed in Russia's policy. Foreign Minister 
Evgenii Primakov's statements in early 1997 were harder, taking a 
decisive stance against the Baltic countries' NATO membership, 
and linking the progress in the border agreement with Estonia with 
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improvements in the position of ethnic Russians. Primakov also 
has said that even one Baltic country's NATO membership would 
shatter the whole relationship between Russia and NATO.247 In 
autumn 1997, Russia advanced proposals on bilateral and multi-
lateral confidence and security building measures in the Baltic Sea 
region. Proposals were focused on the East-Baltic littoral, and they 
included ideas of creating zones of armament and military control 
in the region as well as deepening international military contacts, 
communications and cooperation between the nations of the re-
gion. 
In the Baltic states, interest toward Russia's initiatives has been 
lukewarm. According to the Estonian Foreign Ministry, the long-
term plan for relations contained no reason to change Estonia's 
policy. The Latvian Foreign Ministry's position was similiar.248 
Based on their history, it is clear that neutrality hardly attracts the 
Balts. For historical reasons they will not accept Russia's security 
guarantees either. According to Lithuania's president Algirdas Bra-
zauskas, the Russian offer gave grounds for optimism, but Lithua-
nia sees no better guarantees than membership in NATO.249 All in 
all, the Baltic states consider NATO membership as their only guar-
antee of political independence, while EU membership is seen as 
the foundation of economic progress.2" Russia's policy suggests 
that it has not fully accepted the idea of all countries' freedom to 
make their own decisions about security policy. Some of Foreign 
Minister Primakov's statements reflect the traditional Russian/ 
Soviet idea of telling other countries what they are expected to do. 
The long-term plan for relations is built upon only one option, non-
participation of the Baltic states in military alliances. It states that 
the Baltic countries' NATO membership would create a serious 
barrier between them and Russia.251 Primakov's remarks about the 
effect of any Baltic country's NATO membership on the Russian-
NATO relationship imply some notion of Russia's sphere of influ-
ence in the Baltic region. Russia's current policy seems to resemble 
Russia's orientation in 1993 when the countries of the "near abroad" 
were declared to be a zone of Russia's vital interests.252 The ambi-
guity in the practice of Russia's policy toward the Baltic states tends 
to indicate that at least now Russia does not possess effective polit-
ical means to pursue its interests in the East-Baltic littoral. 
It can be concluded, on the basis of the practice of Russia's 
foreign policy and from threat perceptions, the plan of Russian- 
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Baltic relations and Russia's proposals in 1997 that Russia's con-
cerns regarding foreign policy and politico-military issues in the 
region derive from: (1) NATO enlargement; (2) the Baltic states' 
geopolitical location in Russia's neighborhood; (3) the economic 
significance of the three states to Russia. The politico-economic 
interests between the Baltic countries and Russia are multilateral 
and mutual. Russia needs access to the Baltic seaports, while the 
economies of the Baltic states require trade with Russia and transit 
fees for Russian cargo. The development of Russia's own port ca-
pacity will diminish Russia's dependence on Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, but that is not likely to happen soon. 
NATO Enlargement 
NATO enlargement in Central Europe will presumably dominate 
Russia's political concerns in the Baltic states over the 5 to 10 years 
to come. Russia's long-term interests will be strongly affected by 
whether the Baltic countries become NATO members. Several po-
sitions can be observed in current approaches to NATO enlarge-
ment. The United States' view is that the enlargement contributes 
to overall European security and thereby Russia's national securi-
ty. Russia sees it differently and believes that the enlargement un-
dermines European and Russian security. Other countries empha-
size that the enlargement should not create new dividing lines in 
Europe, which seems to imply that security will weaken if new 
dividing lines emerge or Russia becomes isolated. According to 
another view, the enlargement will in any case create dividing lines. 
How deep they will be depends on the arrangements of Russian-
NATO relations. Still another view suggests that NATO enlarge-
ment does not cause problems to Russia at all: the enlargement is 
needless, because NATO in any case will be unable to respond to 
future threats, which will not be of military nature. 
Among these positions Russia's view is crucial, because 
Russia's reactions to the enlargement will to a large extent deter-
mine how the enlargement affects European security. Some NATO 
countries seem to assume that a European cooperative security 
system would be possible even if NATO expanded to Russia's bor-
ders. Russia, in turn, apparently considers NATO enlargement dis-
ruptive of equilibrium. Geopolitically, the current phase marks a 
search for a balance between the Western and the Russian core ar- 
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eas. Parallel to NATO-Russia cooperation in the field of security, 
Russia's political interest is to influence NATO's decisions. Hence 
it follows that since Russia did not succeed in hampering NATO's 
enlargement, Russia will in the future strive to restrict NATO's 
activities in Russia's "near abroad" in order to restore an accepta-
ble equilibrium. That will affect the Baltic states' situation, regard-
less of their future relation to NATO. 
The NATO-Russia relationship is crucial for European securi-
ty. There cannot be an overall security system without Russia's 
participation. Russia recognizes this and seeks to maximize its ad-
vantage in conjunction with NATO enlargement. Should Russia 
agree to the enlargement, it could not pursue security interests in 
the bordering countries as it is doing now. On the other hand Rus-
sia cannot afford a conflict with the West, because it needs to gain 
time for self-determination and because Western economic rela-
tions are of the utmost importance to Russia. In contrast with the 
Cold War era, Russia now apparently accepts the United States' 
presence in Europe because it stabilizes the post-Cold War geopo-
litical setting there. If Russia's national interests are taken into ac-
count in the way it desires, Russia will cooperate with the West. If 
not, Russia may still cooperate, but at the same time its objective 
will be to restrict the damage and make the enlargement disad-
vantageous for the West.253 
 However, for the time being Russia can-
not be very effective in that because of its current weakness. 
On the basis of recent Russian statements on NATO enlarge-
ment, it is possible to conclude that Russia feels its interests threat-
ened in at least five ways. First, NATO enlargement is viewed as 
an increase of American influence in Europe and in Russia's close 
vicinity. Second, Russia might become politically isolated from a 
united Europe. Third, the enlargement might reduce Russia's means 
of protecting its national interests. Fourth, although the enlarge-
ment per se does not pose a military threat to Russia, it might pro-
vide NATO with advantage in the future. Fifth, it is difficult psy-
chologically for Russia to accept NATO as a neighbor because their 
interests were opposed for about 45 years and only the Soviet 
Union's defeat rendered NATO's approach to Russia's borders 
possible. And moreover, Russians perceive that now as Russia is 
opening up to the West, the West gets together in an organization 
which the Russians viewed as an enemy until recently. It seems 
that Russia's opposition to NATO enlargement is twofold. First, 
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Russia does not agree in the enlargement in general because it does 
not agree in a NATO-centric military security system in Europe. 
Second, for military and political reasons the NATO membership 
of Russia's close neighbors would not be acceptable. So far Russia 
does not oppose its neighbors' membership in the European Un-
ion (EU), though this may not be the final stance. 
In the circumstances of the highly-tuned military confronta-
tion between NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, 
the strategic warning time254 was a key determinant of the allianc-
es' military and politico-military preparedness for war. If the warn-
ing time of a major conflict was 48 hours within NATO during the 
Cold War, in the post-Cold War setting it is counted in months or 
even in years. Military factors were crucial in fulfilling the require-
ments of the warning time during the Cold War, whereas politico-
military aspects are foremost in the post-Cold War era, when the 
danger of a large high-intensity war has dropped dramatically. The 
length of the warning time is generally determined on the basis of 
a party's perceptions concerning its own capabilities and the op-
posing party's aims, readiness and capabilities. The strategic warn-
ing time is becoming particularly important for Russia, now that it 
is geopolitically weakened and its armed forces have considerably 
deteriorated. Russia's demands for special arrangements in Rus-
sian-NATO relations and for restrictions on NATO's activities in 
the new member states are clearly aimed at gaining a maximum 
politico-military advantage, hence maximum strategic warning 
time in the future. 
Russia's first and foremost politico-military interest in the 
Baltic region is to prevent Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from join-
ing NATO. If Russia fails in that, what could it do? A clue is pro-
vided by Russia's activities in opposing the NATO membership of 
the first group of East Central European countries. Russia's strate-
gy would presumably be to restrict the damage by influencing the 
process of the Baltic states' membership preparations. Russia's 
logical aim would be to minimize the military threat potential and 
NATO's activities in the new member states and, consequently, 
gain a longer strategic warning time. Should it achieve this aim, 
the result would be restricted preparations for NATO's common 
defence in the Baltic region. 
In addition to the arrangements stated in the Founding Act,2" 
an essential part of Russia's objectives would be to agree with 
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NATO and the Baltic states on restrictions, for example, in the fol-
lowing areas. First, no permanent NATO bases or units would be 
admitted in the Baltic countries' territories. Second, limits should 
be put on the troop levels of the Baltic states' armed forces as well 
as on the Alliance's exercises in these countries. Third, Russia could 
claim land communications to the Kaliningrad region. Fourth, 
Russia could demand that the Baltic states' membership in NATO 
should be frozen for a decade or two. To pursue these aims Russia 
could attempt to use means like the adaptation of the CFE Treaty 
or its voice in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. Russia 
could also impose political pressure on the Baltic states themselves, 
referring, for example, to the open border issues and the situation 
of ethnic Russians in the region. 
Russia could gain a number of advantages as a result of such 
restrictions. First, they would provide a significant increase of stra-
tegic warning time. Second, they would keep the military capabil-
ities in the Baltic states down and the Alliance's surprise potential. 
Third, Russia might have opportunities to monitor military devel-
opments in the neighbouring countries, at least through the verifi-
cation mechanism of the adapted CFE Treaty. Fourth, Russia's nu-
clear deterrence would remain relatively strong, because no limi-
tations would presumably be accepted to nuclear deployment with-
in Russian territory. The Founding Act in this respect deals only 
with NATO's nuclear assets, not Russia's. Fifth, crisis escalation 
would become easier for Russia to control and NATO's behaviour 
easier to predict, because the peacetime restrictions would imply a 
definite escalation mechanism in a strained situation. In the esca-
lation phases Russia could use NATO's activities as a politico-mil-
itary justification for its own activities and perhaps seize the initi-
ative. 
The aforementioned arrangements would reduce the danger 
of a surprise attack and build confidence between Russia and 
NATO, but they are not unambiguous from the perspective of the 
new members. They should not be compared with the restrictions 
put on NATO's activities in Denmark and Norway, because those 
were suggested by these countries themselves. The arrangements 
that Russia would seek affect the security of the Baltic states, im-
posing risks that benefit Russia. First, limitations on NATO's troop 
levels and activities in the Baltic states may weaken the Alliance's 
ability to fulfill Article 5 commitments in the event of war. Such 
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developments might undermine NATO's cohesion and lead per-
haps to some political fragmentation in the long run. That would 
coincide with Russia's geopolitical interests. 
What are Russia's political interests in relation to non-allied 
Baltic countries? The primary political goal, as deduced from the 
Russian Foreign Ministry's plan for relations, is undoubtedly to 
neutralize potential threats from the Baltic direction. The Russian 
idea of "a zone of indivisible security of countries" would then 
result in a security zone, wherein the three non-allied Baltic coun-
tries together with the Kaliningrad area and Belarus would cover 
more than half of Russia's western frontier between the Gulf of 
Finland and the Black Sea. In the southern Baltic littoral Russia has 
already underscored the borders of its sphere of influence by con-
cluding the Union Treaty and cooperationg with Belarus. Russia's 
attempts to keep the Alliance from its frontiers in the Baltic Sea 
region implies that Russia tries to reserve for the Baltic countries a 
role in its security system. That is reminiscent of Russia's tradi-
tional way of promoting its security, through neighboring coun-
tries. Thus from Russia's perspective, non-allied Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania should pursue policies that stabilize the situation in 
the Baltic region and coincide with Russian policy. Having achieved 
this goal, Russia would exercise continuous political influence in 
the region. 
A major common advantage of the Founding Act on Mutual 
Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Rus-
sian Federation of 27 May 1997 is that it provides a mechanism to 
prevent an automatic growth of military tension and an automatic 
renewal of the arms race over the long run. From Russia's perspec-
tive, perhaps the most significant goal is that the Act partially re-
duces the risk of Russia not being heard on European security af-
fairs. Several observations can be made about NATO enlargement 
in conjunction with the Act. First, the Act defines mechanisms of 
consultation and joint decisions. Second, NATO member states 
reiterate that they have no intention or plan to deploy nuclear weap-
ons on the territories of new members. Third, the Alliance's collec-
tive defence will be based on creating capabilities rather than per-
manent stationing of substantial combat forces. Fourth, the parties 
are prepared to consult on the evolution of their conventional force 
posture. Militarily, from Russia's point of view these points form a 
control and escalation mechanism for strained international situa- 
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tions and contribute to strategic warning time for Russia. 
The value of the Founding Act remains to be seen during the 
years to come. A major risk stems from the fact that the Act was not 
reached as a result of agreement, but rather as a result of Russia's 
weakness. Russia had farther-reaching objectives than it could reach 
at the negotiations. It had to yield because of its weak position, 
and stubbornness would have led to Russia's self-isolation in the 
long run. This imbalance may contain the seeds of future tension 
and lead to Russia's efforts to restore the equilibrium. The Found-
ing Act did not resolve the opposition of interests over NATO en-
largement. In the Act Russia formally accepts the enlargement, but 
that does not mean that Russia agrees with it. And despite the en-
couraging signs of preventing Russia's isolation in Europe, the 
possibility should be noted that Russia, if pressured in Europe, 
might become more active in the south and east (Caucasia, Central 
Asia, China). 
What is the value of the Founding Act from the perspective of 
the East Central European countries? From the Baltic states' view-
point several items of the Act are important, including the follow-
ing: (1) NATO and Russia will cooperate to prevent (passage 
omitted) confrontation or the isolation of any state"; (2) NATO and 
Russia will "refrain from the threat or use of force against each 
other as well as any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity 
or political independence"; (3) NATO and Russia "respect the sov-
ereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their 
inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, 
the inviolability of borders". Although the Act states that the par-
ties do not consider each other as adversaries, Russia's clearly ex-
pressed opposition to NATO enlargement implies that Russia still 
sees dangers and risks in it. The enlargement is also mentioned as 
a threat in Russia's National Security Concept. The Act's refer-
ence to Europe without spheres of influence limiting the sover-
eignty of any state perhaps implies that such spheres should not 
be created in the European security architecture. That does not 
impede Russia from pursuing its interests in relation to the neigh-
bouring countries. According to president Yeltsin (26 May 1997), 
in a dialogue with the Baltic states it will be possible to convince 
them that NATO membership will not improve their security. 
Yeltsin's and his administration's statements on the need to re-
view the Founding Act if former Soviet Republics join NATO goes 
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in the same direction, albeit focused perhaps more on the domestic 
audience. That said, it seems that the rivalry for influence in East 
Central Europe will continue. 
The Founding Act is an important document for Russia. This 
is reflected in the Russian statements stressing the binding quality 
of the Act, comparing it with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. De-
spite Russia's weak position at the negotiations, the document, at 
least theoretically, provides Russia with possibilities for influence. 
First, in relation to the United States Russia's position is stronger 
in setting the agenda for regular sessions of the Permanent Joint 
Council. Russia has constantly a representative in the troika-chair-
manship, while the United States is one of the rotating NATO mem-
bers in the chairmanship. Second, the position of the Joint Council 
provides Russia, at least theoretically, with the opportunity to bal-
ance interests in other forums, like the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council and the OSCE. The provision of the Act stating that Russia's 
and NATO's actions must be consistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations and the OSCE's governing principles implies the 
possibility of moving common issues to the UN and OSCE, where 
Russia's position is relatively stronger than in the Joint Council. 
And finally, it may be asked, to what extent the consensus-based 
decision-making principle of the Joint Council is equivalent to the 
right of veto.256  It should be noted that the Founding Act specifies 
areas for consultation and cooperation and states that the Act does 
not infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to inde-
pendent decision-making and action. On the other hand, it states 
that the Joint Council provides mechanism for joint decisions with 
respect to security issues of common concern." Undoubtedly 
Russia's interest is to interpret these provisions as widely as possi-
ble. It remains to be seen how useful these possibilities of influ-
ence will turn out to be. Now, when more than one year has passed 
after the cooperation on the basis of the Founding Act was launched, 
the experience gained is not very encouraging. According to some 
sources, cooperation within the framework of the Permanent Joint 
Council is suffering from mutual distrust, clashing perceptions and 
bureaucratic inertia. Suspicions and recriminations have emerged 
on both sides. It is said that at NATO headquarters the mood is 
gloomy about hopes for new security partnership between NATO 
and Russia. A substantive dialogue is even alleged to have proved 
impossible, i.a. because of the restricted space for manoeuvrabil- 
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ity posed by Moscow on the Russian diplomats. The Russian side 
claims that when they ask about NATO's plans for military infra-
structure and troop stationing in the three new member states, the 
questions are rejected with excuses that NATO cannot discuss these 
matters over the heads of Poland, the Czech republic and Hunga-
ry. Russian military seem to be more keen in cooperation with 
NATO than in the civilian side.257 
The Charter of Partnership Among the United States of Amer-
ica and the Republic of Estonia, Latvia and the Republic of Lithua-
nia signed in January 1998 gratifies for its part the Baltic countries' 
needs for a more stable security political position. The significance 
of the Charter is of politico-military nature rather than military. It 
notes the shared goal of Baltic integration into European and trans-
atlantic institutions, such as the European Union, the OSCE, the 
World Trade organization and NATO. The United States welcomes 
Baltic aspirations and supports their efforts to join NATO, but this 
does not commit the United States to Baltic membership. The Char-
ter does not offer any security guarantees. It is not an alternative to 
NATO membership, nor is it an effort to regionalize the security of 
the Baltic states. The Charter implies that the Baltic countries must 
themselves develop their military defence to meet the responsibil-
ities and obligations of membership in the Alliance. The United 
States will cooperate with the Baltic states in building up their de-
fence. Emphasizing the significance of stability in Europe, the Char-
ter is also a signal toward Russia and has indirect impact on rela-
tions between Russia and the Baltic states. 
Russia's Instruments for the Realization of its Political Interests 
Cooperation based on the Founding Act may provide Russia with 
opportunities to attempt to influence the security of the Baltic Sea 
area. Another area of influence is Russia's direct activities in rela-
tion to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Which instruments does 
Russia possess for the realization of its political interests toward 
the Baltic states? With regard to the "near abroad" in general, Kon-
stantin Sorokin's analysis advances the following means: (1) eco-
nomic instruments, such as cooperation and penetration; (2) polit-
ico-economic instruments, such as the utilization of the neighbour-
ing countries' dependence on energy supplies, technological de-
pendence and dependence on transport; (3) political instruments, 
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such as diplomatic actions along the lines of the new thinking" or 
balancing diplomacy, and the utilization of the Russian diaspora 
or the national diaspora in Russia; (4) military assistance in train-
ing local armies, delivery of weapons, peace enforcement, estab-
lishment of military bases and the use of military power. Accord-
ing to Sorokin's analysis, the more unstable and socially or politi-
cally unsettled is the country-object, the less appropriate are eco-
nomic and political methods and the more appropriate are mili-
tary and politico-military methods. Hence in relation to the Baltic 
states, economic and political methods would be most appropri-
ate. Sorokin considers the contemporary Russian political estab-
lishment too weak and controversial to protect by itself Russia's 
economic interests in the "near abroad." Therefore, assistance by 
Russian commercial banks would be required. The former Soviet 
republics would be relatively vulnerable to their economic pene-
tration. Private investments would be more effective than govern-
mental, and for political reasons private investments are the only 
option in cases like the Baltic states?" Economic penetration should 
be supported by the Russian government. The "energy weapon" 
is one politico-economic instrument, but its use is questionable 
because of uncertainty about its effect. The Baltic countries could 
eliminate disturbances in oil delivery with purchases from third 
countries. The price factor is not an effective lever because the Bal-
tic states have paid world market prices for Russian oil since the 
early 1990s. With regard to gas supply it can be asked, what would 
be the aim of using a blockade against the Baltic states? That would 
severely undermine Russia's credibility as a gas supplier to the 
West for a long time. Russia can hardly afford such setbacks now, 
when it needs Western currency and is enhancing gas supply 
abroad. Second, Gasprom, which controls 80 percent of Russia's 
gas market, is a private company and may not be easily persuad- 
ed to cut down its foreign deliveries. This reflects the changed sit-
uation in the post-Soviet era. Economic means of influence are per- 
haps effective politically as a potential threat, but their implemen- 
tation is restricted by mutual economic interests. For example, a 
dramatic drop of food imports from the Baltic countries would 
presumably result at least regionally in disturbances of food sup-
plies, which is complicated enough in Russia at present. The use of 
the "energy weapon" is an extreme step, in which Russia would 
run a risk of serious international repercussions. 
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Balancing diplomacy in Soviet times meant playing with "im-
perialistic controversies". Today, and particularly during the Bal-
tic states' hypothetical NATO membership, Russia could utilize its 
geopolitical influence in the "near abroad" and attempt to play 
them against each other. A second way is the "package method," 
which means bringing in other problems in which Russia's posi-
tion is strong, for example, linking energy deliveries and political-
ly open questions. Russia is applying this method at the moment, 
linking the issue of the border agreement with Estonia to the posi-
tion of ethnic Russians. A third method is a "mined gift," meaning 
that Russia could voluntarily abandon issues that it cannot handle 
or that are disadvantageous, and pass the problems to a new host". 
Military power is the ultimate political instrument. According to 
Sorokin, in the current circumstances it is inapplicable in the North-
ern Hemisphere. The objective of Russia's actions would be to gain 
international acknowledgment and legalization for Russia's inter-
ests, for example, in areas like national security and agreements on 
the use of sea ports, terminals and pipelines. At least an informal 
international consensus on the legalization would be important for 
Russia. Subsequent violations of these internationally acknowl-
edged interests would then offer some justification for Russian ac-
tions.259 
Based on the analysis above, it could be asked whether the 
interests of the Baltic states and Russia in the field of security pol-
icy are solely confrontational. Are there no perspectives for mitiga-
tion? The answer is in the affirmative in the event that mutual 
economic interests develop favourably and geoeconomic motives 
in the relations become stronger than traditional geopolitical con-
siderations. In the short term, for example, that could result in a 
way of thinking that Russia can provide for its economic interests 
related to the seaports of the East- Baltic littoral without exercising 
control over the area. In the long term, mutually favourable, wide 
economic interaction could be established as a result of the EU's 
approach to Russia's frontiers. It is noteworthy that so far Russia 
has not made statements opposing the enlargement of the Europe-
an Union. Fourty percent of Russia's total foreign trade is conduct-
ed with the European Union. Dmitri Trenin has delineated possi-
ble minimum benefits that Russia could gain from the Baltic states' 
membership in the EU, as follows: (1) opportunities for profitable 
capital investment; (2) the establishment of a priviledged relation- 
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ship with the European Union; (3) the promotion of integration of 
the Russian speaking population; (4) the stimulation of coopera-
tion at the regional leve1.26° These developments require a new 
approach to ensuring security, reducing risks of military threats by 
creating mutual economic bonds, which would also serve regional 
stability. A vision of favourable geoeconomic developments in the 
Baltic Sea region could be a triangle of economic growth, includ-
ing the Baltic countries, Finland and the area of St Petersburg. 
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7 THE RUSSIAN MINORITIES IN 
THE BALTIC COUNTRIES 
Geopolitically, the presence of a diaspora in another country can 
be an important factor of influence. In recent years Russia has made 
attempts to influence the relations between the indigenous and the 
Russian-speaking parts of the population in the Baltic region. The 
legal, political and cultural rights of ethnic Russians in the Baltic 
countries have assumed particular importance in Moscow's polit-
ical language. They have also been a special concern to Western 
governments and European organizations. Citizenship policies in 
Estonia and Latvia especially have drawn criticism. These policies, 
together with a Russian citizenship policy and its geopolitical as-
pects, are important to regional stability. What are these policies? 
What is the significance of the Russian minority to the Baltic coun-
tries? Is the Russian-speaking diaspora geopolitically important 
to Russia? These are the main questions of this section. 
Citizenship Policies and their Consequences 
After the incorporation of the Baltic countries into the Soviet Un-
ion in 1940, the economies and policies of these countries were re-
vised to follow a Soviet model; rapid large-scale industrialization, 
collectivization of agriculture, centralized control, and diminished 
self-sufficiency. Ethnic Russians were moved into the Baltic repub-
lics to reinforce labor for rapid industrialization, to run firms, the 
bureaucracy, and the army, and to occupy leading posts in the Com-
munist Party. The proportion of indigenous nationalities in the to-
tal population dropped significantly, especially in Estonia and 
Latvia.261 The Russian settlement was socially concentrated. Titu-
lar nationalities predominate in rural areas, while they are a mi-
nority in and around the capitals as well as in industrially devel-
oped urban areas. In Latvia, Russian settlements were widespread, 
but in Estonia the migrants are concentrated in Russian-speaking 
enclaves. Apart from the capitals there are high concentrations of 
Russian settlers in northeastern Estonia and in the Daugavpils area 
in south-eastern Latvia.262 In 1995 there were 1.492 million people 
in Estonia. Of them 64.2 percent (958 thousand people) were Esto- 
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nians, while 28.7 percent (428 thousand people) were Russians and 
7.1 percent others. The population of Latvia in 1995 was 2.530 mil-
lion, including 54.8 percent Latvians (1.39 million people), 32.8 
percent Russians (830 thousand people) and 14.4 percent others. 
The figures for Lithuania are 3.718 million population, including 
81.3 percent (3.02 million people) Lithuanian, 8.4 percent (310 thou-
sand people) Russian, 7.0 percent (259 thousand people) Polish, 
and 3.3 percent others. The number of Russian-speakers is some-
what larger. In the 1989 census, 35 percent of the population in 
Estonia, 42 percent in Latvia and 12 percent in Lithuania listed 
Russian as their native language. A common trend in all Baltic states 
is that the proportion of titular nationalities is growing.263 
Although the Baltic states are often erroneously viewed as one 
entity, they are very dissimilar and pursue quite different policies. 
But three countries define citizenship the same way, linking it to 
citizenship in 1940. People who were citizens in 1940, as well as 
their descendants, retained their citizenship after renewed inde-
pendence in the 1990s. Differences are met within the countries' 
approaches to naturalizing non-citizens who were resident when 
the Baltic states renewed their independence in 1991. 
Lithuania adopted its citizenship law in 1989, before independ-
ence. Lithuania's policy on naturalizing non-citizens is the most 
inclusive among the three countries. The law grants automatic cit-
izenship to all permanent residents who were born in the republic 
or who had at least one parent or grandparent born there. Those 
who did not meet the other criteria but were residing in the repub-
lic when the law was adopted could become citizens by submit-
ting a formal request, signing a loyalty declaration, and renounc-
ing other citizenship. Others could become citizens only through 
naturalization. Naturalization was possible by demonstrating a 
knowledge of the Lithuanian language, maintaining permanent 
residence for ten years, possessing a permanent source of income, 
showing a knowledge of the Lithuanian constitution and promis-
ing to obey it, and signing a loyalty statement. In 1996, 95 percent 
of residents were citizens, either through birth or naturalization. 
They can fully participate in the country's political life.264 
Estonia and Latvia did not adopt their citizenship laws before 
independence. Unlike Lithuania's, the naturalization processes in 
both countries have been exclusionary. Estonia adopted its law in 
1992, but naturalization was not possible before 30 March 1993. 
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Until that time, those who could not show roots in Estonia back to 
16 June 1940 or earlier were aliens. The provisions for automatic 
citizenship were tougher than in Lithuania, which meant that about 
three quarters of non-Estonians were unable to receive automatic 
citizenship, and of the 150 0000 non-Estonians eligible for it, only 
12 000 gained citizenship by June 1993. Most non-Estonians were 
able to apply for naturalization in 1993, and by 1995 more than 50 
000 non-citizens had been naturalized. The key question is the lan-
guage requirement. Those wishing to become citizens must show 
conversational ability in the Estonian language, requiring a com-
mand of around 1500 words. Fulfilling high-school language re-
quirements also fulfills the citizenship language requirement, which 
makes citizenship more easily attainable to young people, but most 
Russian adults are unwilling to make the effort. In Estonia the po-
litical rights of non-citizens are restricted. Permanent residents are 
allowed to vote in local elections, but non-citizens cannot vote in 
national elections, hold national or political office, or join political 
parties.265 
Latvia adopted its official citizenship law in 1994. On the ba-
sis of the law, Latvia's approach to naturalization is the most ex-
clusionary among the three countries. Soviet-era immigrants can 
apply for naturalization only after the year 2000, though their de-
scendants can apply for it earlier. According to the 1994 law, per-
manent residents who arrived in Latvia when they were more than 
30 years old are not eligible for citizenship before the year 2003.266 
Applicants must know some Latvian and swear loyalty to Latvia. 
By the fall of 1995, only a few hundred non-citizens had been nat-
uralized. At present, of the nearly one million non-Latvians living 
in the country, 360 000 had become citizens on the basis of their 
ancestors' citizenship before 1940. Naturalization is allowed only 
for those who are registered as residents. Up to 150 000 people 
residing in Latvia were denied official residency status. In Latvia, 
the rights of non-citizens are more limited than in Estonia. Non-
citizens cannot vote even in local elections. Nor are they allowed 
to own land and other natural resources or purchase housing from 
the state.r267 
When assessing the position of Russian minorities from a ge-
opolitical perspective, the interaction of Russian, Estonian and 
Latvian citizenship policies is a key factor. A basic element of 
Russia's policy was the law on the basis of which residents of the 
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Baltic states who had not been guaranteed citizenship there could 
receive Russian citizenship, applying for it before 6 February 1995. 
As a result, by 1995 over 60 000 people in Estonia and an estimat-
ed 20 000 people in Latvia had gained Russian citizenship.268 Thus 
the exclusionary citizenship policies of Estonia and Latvia togeth-
er with the inclusive citizenship policy of the Russian Federation 
made many Russians in the Baltic countries choose Russian citi-
zenship. This has created a base of Russian citizens in Estonia and 
Latvia, and with it the potential for Russian interference in the af-
fairs of these countries, because Russia can interpret measures of 
the Baltic governments toward the Russian minority as an attack 
against Russian citizens.269 In 1996 and 1995, Estonia and Latvia 
respectively established so-called "alien passports" of five years 
duration for non-citizens. 
In 1992 Russia began openly to criticize the Baltic states for 
violations of human rights in their citizenship policies, subsequently 
increasing claims of discrimination. However, investigations car-
ried out by the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and others 
have not verified these charges.22 President Yeltsin, for example, 
in 1994 presented claims of rights violations and demanded auto-
matic citizenship for the Russians. In January 1997, Russian for-
eign minister Primakov stated that Russia refused to sign the bor-
der treaty with Estonia because of the unequal treatment of Rus-
sians in Estonia and referred to the possibility of economic sanc-
tions against the Baltic countries. In 1995 Russian foreign minister 
hinted at the possibility of using force to protect Russians in the 
former Soviet republics.271 But Russia has not actually done much 
to support the Russians in Estonia and Latvia.272 Nor does it seem 
to be interested in receiving and resettling Russian migrants and 
refugees, as shown by the fact that funds allocated for this purpose 
have been reduced. In 1993-1994, the diaspora question was an 
important part of Russia's external policy, but its importance has 
declined and it is no longer a primary issue in Russia's relations 
with the Baltic states.273 At the moment it seems that Russia's citi-
zenship policy is aimed at keeping Russians in the former Soviet 
republics in their current regions of residence.274 
When the citizenship laws were adopted in Estonia and Latvia, 
they were clearly designed to protect the political dominance of 
the titular nationalities during the first years of renewed independ-
ence. This is apparently a relevant motive in the citizenship poli- 
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cies even today. Thus the exclusiveness of the laws was linked to 
the proportion of non-indigenous nationalities in the population 
and to the level of integration of the Baltic republics into the Soviet 
Union, both of which were far higher in Estonia and Latvia than in 
Lithuania. Obviously a fear of losing national existence was one 
reason for the exclusionary policy. It would be wrong to say that 
the citizenship policies of Estonia and Latvia based on the citizen-
ship laws of 1992 and 1994 have been essentially incongruent with 
European norms. To certain extent, the Baltic citizenship policies 
can be compared with the "guest worker" policies of some West-
ern countries, and the policies of naturalization are not more ex-
clusionary than those of Germany or Switzerland.275 But in the Bal-
tic area conditions are special, because the requirements were uni-
laterally imposed on the sizable population that was permanently 
living in the countries. Since not all permanent residents have the 
right to participate in national elections, the titular nationalities 
are electorally over-represented. As survey results indicate, such 
differences have created perceptions of discrimination among the 
Russians. In an opinion po11276 conducted in 1993, more than 80 
percent of the Russians in Estonia and Latvia felt that the require-
ments of citizenship were unjust. The corresponding share in 
Lithuania was 20 percent. However, it should be noted that it was 
a question of feeling during a time of striking historical contrasts. 
But the situation is a nuisance to the Balts themselves, because it 
decreases the minorities' loyalty to the states, leaving some to call 
on the Russian Federation to protect their rights. Besides the Rus-
sians, the European organizations have criticized Estonia's and 
Latvia's citizenship policies. The CSCE /OSCE, in particular, 
brought major changes in their policies, and the activities of the 
OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities and the OSCE's 
missions in Estonia and Latvia are an important factor stabilizing 
the situation. The role of the Council of Europe is also significant, 
for some improvements in the Baltic legislation process were pre-
conditions placed by the Council on Estonia and Latvia for their 
membership. 
Recently, some progress in Estonia's and Latvia's citizenship 
policies has taken place. In June 1998, the Latvian parliament ap-
proved a liberalizing law that allows any number of non-citizens 
to apply for citizenship instead of setting an annual quota. The law 
also qualified for citizenship children born to non-citizens after 1991. 
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A referendum that was organized in Latvia in October 1998 en-
dorsed the changes. In the future the applicants for citizenship must 
still demonstrate their commitment to Latvia, but the change of 
law is an important symbol of Latvia's desire to join the West as a 
liberal democracy.277 
In November 1998, a similiar change of law is being consid-
ered by Estonian parliament. The bill qualifies for citizenship chil-
dren born after February 1992, without an obligation to show the 
knowledge of the language, when the parents apply for citizen-
ship to the children. Now there are approximately six thousand 
five hundred such children. According to the Estonian media, it is 
highly probable that Estonian cabinet will give the necessary sup-
port to the government for the amendment of the law.278 
The Position of the Russian Minority 
The Russian population has an important role in Estonia's and 
Latvia's economies. In Estonia the Russians dominate the indus-
trial labor force, in which their share was 57 percent in 1987. In the 
Soviet era, Russians had the largest share in the all-union enter-
prises: approximately 80 percent of labor were Russians.279 Rus-
sians also dominate some other key sectors such as transport. In 
Latvia, the Russian labor force is concentrated in key sectors like 
energy, transport and heavy industry. In 1987 their share of the 
industrial labor force was 62 percent. In transport the share of Latvi-
ans was 20-25 percent. In Lithuania, the segmentation of labor force 
is not as clear as in Estonia and Latvia. Here, too, Russians domi-
nated all-union enterprises, but in industry, for example, the share 
of Lithuanians was 71 percent in 1987.2" 
The main concerns of the Russian population seem to be so-
cial rights like access to housing, work and social benefits. These 
are often thought to be even more important than political rights.281  
Economically the Russian population's position is relatively good, 
although there are some differences between and within the coun-
tries. In 1995 GDP per capita in Latvia was 70 percent and in Lithua-
nia 55 percent of Estonia's level. Thus Estonians appear to be rough-
ly twice as well off as Lithuanians and one-third better of than Latvi-
ans. In all three states, only a few are destitute. The highest rate of 
freedom from destitution is 96 percent among Estonians, while the 
lowest is 83 percent among Russians in Latvia and Lithuania. Ac- 
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cording to the second New Baltic Barometer survey conducted in 
April 1995, the economic conditions of Russian and Baltic nation-
als are on the average 84 percent similar in Estonia, 92 percent sim-
ilar in Latvia, and 93 percent similar in Lithuania. A comparison of 
the position of Russians in the three countries reveals that citizen-
ship does not result in a significant difference in economic condi-
tions between Russians in the Baltic countries.282 The Russian pop-
ulation in Estonia and Latvia is generally unwilling to resettle in 
the Russian Federation, because the standard of living in the Baltic 
is higher than in Russia.283 
When assessing the geopolitical significance of the Russian-
speaking minority to Russia, at least three factors should be taken 
into account. First, Russians in Estonia and Latvia are not homog-
enous. Nor are their interests identical. Common factors are lan-
guage, Russian identification and the fact of living outside the 
Russian Federation.2" A survey of Russians in Estonia revealed that 
the ethnic factor does not play as important a role among them as 
the international controversy would suggest. Russians living in the 
CIS states generally do not identify with Russians living in the 
Russian Federation,285 and in Estonia and Latvia they are facing 
difficulties in defining their indentity. Although relations between 
nationalities within the countries remain tense, they have improved 
since 1991, and now some sense of identity with the new states can 
be discovered.2" On the basis of the 1993 and 1995 elections in Es-
tonia it seems that the population is becoming more concerned 
about economic than ethnic issues, and the ethnic polarization is 
beginning to break down.287 Second, as to their approach to citi-
zenship, Russians in Estonia can be categorized roughly into three 
groups, one-third wanting to stay in Estonia and learn the language, 
one-third willing to leave and one-third preferring to stay but un-
happy about it. To a degree this was reflected in the March 1991 
referendum, in which one third of non-Estonians supported 
Estonia's independence. However, relatively few have left and few 
have become citizens. In 1991-1994, 42 000 Russians left Estonia, 
and an estimated 60 000 left Latvia for Russia.288 The figures might 
have been higher if Russia had been willing to receive a larger-
scale resettlement.289 In Estonia and Latvia, only 20 percent of the 
non- indigenous population had become citizens by July 1995.290 
In 1997, roughly 270 000 Russian- speakers in Estonia were with-
out any citizenship.291 According to the Russian Federation's em- 
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bassy, 116.000 Russian citizens were living in Estonia in September 
1996. According to Saulius Girnius, about 120 000 ethnic Russians 
in Estonia have become citizens of Russia, and 63 percent of resi-
dents in the country are citizens. In Latvia, of 33 000 eligible, 525 
people had become citizens in 1996.292 It is said that in 1998 three 
fifths of ethnic Russians in Latvia do not have Latvian citizenship.293 
The third significant factor is that political mass actions do not seem 
likely. When asked in an opinion poll, the majority of Russians in 
the three Baltic states answered that they would not demonstrate 
in the streets over the citizenship issue. It is noteworthy that na-
tional strikes, large-scale demonstrations, petition marches, inva-
sions of official assemblies, planned insurrections and ethnic riots 
have not taken place.294 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Geopolitics in the International Relations of the Russian Empire and 
the Soviet Union 
It would be oversimplifying to say that expansionism was the main 
geopolitical code of Russia/Soviet Union. I would rather conclude 
that Russia/Soviet Union has expanded when the geopolitical sit-
uation on the frontiers has allowed. Expansion has not been inev-
itable, for throughout history Russia has halted expansion in situ-
ations where there has been uncertainty about the commitments it 
would entail. The Soviet expansion in Africa and Southeast Asia 
might be seen as an imperialist action, but I would argue that it 
was rather an aspect of Soviet rivalry with the United States and a 
question of exploiting an apparent opportunity. It was halted when 
no favorable opportunities were available and when the Soviet 
Union became reluctant to take on more economic burdens in the 
Third World. 
The internal dynamics of the Russian core area along with eco-
nomic gain and territorial security, were the main generators of 
expansion. Politically Russia/Soviet Union sought security by bal-
ancing power between its major rivals and trying to make neigh-
boring countries' behavior serve the purposes of Russian security. 
For this the establishment of Russian/Soviet physical presence 
throughout the total field of its geopolitical control was not neces-
sary. It is highly unlikely, for example, that the Soviet Union would 
ever have wanted to fight for Western Europe.295 It would have 
been enough for Soviet purposes if American power and influence 
had been undermined and Western European countries had acted 
in accordance with the Soviet security interests. The Russians have 
never in modern times attacked a major power.296 Militarily, Rus-
sia has always expanded into weak areas. 
Geopolitically, Russia/Soviet Union has always been a conti-
nental power. It used typically continental means in exercising con-
trol over its geopolitical space. The maritime element was impor-
tant for foreign trade, but even access to warm seas was gained 
with continental methods of expansion. The only time a maritime 
control over space was attempted was the Russian-Japanese war 
(in 1904-1905), which ended unsuccessfully. Seas were not routes 
103 
of expansion for Russia/Soviet Union, but they were strategically 
important because they would allow hostile penetration of the core 
areas. For political and military reasons Russia tried to close the 
coastal seas (the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Sea of Ohotsk) by 
seizing control over straits leading into these seas. But this never 
succeeded. 
The geopolitical behavior of the Soviet Union was a mixture 
of Russian expansion and Communist ideology. The role of ideol-
ogy was considerable in the first years of the revolution but de-
clined from the early 1930s on, while the role of classical geopoli-
tics in Soviet foreign relations was constantly growing. Control over 
space was a basic component in achieving geopolitical goals. Al-
though developments in weapons technology have reduced the 
value of space and buffer zones as factors of military security, the 
Soviet Union has applied other forms of geopolitical control, in-
cluding economic, political, ideological and demographic control, 
etc. The size of the total field of geopolitical control has varied, 
depending on the capabilities of the Soviet Union to initiate in in-
ternational relations. After World War II, the Soviet Union regained 
what the Russian Empire had lost in World War I and expanded 
into areas which the empire had sought. By the 1980s, a complex of 
four geopolitical circles had been created around the Russian core 
area, extending from the closest autonomies to the developing coun-
tries in other continents. 
Finally, what were the geopolitical reasons for the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union? One explanation can be found by applying 
the geopolitical model that John P. LeDonne developed to explain 
the foreign policy of the Russian Empire. After World War II, the 
Soviet Union extended its total geopolitical field of control beyond 
the line of an optimum conquest, moving too close to other geopo-
litical core areas. This generated tension and the situation ended 
up with a politico-military confrontation between the Russian and 
other core areas. The price of maintaining the line of conquest un-
der circumstances of confrontation turned out to be so high that in 
the long run the Soviet Union could not afford it economically, 
politically and militarily and was forced to withdraw. This led to 
the disintegration of the whole geopolitical sphere, because it had 
been built up on the traditional Russian principle of centralization 
of power, and there were simultaneously disturbances in the pow-
er center, the Russian core area. To a degree this resembles the course 
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of events in Russia and Eastern Europe during World War I (i.e. 
overexpansion). 
The Geopolitics of Russia after the Disintegration of the Soviet Union 
Currently, Russian scholars are calling for a reform of classical 
geopolitical theories. The purpose of the reform would be to sup-
plement geographical factors with the other geopolitical consider-
ations in today's world and to re-evaluate their relative importance. 
Reforms point to changes in the physical environment and new 
emphases in the behavior of states as well as the increased signifi-
cance in world politics of such factors as the global economy and 
the information revolution. The military aspects of geopolitics have 
changed. The traditional postulate of spatial invulnerability has 
been undermined by advances in the technologies of destruction 
and detection, command and control, maneuverability, troops 
transport, long-range weapon systems, etc. Scientific and techni-
cal progress have reduced the geopolitical significance of landscape 
factors like geographical distance, forests, mountains, rivers, seas 
and oceans. Railroads have lost a part of their importance due to 
improved air and road transportation capabilities. New missile, 
communications and surveillance technologies have improved the 
range and penetration of control. All the globe is now observable 
from space. 
Geopolitical expansion is taking new forms. Traditionally ex-
pansion meant territorial gain. Geopolitical expansion in the fu-
ture will have other dimensions as well: information-related, cul-
tural and civilizational, religious, ethno-religious, political (through 
pressure, sanctions, isolation) and economic. Russian geopoliticians 
also deem obsolete the traditional concept of confrontation between 
the Heartland and the rest of the world. It reflects bipolarity and a 
static setting, while the current and future geopolitical world pic-
ture is polycentric, multi-structured and changing. These ideas are 
similar to those presented recently by some Western scholars, lead-
ing to what could be called the new geopolitics." Some Russian 
scholars go so far as to suggest that geopolitics should be adopted 
as a foreign policy orientation in Russia, though that may be over-
estimating the role of geopolitics in the spectrum of national inter-
ests. 
Russia's contemporary geopolitical situation is unstable. The 
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country is still recovering from the consequences of the disintegra-
tion of the Soviet Union. There are open border questions around 
the periphery of the country and within it. Communication chan-
nels have profoundly changed. Contemporary seaport capacity is 
insufficient and is concentrated in a few geographical corridors. In 
land communications Russia is even more isolated than by sea. In 
telecommunications, computerization, and information systems 
Russia has lagged 15-20 years behind the West. Russia's geopoliti-
cal power is diminishing in a number of areas. The economy is 
declining, industrial and agriculture production are falling, infra-
structure deteriorates and the population is becoming destitute. 
The state of the armed forces has gravely deteriorated. A popula-
tion deficit threatens Russia. 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a relative-
ly weak actor. Geopolitically Belarus and Kazakhstan are Russia's 
most substantial CIS partners. As the main supplier of oil and gas, 
Russia has maintained some geopolitical control over the former 
Soviet republics. But Russia is under strong external and internal 
geopolitical pressures. To the west of Russia the Central European 
geopolitical core area is penetrating closer to the Russian core ares. 
To the east, the influence of three power centers, China, Japan and 
the United States, is growing. The most acute security threats are 
in the south, where geopolitical cross-pressures are focused on the 
Caucasian and Central Asian zones from the Russian and the Turk-
ish-Iranian core areas. In the world arena Russia is mainly com-
pelled to react rather than initiate, and its freedom of action is dra-
matically diminishing. Internal strengthening should be the prior-
ity in Russia's policy. That requires stabilizing external relations, 
which would give the country a chance to breathe and put its do-
mestic base into order. 
Russia's geopolitical strategy alternatives are scarce. Russia 
does not have the capacity for an expansive strategy, because it 
lacks economic and military power, as even the most nationalist 
policy orientations in Russia are forced to acknowledge. A yield-
ing strategy is considered inappropriate, too. A position strategy 
(status quo strategy) seems to be the only option left. As Russia's 
recent policy indicates, the position strategy would be active in 
relation to the "near abroad" and balance-of-power in foreign rela-
tions, emphasizing the significance of a multipolar world order. 
Gaining time in foreign policy and preventing Russia from being 
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isolated would allow the restoration of Russia's internal stability 
and power. Since attempts to integrate the CIS have met steady 
resistance, Russia will have to build its relations with the CIS states 
on bilateral basis. 
Geopolitical Trends in the Baltic Region 
Since the thirteenth century the Baltic Sea has been an area of con-
flict between East and West. These conflicts have stemmed from 
opposing economic and military interests. In the Baltic basin, the 
major geopolitical transitions have been closely linked to the rise 
or fall of great powers. Until the twentieth century, the geopolitical 
interests of the littoral and external powers in the Baltic were mainly 
economic. In the twentieth century until the end of the Cold War, 
military considerations dominated the Baltic geopolitical setting, 
while in the 1990s economic activities are gaining more importance. 
The history of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania shows that even be-
fore the Modern Age the significance of the area was first of all 
commercial, stemming from its location on an important water-
way that connected European centers through a river network with 
Byzantium. Commercial reasons initially made the Baltic region 
important to Russia: economic considerations dominated Peter Is 
foreign policy, and military-strategic policy followed commercial 
strategy. It should also be noted that for two centuries after the era 
of Peter I, the Baltic Sea was Russia's only stable outlet to ice-free 
seas. 
In the post-Cold War era, the political situation has evolved 
through fragmentation to cooperation and integration. The signif-
icance of the Baltic Sea from the perspective of sea transport is ex-
pected to grow during the coming 10-15 years. The role of Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania as an economic gateway between Russia and 
the West may grow under favorable political conditions. In the field 
of security, NATO enlargement is the major challenge to stability 
in the region. 
Future developments in the Baltic Sea region were discussed 
in this paper using six scenarios. In the scenarios, the imbalance of 
power and Russia's attempts to restore equilibrium are dominat-
ing geopolitical phenomena affecting the Baltic countries at least 
in the near future. Russia and the Baltic states have conflicting se-
curity interests, and the rivalry for influence in the region will pre- 
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sumably continue. Another possible course of development is a 
growing significance of economic interaction and geoeconomic 
aspects in security policy. That could mitigate conflicting interests. 
Russia's Military Interests in the East-Baltic Littoral 
Threat perceptions, the evolution of military technology and the 
extension of the Russian/Soviet sphere of influence have affected 
Russia's military interests in the area of the Baltic states over the 
centuries. In terms of land strategy, the area has been important 
for Russia throughout history, whereas the significance of the air-
and sea-strategic aspects has varied. From Russia's perspective the 
air space of the region is growing in importance at the expense of 
the area's sea-strategic significance. This is explained by the rapid 
evolution of air and missile technologies in the post-World War II 
era. Time and distance factors have become more important, which 
is critically reflected in the use of air power. This shift of emphasis 
may also be linked to the softening of the historical land power-
sea power contrast as a result of the evolution of military air pow-
er and inter-continental ballistic missiles. Moreover, naval opera-
tions are undermined by the fact that the air space above the Baltic 
Sea can be dominated by land-based aviation. 
Poland, the Straits of Denmark, the passage of the Gulf of Fin-
land, and the St Petersburg area are the key geostrategic areas in 
the region and have been throughout history. The Kaliningrad re-
gion is militarily very important for Russia, as is the extension of 
Russia's defenses to the territory of Belarus. A major Russian prob-
lem is that possibilities for developing and utilizing the Kalinin-
grad area are limited. In Russian threat perception, the Baltic Sea 
and its eastern littoral are undoubtedly viewed over the long run 
as a potential enemy bridgehead, permeable to hostile penetration 
into the Russian core areas. To repel such penetration in war, Rus-
sia would wish to utilize Estonia's, Latvia's and Lithuania's land 
and sea space and especially their air space. This would hold true 
whatever the relations between the Baltic states and NATO. The 
main hypothetical military threat that NATO enlargement would 
create is an increased surprise aircraft-missile strike potential. In 
an extreme case, Russia's fear of this might lead to military con-
frontation in the East Baltic littoral. Geopolitical and strategic pres-
sure from Russia on southern Lithuania and northeastern Poland 
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would increase, because one of Russia's obvious aims in war would 
be to cut off the Baltic states' land communications with the West 
in this area and to open Russia's access from Belarus to Kalinin-
grad. Sea-strategically, Estonia's NATO membership would mark 
an extension of the Helsinki-Tallinn-Aland Islands operation area 
into the Gulf of Finland. In air and missile defense, Russia would 
have to build a system that meets far higher requirements than a 
system bordering non-NATO Baltic states. That would mean high-
er costs for the defence of northwestern Russia. Even so, Russia is 
not creating its defense from scratch, and its concerns should not 
be exaggerated. It is important to note that after the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, 70 percent of its air defense systems remained on 
Russian soil. NATO enlargement (Poland, Hungary, Czech Repub-
lic) will cause other changes in the Baltic Sea, too. The influence of 
Germany will clearly grow in the region. Whether that will lead to 
a repetition of the historical rivalry between Germany and Russia 
on the Baltic Sea remains to be seen. 
Has the East-Baltic littoral become militarily more important 
for Russia in the post-Cold War era? From Russia's perspective 
the area is a part of the zone of countries on its western borders 
extending from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. With the contrac-
tion of Russia's immediate area of influence, this zone has become 
more significant. Three further observations can be made. First, 
Russia's provisions for gaining a long strategic warning time in 
the region have significantly deteriorated. Second, the Baltic Sea is 
falling under NATO's continuous control. Third, the indirect im-
portance of the Baltic Sea region as an outer defence zone of the 
Kola peninsula, Russia's most important military strategic area in 
Europe, has grown substantially. However, it should be noted that 
the main threats to Russia's national security in the foreseeable 
future are of non-military nature. According to Defence Minister 
Igor Sergeev, at least by the year 2005 the probability of a large 
scale aggression against Russia is low. 
Russia's Economic Interests in the Area of the Baltic States 
The availability of transportation routes and access to the sea are, 
from a geopolitical standpoint, Russia's first and foremost eco-
nomic interests in the Baltic region. The scarce natural resources of 
the area are of little geopolitical interest. The Baltic states possess 
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agricultural potential, but not enough to be of more than limited 
regional importance to Russia. Trade relations with the Baltic states 
are significant, because they can be used as an instrument in pur-
suing Russia's geopolitical interests. 
Economically, Russia's main geopolitical objectives in the Baltic 
region are to increase its seaport capacity and to gain the freest 
possible access to the Kaliningrad area. These objectives are inter-
twined. Kaliningrad has good technical potential as regards the 
extension of Russia's port capacity on the Baltic Sea, but its full 
exploitation is restricted by risks in access to the area. Two consid-
erations have made the Kaliningrad area vitally important to Rus-
sia. As Russia's foreign trade grows, the importance of the Kalin-
ingrad region will grow accordingly. Also Kaliningrad has the po-
tential to become a gateway even to non-Russian regions and may 
compete with the Baltic countries in this respect. 
In cargo transportation, along with its own ports, Russia will 
likely resort to the ports of the neighbouring countries, including 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Baltic countries, in turn, need 
transit cargo traffic as a source of income, while Russia, for its part, 
needs long-term agreements with them on transit transportation 
and commercially stable transportation conditions. That binds the 
interests of Russia and the Baltic states together. Nevertheless, 
Russia will unambiguously avoid dependence on the Baltic states, 
regarding them as an unstable area because of uncertainty about 
their future policies. Over the long term this approach could pro-
foundly change if geoeconomic motives strengthen in the Russo-
Baltic policy at the expense of traditional geopolitical considera-
tions. The rest of Europe is a third player, the transportation needs 
of which will likely increase transit shipping movements in the 
Baltic ports. The Baltic countries' EU membership could increase 
economic transactions between Russia and the EU via the Baltic 
Sea. Thus Russia's and the Baltic countries' interests in relation to 
the Baltic seaports are intertwined and mutual. 
A study of Russian-Baltic trade relations reveals imbalance. 
Russia is a far more important trade partner to the Baltic states 
than they are to Russia. A main factor of imbalance is the depend-
ence of the Baltic countries on energy and raw materials from Rus-
sia. The Baltic countries' major advantage in production is their 
low-income, highly-skilled labor force. However, the labor- and 
resource-intensive exports and a relatively narrow chain of process- 
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ing in production, as well as focusing on traditional commodities, 
make the Baltic states' economies vulnerable to external distur-
bances. Their fragile financial systems are also vulnerable to de-
velopments in the world economy and especially from Russia.297 
Russia's high share of the Baltic countries' foreign trade together 
with the concentration of that trade within a few commodities is a 
risk factor as well. A sharp, substantial decrease in trade would 
likely result in a deep economic recession in these countries - a 
lever that Russia might use to influence in them in extreme situa-
tions. Russia can easily make the Baltic countries' trade situation 
difficult, for example, by changing tariff policy, as it has done by 
putting double tariffs on Estonia. The Baltic states can replace their 
major imports from Russia, particularly minerals and raw materi-
als, with imports from third countries, but it is difficult to assess 
the financial costs of the necessary technical arrangements. 
Russia's Geopolitical Interests related to Foreign Policy and Politico-
military Affairs 
Russia's political interests in relation to the Baltic states stem from 
the significance of the region in economic and security policy, par-
ticularly in conjunction with NATO enlargement. Russian think-
ing remains very traditional. It tends to view the Baltic countries 
as part of the Russian sphere of influence. Russia links their non-
participation in military alliances with improvements in relations 
with Russia. Russia's short-term political interest is to prevent 
Estonia's, Latvia's and Lithuania's NATO membership. Presuma-
bly its long-term interest is to establish balanced relations and co-
operation with the Baltic states, meaning that the latter are expect-
ed to pursue policies that would serve Russia's security parallel to 
their own security. 
If Russia cannot prevent Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from 
joining NATO, and if Russia's interests are not taken into account 
in the way it wishes, its objective will be to restrict the Alliance's 
potential in the Baltic region and make the enlargement disadvan-
tageous to the West. A situation that guarantees a maximal strate-
gic warning time to Russia is undoubtedly a primary politico-mil-
itary goal. Geopolitically, the Western and the Russian core areas 
are now seeking balance. The closer NATO gets to Russia's bor-
ders, the more will be at stake in Russian threat perceptions. The 
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arrangements that Russia would demand from NATO in the case 
of the Baltic states' membership would be farther-reaching and than 
those made in the case of Poland's, Hungary's and the Czech 
Republic's membership. And the farther-reaching are these ar-
rangements, the higher is the risk that they will undermine the 
Alliance's freedom of action in the Baltic states or even endanger 
NATO's political cohesion. Such developments would coincide 
with Russia's geopolitical interests in the Baltic region. This all can 
be perceived as the result of friction between the two geopolitical 
core areas when they approach each other closely. The conclusion 
of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Securi-
ty between NATO and Russia provides mechanisms to prevent 
the automatic growth of military tension. But reasons for tension 
remain, and the rivalry for influence in East Central Europe is like-
ly to continue. 
Russia does not possess effective instruments for pursuing its 
interests. Russia can make political "packages" in areas where its 
position is strong and leaving mutual problems unsettled, Russia 
could perhaps attempt to delay the Baltic states' integration into 
the West and create uncertainty. The applicability of politico-eco-
nomic means is restricted by Russia's dependence on access to the 
Baltic sea ports. Exercising politico-economic pressure by cutting 
energy deliveries is a questionable tactic because of uncertainty 
about its effects on Russia itself. Penetration into the Baltic econo-
mies could be effective over the long run but is restricted by a lack 
of Russian capital for foreign investment in the immediate future. 
Certainly Russia will try to use its special relations with NATO 
and the adaptation of the CFE Treaty as channels of indirect influ-
ence on the Baltic situation. The conflict of security political inter-
ests between the Baltic states and Russia could be mitigated by 
growing economic interactions. A favourable development requires 
a shift from traditional geopolitical approach toward a geoeconomic 
agenda. 
The Russian Minorities in the Baltic Countries 
The situation of ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia has been 
driven into stalemate. Russians account for roughly one-third of 
Estonia's and Latvia's populations, and these countries cannot 
survive economically without their Russian populations. Howev- 
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er, it is questionable to what extent the Estonians and Latvians want 
the Russians eventually to be naturalized. The Russian minority, 
in turn, does not have many options. Some of them want to be 
naturalized, though the requirements are generally considered too 
high. Others want to leave (or at least say so) but have no place to 
go. Russia does not encourage resettlement and in any case has a 
lower standard of living. Still other Baltic Russians seem to be pas-
sive, which implies that they will eventually accommodate them-
selves. To the Russian Federation the situation of the ethnic Rus-
sians is a concern, but the country cannot do much to improve it. 
Since the Russian geopolitical core area is weak at present, it is 
questionable whether the Russian Federation is willing to help 
Russophone abroad. Nor are its interests in relation to Russians 
abroad clearly defined. 
It seems that Estonia's and Latvia's desire to become integrat-
ed with the West is a strong motive to further the development of 
citizenship policies in the two countries. Dramatic changes are 
unlikely because ethnic tensions have been amazingly low, and it 
is a common interest of all parties to avoid confrontation. The will 
to protect the political dominance of the titular nationalities will 
presumably affect the future developments in citizenship policies. 
It remains to be seen whether the development of the Baltic econo-
mies gives rise to confrontation by setting back industrial branch-
es occupied by Russians and favoring areas in which Balts pre-
dominate. So far it seems that living in the Baltic states as non-
citizens is not too complicated, which may lower non-citizens' 
willingness to seek naturalization. On the other hand it is unlikely 
that the Baltic countries will adopt bilingualism in the foreseeable 
future. 
Ethnic Russians in the Baltic states are not an instrument of 
Russian direct geopolitical control over the Baltic states for at least 
three reasons. First, Russia does not have control over the diaspora. 
Second, the Russian population in Estonia and Latvia is heteroge-
nous and passive in terms of political mass actions. Third, the po-
litical influence of ethnic Russians in the Baltic countries is low 
because of the restrictions put on non-citizens. The significance of 
the diaspora as Russia's geopolitical instrument is low and will de-
crease further as the gap in standards of living between Russia and 
the Baltic countries grows,298 which will strengthen the diaspora's 
ties to the new states and diminish their attraction to Russia. Fur- 
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thermore, even now there is no significant difference between the 
economic conditions of Russians and the titular nationals in the 
Baltic countries. In any case, the diaspora's ties to Russia will grow 
weaker as its age structure changes in the next 10-20 years, with 
the proportion of Baltic-born Russians in the diaspora growing sig-
nificantly. 
Even if Russia cannot influence the Baltic states through the 
Russian population there, the situation of the diaspora can serve 
as a justification for Russia's policies toward the Baltic countries 
on matters other than ethnic inclusion. A different issue is, how 
effective could Russian interference in the Baltic states be and how 
far Russia alone could go without jeopardizing its relationship with 
the democratic countries, an association of which is very impor-
tant to Russia. The credibility of Russia's arguments for interven-
tion will be lower the better off is the diaspora in the Baltic area 
and the higher the number of naturalized citizens in the future. 
Nevertheless, the position of ethnic Russians in the Baltic coun-
tries is one of the strongest instruments in Russia's hands at the 
moment and a means of indirect geopolitical control. The experi-
ence of other European ethnic regions shows that if a minority is 
not integrated, its problems will recur or will be exploited from 
outside. In this sense, Russia can exercise partial geopolitical con-
trol over the Baltic states through their Russian minorities. 
Conclusion 
Russia's interests in the Baltic states' area are primarily economic, 
political and politico- military. The military-strategic significance 
of the area is low at present, though it will grow if the Baltic coun-
tries join NATO. Even then, depending on Russia's economic situ-
ation, its immediate military reactions may not be strong. Russia's 
basic geopolitical interests are summarized in Table 4. The correla-
tion of Russia's interests with the Baltic states' interests is assessed 
in the third column of the table. It is worth noting that in most 
areas Russia's and the Baltic states' interests are parallel. They are 
antagonistic in political, politico-military and military strategic is-
sues. 
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Russia's interests 
in the Baltic 
states 
Importance 
for Russia at 
present 
(trend) 
Correlation 
with the Baltic 
states' 
interests"' 
Notes 
Territory as a source 
of energy and mineral 
raw materials 
LOW 
(stable) 
+ 
Scarce natural resources. Baltic 
production structure favors areas less 
dependent on heavy raw materials. 
Import of raw materials increases 
possibilities of Russia's influence. 
Territory as a transit 
area of transport 
HIGH 
(stable-declining) 
+ 
Russia's access to Kaliningrad is a 
stable high interest.Use of Estonia's 
and Latvia's ports may decline with 
the improvement of Russia's own port 
capacity (5-15 years?) 
Territory as a channel 
providing access to 
sea 
HIGH 
(stable-declining) 
+ 
Significance stems from use of 
seaports. 
See the column above. In crisis 
situations free access to the Baltic Sea 
through Helsinki-Tallinn passage is a 
high priority. 
Territory as a military 
strategic bridgehead 
or a buffer zone 
LOW-HIGH 
(increasing?) 
— 
At present the military strategic 
interest is low, because no military 
threat is foreseen. The Baltic states' 
NATO membership would change the 
situation. However, even then Russia's 
strong military reactions may not 
necessarily be immediate. 
The conflict of security interests could 
be softened, if geoeconomic motives 
grow at the expense of traditional 
geopolitical motives in Russia's 
policy. 
Territory as a 
potential area of 
agriculture 
LOW-MEDIUM 
(stable) 
+ 
Low interest in the scale of whole 
Russia because of the Baltic 
agriculture's limited capacity. Medium 
significance in regional trade? 
Territory as a location 
of significant industry 
LOW 
(stable) 
+ Both existing and potential industries 
are of low interest to Russia. 
Territory as a source 
of potential labour 
force 
LOW 
(stable) 
+ 
Skilled labor force, but small in 
number on the Russian scale. Russia 
has no provisions for hiring labor 
force. Neither ethnic Russians nor the 
Baits are interested in moving. 
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Russia's interests 
in the Baltic 
states 
Importance 
for Russia at 
present 
(trend) 
Correlation 
with the Baltic 
states' 
interests"9 
Notes 
Foreign policy and 
politico-military 
interests focused on 
the region 
HIGH 
(stable- 
increasing) 
The current interests derive from 
NATO enlargement. Russia's main 
interests are: 
- to gain as long a strategic warning 
time as possible; 
- reduce NATO's surprise potential 
and level of preparations for common 
defense. 
Territory as a place to 
store or process 
industrial waste 
LOW 
This is an estimate. No information is 
available as to why the Baltic 
countries would be a better place for 
waste than any other place. 
Territory as an 
ecologically clean area 
for settling (migration 
of Russian population) 
MEDIUM 
(increasing) 
— 
In the future, the Baltic countries may 
become a more and more attractive 
place for Russians to move in because 
of the higher standard of living. 
However, the Baits are not interested 
in Russian migration, and the 
Russians find the Baltic countries 
nationality policies exclusionary. 
Table 4. Russia's geopolitical interests in the area of the Baltic states3" 
Russia does not possess effective instruments for pursuing its geo-
political interests directly in the East-Baltic littoral. The situation 
of the diaspora in the Baltic countries is one of the strongest instru-
ments, but its value will decline. Politico-economic pressure is ap-
plicable, but its use is restricted by Russia's dependence on the 
Baltic countries' port facilities and transit routes. Cutting energy 
deliveries would be risky for Russia itself. Security-policy initia-
tives made by Russia are a political instrument. However, the ap-
plicability of this instrument is restricted by the Baltic states' strong 
commitment to a policy aiming at their NATO membership as the 
only guarantee of security. From Russia's perspective, an effective 
political means is to make "packages" of open problems in areas 
where Russia's position is strong. Economic penetration is an in-
strument of the future, but at present it is less effective because of 
Russia's scarce capital for foreign investments. Russia's hypothet-
ical means of realization of its geopolitical interests in the area of 
the Baltic states are summarized in Table 5. 
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Means of realization Effect / Usability 
at present (trend) 
Notes 
Economic penetration and 
influence on the financial 
systems of the Baltic states 
HIGH / MEDIUM 
(increasing value) 
So far limited because of Russia's scarce capital for 
foreign investments. More usable and effective in 
the future if investments can be directed to the Baltic 
states. 
Economic cooperation as a 
means to pressure 
Economic cooperation as a 
means to improve 
relations 
MEDIUM/ LOW 
HIGH/HIGH 
In the Baltic states' economies and foreign trade, the 
tradition of cooperation with Russia, inherited from 
the Soviet era, is important. However, its use as a 
means by Russia to pressure the Baltic states is 
restricted by risks of negative consequences to 
Russia. 
The enhancement of economic cooperation could 
create favourable conditions for positive 
developments in overall Russo-Baltic relations. 
Politico-economic 
utilization of dependence 
on energy resources 
HIGH / LOW 
(decreasing value) 
The Baltic countries can compensate disturbances in 
oil supply with import from third countries. 
Dependence on gas is an instrument, but its use is 
limited by risks to Russia itself. A connection of the 
Baltic area with western gas networks will reduce 
the value of the energy instrument. 
The use of technological 
dependence 
MEDIUM / LOW 
(decreasing value) 
Trend in the Baltic countries is toward Western 
technology, but plants are inherited from the Soviet 
era. The trend away from heavy industry reduces 
dependence. 
The use of dependence on 
transportation 
HIGH / LOW 
(increasing value) 
Low usability because interests in keeping up transit 
cargo transportation are mutual. Usability will grow 
with the improvement of Russia's own port capacity 
(5-15 years?) 
The politico-economic use 
of trade relations as a 
means to pressure 
The politico-military use 
of trade relations as a 
means to improve 
common Russo-Baltic 
relations 
HIGH / LOW 
(decreasing value) 
HIGH/HIGH 
High effect because of Russia's high proportion in 
the foreign trade of the Baltic countries. Usability is 
restrained by Russia's dependence on access to the 
Baltic ports. The Baltic states' possible EU 
membership will reduce the value of this instrument. 
See the line:Economic cooperation as a means of 
improving relations. 
Russian diaspora in the 
Baltic countries HIGH / LOW 
(declining value) 
The effect could be high due to the large proportion 
of ethnic Russians in Estonia's and Latvia's 
population. The usability is low, because the 
diaspora is not under Russia's control and is not 
politically active. Higher standard of living and the 
growing proportion of Baltic-born Russians will 
reduce the value of this instrument. 
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Means of realization Effect / Usability 
at present (trend) 
Notes 
Political means like Effective in areas where Russia has strong positions. 
making security-policy The applicability of security-policy initiatives may 
initiatives, balancing be restricted by the three Baltic states' strong 
power, preventing the MEDIUM-HIGH/ commitment to a policy line aiming at NATO 
Balls' unified approaches, 
unequal relations, favoring 
one Baltic country at the 
MEDIUM-HIGH membership as the only guarantee of their security. 
Russia's possible pressure may be partially 
expense of the others, etc; neutralized by Western good offices to the Baltic 
political "packages". countries, i.e. in negotiations with Russia. 
Military means like LOW / LOW The use of military force is inapplicable in the 
- weapon deliveries; foreseeable future. A Western orientation is 
- the use of military force. (declining value) prevailing in equipping the Baltic armed forces. 
Table 5. The main hypothetical means to realize Russia's geopolitical 
interests in the Baltic states3°1 
Regardless of Estonia's, Latvia's and Lithuania's relation to NATO, 
Russia will likely seek to influence the Baltic countries in order to 
promote its interests in the region. As long as Russia is dependent 
on access to the Baltic through Estonia's, Latvia's and Lithuania's 
ports, the attempts to influence will be restrained. The situation 
may change with the improvements of Russia's own port capacity. 
Over the long run, the mere availability of instruments for the real-
ization of geopolitical interests is, however, not enough. The main-
tenance of influence requires geopolitical control over the Baltic 
states. At the moment there are no provisions for total geopolitical 
control. Partial control can be imposed through the diaspora and by 
keeping mutual political questions (like the border issue) open. In 
the future, Russia's economic strengthening may create more free-
dom of action and possibilities for building economic control over 
the Baltic countries. Russian investments in these countries could 
be especially effective. But on the other hand, Estonia's, Latvia's 
and Lithuania's possible EU membership, in turn, would provide 
more flexibility to their economies in relation to Russia. It should 
be noted that in the future the Russo-Baltic relations may profound-
ly change, if geoeconomic aspects strengthened in Russia's securi-
ty policy combinated with an emerging new thinking. According 
to this idea Russia could satisfy its economic interest toward the 
seaports in the East-Baltic littoral without controlling the area geo-
politically. An assessment on Russia's hypothetical forms of geo-
political control is presented in Table 6. 
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Forms of Russia's 
geopolitical control 
over the area of the 
Baltic states 
Possibilities to 
accomplish 
(trend) 
Notes 
MEDIUM 
(stable) 
The instruments that are currently available are mainly 
temporary, while the possibilities of creating long-term 
control based on political infrastructure like political 
parties, treaties, etc are scarce. 
Political control 
Military control over 
geographical space 
LOW 
(stable) 
No possibilities in peace time. Partial control can be 
achieved in strained international situations by threatening 
with air-missile strikes or other use of military force. 
Tactical nuclear weapons may assume a strategic role, but 
their further development is not likely because of high 
costs, and Russia's first priority is to create effective 
conventional armed forces. 
Economic control over 
geographical space MEDIUM-HIGH 
(increasing) 
At the moment Russia's indirect control is relatively large. 
However, the effect of control is restricted by risks of 
counter-actions by the Baltic states touching Russia's 
interests (access to ports). Mutual interests are 
geopolitically balanced. Russia can improve indirect 
economic control over the Baltic countries in the future by 
penetrating into their economies. 
Civilizational and 
ideological control 
over 
geographical space 
VERY LOW 
(stable) 
It is impossible to establish dvilizational control over the 
independent Baltic states because of their strong resistance 
deriving from the historical experience and the fact that 
the Baltic states and Russia belong to different 
civilizations. 3p2 Only very strong ideologies can be used 
as means of control over space, and Russia does not 
possess any at the moment. 
Communications and 
information control 
LOW 
(stable) 
There are no physical provisions for these and very low 
susceptibility in the Baltic countries. 
Demographic control 
LOW 
(decreasing) 
Theoretically possible in the areas of concentrations of 
ethnic Russians like in northeastern Estonia and in 
southeastern Latvia. In practice the possibilities are low, 
because the diaspora is not under Russian control. 
Land surface, sea, 
air and 
cosmic space control 
HIGH 
(increasing?) 
The Baltic countries are totally controllable in terms of 
surveillance and intelligence with Russia's military 
technical means. Control will be significantly improved if 
the Baltic countries join NATO. 
Table 6. Russia's hypothetical forms of geopolitical control over the 
area of the Baltic states.3°3 
Russia's geopolitical interests in the area of the Baltic states 
are concentrated on few issues. In most geopolitical areas of in-
terest the Baltic states' territory is of low significance for Russia. 
Russia possesses only few means for the direct realization of its 
geopolitical interests in the Baltic states and almost no possibili- 
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ties for establishing long-term geopolitical control over them. 
The aim of this paper is not to develop recommendations 
for the Baltic countries' and Russia's policies toward each other. 
But in light of this survey it seems that economic issues and com-
munications (ports and transit cargo) could serve as a core of sta-
ble relations between the Baltic countries and Russia. The utiliza-
tion of the historically advantageous geographical position of 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as an economic bridge between Rus-
sia and the West could be a basis for mutually beneficial relations 
between the Baltic countries and Russia, leading perhaps to stable 
security relations. The relationship between the West (the United 
States, Western Europe, EU, NATO) and Russia is important for 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In the long term, mutually benefi-
cial economic relations could create bonds between Russia and the 
Baltic states as a result of the enlargement of the European Union 
together with enhancing economic interactions and a possible 
growth of geoeconomic motives in Russia's policy at the expense 
of traditional geopolitical considerations. The importance of eco-
nomic interactions could perhaps diminish the role of military as-
pects in Russia's policy, eliminating conflicting military security 
interests between the Baltic states and Russia. In the short term, 
the importance of Western economic relations for Russia could be 
used by the West as a medium of good offices in neutralizing prob-
lems between Russia and the Baltic states. Currently, for example, 
the interests of the Baltic countries can be pursued by NATO when 
cooperating with Russia. But a triangle structure can hardly be the 
optimal arrangement of Baltic-Russian relations. Bilateral balanced 
relations between Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Russian Fed-
eration are of the utmost importance for stability in the Nordic-
Baltic region. 
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	 For example, the geopolitical significance of economics is not new. There 
have been earlier transnational actors like trading companies (e.g. East 
India companies) that have acted like political actors, as "agents of 
empire." The simple polarization of the world during the Cold War is 
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